Defending Dualism

Authors

  • Thomas W. Smythe

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14738/assrj.47.2964

Abstract

It is the contention of this paper that the arguments in philosophy given both for and against dualism are less than decisive. In this paper I examine some of the standard arguments or objections to dualism, and try to show they are unconvincing. Although I do not think that any good arguments have been given for being a dualist, I shall not pursue that here. Instead, I will engage in a relatively unpopular enterprise of defending dualism against some common objections. I make no claim to cover all of the objections. 

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Published

2017-04-09

How to Cite

Smythe, T. W. (2017). Defending Dualism. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 4(7). https://doi.org/10.14738/assrj.47.2964