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Archives of Business Research – Vol. 9, No. 11
Publication Date: November 25, 2021
DOI:10.14738/abr.911.11280. Dzekashu, W. G. (2021). French Economic and Monetary Policies in Francophone Africa: A Barrier to Economic Development in the
Central and West African Monetary Zones. Archives of Business Research, 9(11). 51-68.
Services for Science and Education – United Kingdom
French Economic and Monetary Policies in Francophone Africa: A
Barrier to Economic Development in the Central and West
African Monetary Zones
William G. Dzekashu, PhD
College of Business
Argosy University, Arlington, Virginia, USA
ABSTRACT
Since granting independence to her former colonies (especially the countries in the
West and Central Africa subregions), France has maintained tight economic,
political, and to a great extent, social control over their internal and external affairs.
These continued ties with France have become the subject of contentious debates
(previously considered taboo) among scholars in recent times, evidenced in the
development of activism in Africa and continental Europe where the former has
been sensitized or radicalized about France’s exploitative approach to economic
partnership. The economies of these African nations have suffered stagnation and
retrogression in contrast to their non-French-influenced neighbors. This essay
employs a literature review to assess the impact of French hegemony over these
former colonies, therefore providing a cogent argument for the abolition of the
monetary agreement in favor of a local currency, and cessation of political
dependencies that also carry a negative stigma. Intellectuals and politicians have
argued that the continued use of the CFA franc currency (a relic of colonialism with
a different twist) is exploitative; recognized even by French politicians who have
appealed to their government to employ moral and ethical considerations to desist
from the persistent exploitation of Africa. Social movements have developed today
in demanding that African nations still using this currency should withdraw from
the agreements due to the severe negative effects on economic development.
Keywords. Central Africa, CFA franc, China, Colonization, Development, European Union,
Françafrique, France, Francophonie, FDI, GDP, Trade, United States, West Africa.
INTRODUCTION
The relationship that binds France and its economic and monetary partners in Africa is
preserved today through the concept of Françafrique based on the concept of cooperation
between France and its former African colonies, (or League of Nations mandate territories
acquired after the defeat of Germany in the First World War (WWI); specifically Cameroon and
Togoland), and implemented through a series of eight accords de coopération (cooperation
accords or post-independence agreements) in which France established close cultural,
economic, judicial, monetary, and military ties. Although some accords have been revised or
suppressed today, they each still have effects on these governments’ [13] ability to operate
independently; evidenced in the regular consultations with the French government before the
development and implementation of national and foreign policies. Francophone nations in
Africa have agitated against these agreements which largely have contributed to economic
stagnation after over 60 years of attaining what appears to be sham independence.
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Many colonial powers established a common currency with the colonies aimed at facilitating
transactions. On granting independence and with the apparent termination of colonialism,
many new nations were left to decide their monetary policies going forward. This however was
not the case with France and its former colonies. At its origin, the CFA franc was pegged to the
French Franc (and hosted in the French Treasury) though today it is pegged to the Euro and
guaranteed by the French Treasury. As part of her economic and monetary agreements, France
required member nations of the communauté financière Africaine (African Financial
Community; for the West Africa zone) and coopération financière en Afrique Centrale (Central
African Financial Cooperation; for the Central Africa region) both more commonly known by
the same French acronym—CFA, to deposit first 100% (before 1973), then 65% (between 1973
and 2005), and now 50% (since 2005) of their countries’ foreign exchange reserves in a special
French Treasury “operating account.” What is worrying in this discussion is the question of
whether this is a win-win arrangement. Before the institution of the Euro, the CFA franc was
devalued against the French franc as a way of stabilizing the latter’s currency against other
European currencies. This devaluation hurt the cost of living of the nations concerned. What is
wont is that France does not publish an accounting of the reserve balances held in the treasury
account, rather treating it as classified. To put these discussions in further context, the next
section provides a background of how France came to be involved in Francophone Africa.
Historical Background
Ginio and Sessions [8] date French presence in Africa to the 17th Century, though the main
period of her expansion in the continent was during the colonial era in the 19th Century after
the invasion of Ottoman Algiers in 1830. The uptick in territorial gains continued with the
addition of West and Equatorial Africa during the Scramble for Africa [8], which emanated from
bilateral agreements concluded before and following the Berlin Conference (sometimes known
as Congo Conference or West Africa Conference) of 1884. This conference was convened to
regulate European colonization and trade in Africa during the Age of New Imperialism and
together with the bilateral agreements led to the partitioning of Africa. From these agreements
came the erosion of existing forms of African autonomy and self-governance, replaced with
French dominance.
The League of Nations was created to provide a forum for resolving international disputes to
avert future wars [1]. Through this international body, German territories that were conquered
during the war were partitioned amongst other European powers to which France was added
Kamerun and parts of German Togo as mandate territories. Following the end of the Second
World War (WWII), and the creation of the successor body to the League of Nations—the United
Nations Organization (known commonly as the United Nations), these mandate territories were
converted to trust territories under a UN trusteeship agreement administered by the United
Nations Trusteeship Council (UNTC)—an arm of the UN established to accomplish
decolonization objectives, and to prepare these trust territories (former colonies) for
independence [1].
France’s Politics in Africa
Today, France appears to be governing a 21st Century Africa with tools developed by Napoleon
Bonaparte’s—appointed Préfet (Territorial Prefects)—to govern France at the start of the 19th
Century. To make this approach work, France added a few tricks developed largely by the
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Dzekashu, W. G. (2021). French Economic and Monetary Policies in Francophone Africa: A Barrier to Economic Development in the Central and West
African Monetary Zones. Archives of Business Research, 9(11). 51-68.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/abr.911.11280
military administrators—French Indochina and Algeria war veterans—who served as colonial
Governors in French Africa. The outcome has been the creation of class stratification that has
kept the general citizens away from governing, while the economic potential is exploited.
During this time, France provided aid to include French teachers for the furtherance of the
French language and culture, securing markets for French goods, and military advisers to
project French interests in the newly formed governments. The accords also established a
framework to allow for French military intervention in the regions.
The value of history may clarify what appears to be present-day, intractable problems. One such
problem, in the governance in French Africa, is the vexing question of tutelage or direct
supervision exercised over elected sub-national tiers of Government (Regions and Local
Councils) by centrally appointed officials, namely Governors and Préfets (Prefects or Senior
Divisional Officers). These officials are hallmarks of the French prefectorial system, an
institution established by Napoleon Bonaparte through the Loi du 28 Pluviôse an VIII, of 17
February 1800 (adopted exactly 221 years ago, represents a hallmark of French judicial history
[3]. The said Law would grant French prefects these tutelage powers over elected local officials
for 182 years, almost spanning 2 centuries. France found this system of having central
appointees over-shadowing local elected officials to be inefficient, and in the 1960s General de
Gaulle, identified its weakness [3]. That reform however fully came into effect in 1982, with the
Socialist government of Francois Mitterand, who would promulgate the Lois Deffèrre (Defferre
Laws), a set of reforms that would profoundly reform the French Prefectorial System [17]. Most
notably, this change took away the executive function over the French département (a
territorial unit) from the Préfet, handing it to elected Councils/Assemblies, and their President.
The system used to govern in French Africa is rather archaic and one wonders how long it will
take to close the gap between tools of Napoleon’s time and a modern Africa. With France being
incorporated into the European Union, there has been a further need for empowering locally
elected officials [4].
French Economic and Monetary Policies in Francophone Africa
French economic policies in the CFA franc nations are centered around its monetary and
financial agreements dating back to 1945 and in some sense a continuation of the pre- independence approach which has been largely described as exploitative. France created the
CFA franc to propagate the economic integration of its colonies under its administration to
control resources, economic structures, and the political system [20]. The pillars of the
monetary agreement between France and the CFA franc nations are as follows: 1) fixed
exchange rate with the French franc, 2) guarantee of unlimited convertibility of the CFA franc
to the French franc, 3) centralization of foreign exchange reserves, and 4) free capital transfer
within the franc zone (20). The convertibility of the CFA franc today is against the Euro though
still guaranteed through the French Treasury. It is worth noting that there is no
interconvertibility currently between the two CFA franc currencies (although from the onset,
they were) in the Central African and West Africa economic and monetary zones.
Today’s Francophone Africa as the old continues to attract foreign interest from the West
notably the European Union, with France in the lead, with the US also being a big player, as well
as other advanced nations such as China and Russia. China has through its Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) secured strategic engagements [6], and expanded its footprint in these regions
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to the discomfort of France and the West in general. The CFA franc monetary arrangements
were designed to serve French interests in the former colonies [12]; though and not surprising
the French legislature in 2020 voted to end French engagement in the West African CFA franc,
meanwhile, a decision has not yet been arrived at concerning the Central African regional
agreement. This announcement gave the nations in West Africa a semblance of freehand to
launch its previously failed common currency—Eco—in 2020, which was saddled with
controversies of French mingling.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
For the most part, the Central and West African states have been faulted for their under- development viewed through sluggish economic growth and political instability, attributed to
poor governance by their leaders. The economic policies of France, specifically, the monetary
policy of France towards these 14 African nations (under the economic and monetary
community) has been a thorny issue in recent years by both Africans and world stage partners.
French economists have argued that the economic and monetary agreement under the CFA
franc has guaranteed a stable foreign exchange rate against the Euro thus stabilizing the
currency compared to other African currencies that suffer from inflations. In comparison to
other former French colonies such as Algeria, Morrocco, and Tunisia (that opted out of the CFA
franc choosing to mint their currency) have continued to demonstrate stronger economic
performance, the 14 nations described herein continue to display slow economic growth with
poor jobs creation as a major indicator.
The challenges with implementing effective monetary policies for growth and stability in
Francophone Africa have led to debates over the CFA franc. Slow development in these zones
has been reduced to the use of the CFA franc currency seen as an enabler and barrier to
development. The debates over the impact of the CFA franc often start with questions about
exchange rates and rumors about planned devaluation which inevitably harms the population’s
buying power. To understand the French economic hold on Central and West Africa, it would
be worthwhile to briefly examine the historical background of the relations which shed some
light on how Africa got entangled in this quagmire. The accords de coopération covers cultural,
economic, monetary, military, and to a great extent political understanding. The monetary
agreements tend to be the more questionable of the cooperation accords. Therefore, the
question it begs is: Do these accords de coopération still have a place in the struggle for
development in today’s economy in these African states?
OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE
The objective of this article is to advance an independent synthesis of existing literature related
to France’s engagement in countries in the Central and West African economic and monetary
community (some are former colonies) through the concept of Francophonie or more
specifically Françafrique. This essay assesses relationships between France and the following
14 countries in the two economic and monetary unions of the Central African Economic and
Monetary Union (CAEMU) zone which constitutes Cameroon, Central Africa, Chad, Republic of
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon that use the XAF (Central African CFA franc); and West
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) zone consisting of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte
d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo that use the XOF (West African CFA
franc). As previously indicated, both currencies are not interconvertible, although they have the
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Dzekashu, W. G. (2021). French Economic and Monetary Policies in Francophone Africa: A Barrier to Economic Development in the Central and West
African Monetary Zones. Archives of Business Research, 9(11). 51-68.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/abr.911.11280
same parity against the French franc. Equatorial Guinea (a former Spanish colony) opted to
drop the use of Ekwele in 1984-85 to join this monetary arrangement [15], and Guinea-Bissau
(a former Portuguese colony) opted in 1997 to join the CFA franc community as well. Some
countries who after attaining independence quit this monetary agreement include Mali (1962-
1967), and Madagascar and Mauritania in 1972 [20]. The focus of this article is on the neglected
case of monetary dependency in what has been described severally by economists, intellectuals,
and politicians as an imperial currency that denotes financial subordination, or monetary
repression. This essay shall explore the implications of French economic policies and
agreements in the CFA franc zone while presenting a balanced discussion of the monetary
arrangements that have raised contentious discussions about French use of the currency as a
tool of exploitation.
DEFINITION OF TERMS
Below are definitions peculiar to international investments and trade that could provide
additional context for understanding the Françafrique arrangement.
Accords de Coopération (translated as cooperation accords) represents a set of agreements
signed between France and its former overseas colonies for close political, economic, military,
and cultural ties.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is an investment made by a firm or individual in one country
into business interests located in another. Generally, FDI takes place when an investor
establishes foreign business operations or acquires foreign business assets in a foreign
company. FDI flows record the value of cross-border transactions related to direct investment.
Financial flows consist of equity transactions, reinvestment of earnings, and intercompany debt
transactions. FDI stocks measure the total level of direct investment at a given point in time.
Both FDI flows and stocks are usually measured quarterly, semi-annually, or annually. The
outward FDI stock is the value of the resident investors' equity in and net loans to enterprises
in foreign economies. The inward FDI stock is the value of foreign investors' equity in and net
loans to enterprises resident in the reporting economy. FDI stocks are measured in USD and as
a share of GDP. FDI creates stable and long-lasting links between economies.
Françafrique is an expression that describes France’s sphere of influence over its former
colonies in sub-Sahara Africa.
Francophonie is a loosely united group of nations in which French is a first, official, or culturally
significant language.
Gross Domestic Products (GDP) is the monetary value of finished goods and services made in a
country during a specific period. GDP provides an economic snapshot of a country and is used
to estimate the size of an economy and growth rate, calculated by, expenditures, production, or
incomes.
METHODOLOGY
The accumulation of knowledge in the field of business research is growing at a fast pace but
remains somewhat disjointed, therefore making the process of building on and relating it to
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existing knowledge complex [19]. This article utilizes a semi-systematic literature review
method to review research and track developments of French economic influence in the CFA
franc zone over time by analyzing and evaluating qualitative and quantitative literature
materials and themes, and historical overview [19]. The semi-systematic (also known as
narrative review approach) is designed for research that has been conceptualized otherwise
and studied by different groups of researchers in varied disciplines. This semi-systematic
review method usually looks at the progression of a topic developed across research traditions.
The analysis or evaluation of research can be accomplished using content analysis or pattern
matching. Content analysis is a research tool used to determine the presence of certain words,
themes, or concepts within some given qualitative data. This tool enables researchers to study
topics where quantitative data is difficult to access, and given the multidisciplinary nature of
business research, using different methodologies and approaches for data collection and
analyses [7] has the potential to create an agenda for future studies as an outcome.
LITERATURE REVIEW
At the heart of the relationship between France and its African monetary community are issues
related to trade patterns and economic policies. The instruments used to sustain market share
are the surviving colonial currency—CFA franc, military presence, and secret diplomacy [5].
The agreement with France secures access to markets and resources in these countries for the
benefit of the former and has been the status quo for over 60 years since independence. Below
is a brief description of some of the profiles and economic indicators of CFA franc countries and
France in the five big economies in both monetary zones: the trade relations between France
on the one hand and Cameroon and the Republic of the Congo (in the CAEMU zone) and Côte
d’Ivoire, Mali, and Senegal (in the WAEMU zone) on the other.
Political Profile and Economic Indicators of Select CFA Franc Countries
Cameroon
Cameroon, officially known as The Republic of Cameroon, previously known as The Federal
Republic of Cameroon (1961 to 1972) and United Republic of Cameroon (1972 to 1984) with a
population of 26.6 million as of 2000, was not a French colony from the onset; The Cameroons
(commonly referred to as Cameroon) and France have a rather unique history. During
European explorations of Africa, Fernando Pô (a Portuguese explorer) in 1472 arrived in
Douala through the Wouri River which he named Rio dos Camerões (meaning River of Prawns)
from which the name Cameroon got coined. There were subsequent interactions with the
British between 1858 and 1887. Eventually, before WWI between 1887 to 1914, Kamerun was
a German colony. The territory following the defeat of the Germans in WWI was subdivided into
two unequal parts and transferred to Britain and France under the League of Nations mandate.
Subsequently, at the end of WWII, both territories still administered by the British and French
were placed under the UN Trusteeship to prepare them for independence. In 1960, the French- administered territory gained its independence taking on the name, La Republique du
Cameroun. In 1961 the territory administered by Britain through the system of Indirect Rule
with Nigeria proposed the split of Northern and Southern Cameroons and independence
handed through an understanding where Northern Cameroons would join the Republic of
Nigeria, while Southern Cameroons would gain independence and then immediately join La
Republique du Cameroun. Both countries reached an understanding to federate as The Federal
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Dzekashu, W. G. (2021). French Economic and Monetary Policies in Francophone Africa: A Barrier to Economic Development in the Central and West
African Monetary Zones. Archives of Business Research, 9(11). 51-68.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/abr.911.11280
Republic of Cameroon constituting separate entities East Cameroon (La Republique du
Cameroun) and West Cameroon (Southern Cameroons).
The heritage of The Cameroons is therefore linguistically English and French (the official
languages), wherein the UN recognizes the integrity of each of the two territories as separate.
This method of granting self-determination has been a source of contention that has plunged
the nation into an ongoing civil war since 2016; first over issues of marginalization of the
English-speaking minority group and secondly over the failed union and the dismantling of the
English educational and legal heritage. Without indulging in the internal politics of this nation,
this federation seems to have been an experiment in a place where there exist three main ethnic
groups; Bantus, Semi-Bantus, and Sudanese; and an estimated 240 tribes and sub-languages.
The issues around the legality of the relationship between both territories and the influence of
the French could be a topic for additional exploration. Such additional exploration could
uncover whether French exertion of influence over La Republique du Cameroun through its
accords de coopération gives access to the resources of West Cameroon (Southern Cameroons).
Figure 2 shows statistics on export from Cameroon to France.
Figure 1: Cameroon Exports to France
Data Source: https://tradingeconomics.com/cameroon/exports/france
Cameroon exports to France in 2017 totaled US$686.2M. Imports in Cameroon increased to
412B CFA franc (about US$777.36M) in December from 357.39B CFA franc (about
US$674.32M) in November of 2019. The main exports included minerals, oils, and distillation
products (US$200.23M); cocoa and cocoa preparations (US$44.86M); inorganic chemicals,
precious metal compounds, and isotope (US$37.45M); wood, wood articles, and wood charcoal
(US$19.27M); and edible fruits, nuts, citrus fruits, and melons (US$13.68M) and other items
such as paper, rubbers, vegetable coffee, tea, spices, all totaling (US$18.7M). FDI inflows to
Cameroon are traditionally low compared to the potential of its economy, which reached
US$782M in 2019, increasing slightly compared to US$765M registered the previous year. FDI
stocks are estimated to represent US$8.4B in the same year. Most of the FDI comes from the
European Union, particularly France and Germany, which target the mining industry, including
oil extraction. Cameroon is a commodity-dependent economy where oil exports account for $243 $249 $370 $218 $228 $209 $164 $686
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
CAMEROON EXPORT TO FRANCE (MILLIONS O F USD)
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over 50% of total exports, even though agriculture employs more than 50 percent of its
workforce. The GDP of Cameroon in 2019 was US$38.76B (representing 0.03 percent of the
world’s economy) according to official data from the World Bank and projections. The GDP of
Cameroon expanded 0.80 percent in the fourth quarter of 2020 compared to the same quarter
of the previous year. Cameroon’s main imports are cereals, fish, and capital equipment, and her
main import partners are China and France with 17% of imports each. Other partners include
Nigeria, Belgium, Italy, and the United States (US).
Congo
The Republic of the Congo was established in 1958 and gained independence from France in
1960. The Republic of Congo with a population of 5.5 million as of 2020, though resource-rich,
is categorized as an economically poor country, with more than half of its population living
below the poverty line and relying on subsistence agriculture, Congo is the fourth-largest oil
producer in the Gulf of Guinea. The economy is heavily dominated by the oil industry, which
accounts for 90 percent of exports and is a major source of government revenues. Despite being
in one of the most volatile regions in Africa, the Republic of Congo has a democratic system and
peace lasting for over a decade. On-going reforms in the public sector backed by the IMF are
expected to bring economic stability and address the country’s main economic challenges:
youth unemployment, outdated infrastructure, bureaucracy, corruption, and a non-diversified
industrial sector. The Congo is increasingly converting natural gas to electricity rather than
burning it and greatly improving energy prospects. Figure 3 shows the total imports from
France between the periods 2010 through 2017; accordingly, imports dropped to an all-time
low.
Figure 2: Congolese Imports from France
Data Source: https://tradingeconomics.com/republic-congo/imports/france
Imports from France in 2017 totaled US$358.79 million, which included mainly machinery,
nuclear reactors, and boilers (US$65.69 million); pharmaceutical products (US$57.29 million);
electrical and electronic equipment (US$27.33M); articles of iron or steel (US$17.41M); and
meats and edible meat offal (US$17.25M). The main exports include petroleum, plumber,
plywood, sugar, cocoa, coffee, and diamonds. The main import partners are France, China, $534 $534 $603 $761 $635 $661 $676 $359
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
CONGO I MPORT FROM FRANCE (MILLIONS O F USD)
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Dzekashu, W. G. (2021). French Economic and Monetary Policies in Francophone Africa: A Barrier to Economic Development in the Central and West
African Monetary Zones. Archives of Business Research, 9(11). 51-68.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/abr.911.11280
Brazil, the US, and India; while the main export partners are China, the US, France, Australia,
and the Netherlands. The GDP in the Republic of the Congo contracted 7.80% in 2020 in the
fourth quarter of 2020 over the same time the previous year.
Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast)
Before its colonization by Europeans, today’s Republic of Ivory Coast was home to several
states; first, a protectorate of France in 1843 and later consolidated as a French colony in 1893
amid the European scramble for Africa. It gained independence in 1960. Today’s Côte d'Ivoire
is located on the south coast of West Africa and has an estimated population of 26.4 million as
of 2020. The economy is largely market-based and depends heavily on the agricultural sector,
with over 70% of the population engaged in different agricultural activities. The nation is
among the world's largest producers and exporters of coffee, cocoa beans, and palm oil; and
thus, its produce and economy are highly sensitive to international price fluctuations and
weather conditions. The nations recorded a trade surplus of 506.80M CFA franc in February of
2021. In 2019 the GDP stood at US$58.79B which value represents 0.05 percent of the world’s
economy. Figure 4 shows Côte d’Ivoire’s exports by country as a percentage.
As of 2019, the five main export partners included: the Netherlands, US, France, Spain, and
Malaysia; while the main import partners were China (18%), Nigeria (13%), and France (11%),
Vietnam (5%). Côte d’Ivoire exports to France was US$752.96M during 2019.
Figure 3: Côte d’Ivoire’s Overseas Exports (by Country)
Data Source: https://tradingeconomics.com/ivory-coast/exports-by-country
Mali
The Republic of Mali is a landlocked country in the interior of Western Africa, with large parts
in the north reaching deep into the center of the Sahara, more than half of the country lies in
the extremely hot, dust-laden desert, while its central parts are in the Sahel zone, the transition
zone between the desert and the savanna, the grassy plain in the south. Mali depends on gold
mining and agricultural exports for revenue. As of 2020, the population was 20.3 million.
Economic activity is largely confined to the riverine area irrigated by the Niger River. About
10% of the population is nomadic and about 80% of the labor force is engaged in farming and 38.4% 11.0% 6.1% 6.0% 5.0% 4.9% 4.9% 4.9% 4.8% 4.7% 4.7% 4.6%
OTHER
NETHERLAND
UNITED STATES
FRANCE
MALAYSIA
VIETNAM
MALI
SPAIN
SWITZERLAND
GERMANY
BURKINA FASO
BELGIUM
EXPORTS B Y COUNTRY (MILLIONS O F USD)
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fishing. Mali is considered among the 25 poorest countries in the world. The GDP in Mali was
worth US$17.51B in 2019, which represents 0.01 percent of the world’s economy. The main
import is fuel (42% of total imports) followed by capital equipment and foodstuffs. Its main
import partner is China (20% of total imports). Others include Senegal, China, France, and Ivory
Coast. Imports in Mali increased to 719.97B CFA franc in the fourth quarter of 2020 from
700.49B CFA franc in the third quarter of 2020.
Mali imports the following from France: pharmaceuticals products, cereals, machinery, nuclear
reactors, and boilers, electrical, electronic equipment, vehicles, furniture, and other medical
apparatus. In 2017 Mali imports from France stood at US$341.73M which represents 7.88%
partner share. Other countries along with France that represent the top five importers of Malian
goods include Senegal (20.52%), China (15.22%), Côte d’Ivoire (9.67%), and Germany (3.6%).
On the flip side, the top five countries that Mali exports to are South Africa (41.01%),
Switzerland (21.43%), Burkina Faso (6.13%), Bangladesh (5.84%), and Côte d’Ivoire (4.93%).
Table 2: Indicators of Malian Economic Performance 2017
Indicator Last Previous Highest Lowest Unit
Balance of Trade -227.41 -154.24 34.36 -356.64 XOF Billion
Current Account -364.90 -357.50 -47.94 -704.30 XOF Billion
Current Account to GDP -4.20 -4.10 0.51 -15.96 % of GDP
Imports 719.97 700.49 823.65 116.00 XOF Billion
Exports 492.57 546.24 605.16 69.40 XOF Billion
Data Source: ttps://tradingeconomics.com/mali/imports/france
Senegal
Before the arrival of European settlers, the history of the Saharan region is mainly characterized
by the consolidation of settlements in large state entities –Ghana Empire, Mali Empire, and
Songhai Empire. The cores of these great empires were located on the territory of the
current Republic of Mali, so current-day Senegal occupied a peripheral position. The today’s
Republic of Senegal was a breakaway from the Mali Federation and a merger with French Sudan
all part of what was referred to as French West Africa. In January 1959, Senegal and French
Sudan merged to form the Mali Federation, which became fully independent on June 20, 1960.
The transfer of power agreement with France was signed on April 4, 1960. Due to internal
political difficulties, the Federation broke up on August 20, 1960. Senegal and Sudan (renamed
the Republic of Mali) proclaimed independence. The colony gained its independence from the
French in 1960.
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Dzekashu, W. G. (2021). French Economic and Monetary Policies in Francophone Africa: A Barrier to Economic Development in the Central and West
African Monetary Zones. Archives of Business Research, 9(11). 51-68.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/abr.911.11280
Figure 4: Senegalese Overseas Exports (by Country)
Data Source: https://tradingeconomics.com/senegal/exports-by-country
From 1981, when Senegalese troops help suppress a coup in The Gambia (a neighboring British
former colony), both countries agreed to confederate; thus, uniting in 1982 for many aspects of
government, under the name Senegambia. However, this arrangement only lasted through
1989, before crumbling after The Gambia refused to move closer toward a union. Today’s
Senegal has a population of 16.7 million in 2020. The economy of Senegal is driven by mining,
construction, tourism, fishing, and agriculture, which are the main sources of employment in
rural areas, despite abundant natural resources in gas, gold, iron, phosphates, zircon, and
numerous oil discoveries recently. The GDP of Senegal in 2020 was projected to reach
US$21.30B. In the long-term and projected to trend around US$23.20B in 2021 and US$23.70B
in 2022, according to the econometric models of Trading Economics in 2019. Figure 5 shows
Senegal’s exports by country as a percentage. The main export partners in 2017 were Mali,
(14.8%) Switzerland (11.4%), India (6.0%), Cote d’Ivoire (5.3%), United Arab Emirates or UAE
(5.1%), The Gambia (4.2%), Spain (4.1%), while the main goods exported include fish,
groundnuts (peanuts), petroleum products, phosphates, and cotton. The main import partners
in 2017 included France (16.3%), China (10.4%), Nigeria (8.0%), India (7.2%), the Netherlands
(4.8%), and Spain (4.2%); and the import goods included mainly food and beverage, capital
goods, and fuels.
RESULTS
The purpose of this essay was to advance an independent synthesis of existing literature related
to France’s engagement in countries in the Central and West African economic and monetary
community (some are former colonies) through the concept of Francophonie or more
specifically Françafrique. The data was analyzed using a semi-systematic literature review
method to review research and track developments of French economic influence in the CFA
franc zone over time by analyzing and evaluating qualitative and quantitative literature
materials and themes, and historical overview. Trade between France and the CFA franc
countries has resulted in limited growth and development in the regions because there is
limited credit flow from France to the regions compared to other developed nations that also
do business with these nations. 26.0% 22.0% 13.0%
7.9%
7.0%
5.7%
5.1%
3.9%
3.3%
3.1%
3.0%
2.0%
OTHER
MALI
SWITZERLAND
INDIA
CHINA
AUSTRALIA
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
GUINEA
SPAIN
UNITED STATES
GAMBIA
FRANCE
S ENEGALESE EXPORTS B Y COUNTRY (% SHARE)
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Table 1: Comparison of Chinese and French Trade in the CAEMU Zone
(Millions of USD): 2017
Country 1995 2017
France France China
Cameroon $337.1 $508.1 $892.8
Central African Republic 90.7 109.4 27.7
Chad 88.8 - -
Republic of Congo 145.1 364.2 295.7
Equatorial Guinea - - -
Gabon - - -
Total $661.7 $981.7 $1,216.2
Data Source: https://www.e-ir.info/2019/08/07/chinas-rise-in-the-african-franc-zone-and- frances-containment-policy/
Note: There was no data readily available for Chad, Equatorial, Guinea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau,
and Niger.
These nations have attracted external funding for the implementation of investment projects
generally from China who in the last decade has become a bilateral trade partner with most of
Africa. Table 1 shows how France compares to China on the import markets (for goods) in the
CAEMU in 2017. The statistic provided here indicates that China in recent has increased her
visibility in trade partnership with these nations although her values and interests in the region
are different from those of France. Looking at the 1995 statistic it can be extrapolated that
France has had a foothold in these nations for years. France has held the position of the largest
economic partner of most former French colonies, notably the countries in the CFA franc zones
for decades, though China recently has risen to become the largest trading partner in this zone.
Figure 1 demonstrates similar comparative data for the WAEMU.
Figure 5: Comparison of Chinese and French Trade in the WAEMU Zone - 2017
Data Source: https://www.e-ir.info/2019/08/07/chinas-rise-in-the-african-franc-zone-and- frances-containment-policy/
$-
$126.2
$647.0
$-
$-
$78.4
$-
$114.4
$207.8
$318.6
$1,100.0
$-
$341.7
$-
$989.9
$174.5
$240.3
$518.7
$1,300.0
$-
$660.1
$-
$654.5
$317.1
BENIN CÔTE D'IVOIRE MALI SENEGAL
F RANCE AND CHINA INVESTMENTS IN WAEMU (BILLIONS O F
USD)
France-1995 France-2017 China-2017
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Dzekashu, W. G. (2021). French Economic and Monetary Policies in Francophone Africa: A Barrier to Economic Development in the Central and West
African Monetary Zones. Archives of Business Research, 9(11). 51-68.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/abr.911.11280
One thing that stands out is that Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal each individually surpass all the
CAEMU zone in import markets, indicating that there is more activity in that zone. Over a third
of French exporters export to Africa (38,000 French businesses exported to Africa between
2002 and 2017). French exports to sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 2.4% of all French exports;
€11.1B (about US$13.57B) in 2017, and 2016, the trade surplus with sub-Saharan Africa
reached the highest level for 10 years at €3.5B (about US$4.28B); and in 2017, it stood at €2.9B
(about US$3.55B). France has strengthened its presence in recent years to support French
businesses in Africa, with new offices and satellites set up in Angola, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire,
Kenya, Senegal, Nigeria, and Ethiopia between 2012 and 2016.
Economic and Financial Impact of the CFA Franc
The 14 nations that constitute the discussions in this paper, have relations amongst themselves
within their monetary zones, and with France and the European Economic Community. As
earlier indicated, the fundamental features of the CFA franc system are the guarantee (by the
French Treasury) of parity and convertibility between the CFA franc and the French franc
through the mechanism of an Operations Accounts maintained by their respective central
banks—Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) for the WAEMU zone and
Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (BEAC) for the CEAMU zone. How far have these
guarantees held up in these countries? To be a member of the CFA franc community means
sharing sovereignty with France and the member nations of the monetary and economic zones
[16]. According to Mba [16], the mere fact that the currency is minted by Banque de France does
not preclude the possibility of the currency being minted in any or all the countries in the
community, since the same bank also mints for other non-CFA franc countries. The currency
since its creation in the post-WWII years has undergone several reforms in reaction to changing
economic and political needs. The mark of colonialism continues to loom with the currency
being used in Africa as it continues to depend on the chief colonizer and creator of the
currency—France. So, will the discontinuance of the currency represent the completion of
colonialism, or simply give the optics of completion, while plunging the nations into monetary
turmoil?
The total population that uses the CFA franc currency is 158.6 million spread through different
climatic zones, Sahara, Sahel, Arid Tropical, Humid Tropical, and Equatorial Forests with the
most populous nations being, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali, which
only contributes 8% to the world’s GDP although it consists of 13% of the world’s population.
One of the reasons is that these countries export mostly raw materials that have not been
transformed into finished goods, hence no added value. One of the biggest exports includes
cotton which is grown in Senegal, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Togo, Benin, Cameroon, and
Chad; cocoa, grown in the plantations of Côte d’Ivoire (largest world exporter) and Cameroon;
coffee, palm oil, rubber, and tropical fruits. These agricultural products represent an important
share of these nations’ wealth—20% to 94% of their export revenue. Other export items
include mining products (gold, phosphate, uranium, diamond, manganese) and hydrocarbons.
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Figure 6: 2019 Export Comparison (in Billions of USD)
Data Source: https://oec.world
Congo, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea depend on the export of petroleum products or black gold
which represents about 80% of their export revenues. Between the years 1994 and 2014, the
average growth rate of these regions was 1.5% with only three countries (Burkina Faso-3.1%,
Chad-3.4%, and Equatorial Guinea-16.4%) in the CFA franc zone demonstrating higher growth
rates. After 2015, the price hike in agricultural produce helped many countries to achieve
significant growth. The countries in question are Côte d’Ivoire (8.9%), Mali (6%), Senegal
(6.5%).
Figure 7: 2019 Import Comparison (in Billions of USD)
Data Source: https://oec.world
According to Figure 6, in the 2019 data, Congo demonstrates export to China to the tune of
US$5.28 Billion. This number is higher than the combined total of the other four nations that
have the largest economies within the Françafrique. The export to France and the US is quite
minimal in comparison. On the import side (Figure 7), Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Senegal $0.91 $5.28 $0.37 $0.15 $0.24 $0.29 $0.05 $0.87 $0.01 $0.10 $0.30 $0.57 $0.89 $0.04 $0.15
CAMEROON CONGO COTE D'IVOIRE MALI SENEGAL
2019 EXPORT COMPARISON (BILLIONS O F USD)
China France USA
1.7
0.4
2.0
0.4
1.9
0.6
0.3
1.2
0.4
1.2
0.2
0.1
0.4
0.1
0.2
CAMEROON CONGO COTE D'IVOIRE MALI SENEGAL
2019 I MPORT COMPARISON (BILLIONS O F USD)
China France USA
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Dzekashu, W. G. (2021). French Economic and Monetary Policies in Francophone Africa: A Barrier to Economic Development in the Central and West
African Monetary Zones. Archives of Business Research, 9(11). 51-68.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/abr.911.11280
appear to be the biggest importers from China. Cameroon is trailing behind Côte d’Ivoire and
Senegal in their imports from France. There is a trade deficit in favor of France.
Summary of Findings
The contents of the accords de coopération were kept a secret for decades and once
policymakers and scholars brought the topic to the limelight, it lost its taboo status of close to
60 years as evidenced in social movements mostly described as anti-French sentiments. The
agreements under these accords as indicated previously, are not only about the monetary
policies, but also include cultural, military, and political. arrangement. France has succeeded to
a great extent in the agenda of exporting her cultural values, such as planting the language that
has become mainstream in Africa albeit through forcible assimilation practices. The many coup
d’étatsthat have taken place in Africa have emanated from disagreements with France’s foreign
policy position, and in some cases, provoked by the departure of African leaders from the
economic agenda of France.
Italy in 2019 castigated France’s economic and monetary policies towards these 14 nations as
the main reason for the hike in refugees along the coasts of southern Europe. In the words of
the Italian Vice President, “France is one of those countries that by printing money for 14
African states prevents their economic development and contributes to the fact that the
refugees leave and then die in the sea or arrive on our coasts” [18]. The now-deceased Chadian
President Idriss Déby in 2015 said the CFA “...pulls African economies down...,” adding that
“...time has come to cut the cordon that prevents Africa to develop.” The use of the currency
continues to be controversial because there are African heads of state who argue in favor of its
continued use, while many leaders and economists have proved that the currency is bad for
economic development. Now is the time for France to terminate the agreements under the
accords de coopération and leave these 14 nations a free hand in managing their own economic
and monetary affairs.
The attempt by West African states under the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) to circulate a new currency in 2003 has been postponed several times; 2005, 2010,
2014, 2015, 2020. Hairsine [10] suggests that the failure to implement the agreements to
launch the Eco is squarely in the court of the Francophone countries in the ECOWAS region. The
West African regional bloc has adopted a new plan to launch Eco single currency in 2027. It is
anticipated that this new currency shall help boost trade and economic growth. The
implementation of the convergence pact was abandoned in 2020 due to the shock of the COVID- 19 pandemic. This however is the official reason provided for the failed implementation of the
currency. However, the controversy surged after the announcement by the president of Côte
d’Ivoire—Alassane Ouattara in 2019 that the French-backed CFA franc used by the WAEMU
zone would be renamed Eco—an announcement that was not in line with the plans of the
regional bloc [10].
Implications of CFA Franc and Francophonie for Economic Development
The continued use of the CFA franc by the 14 African nations binds them economically to France
(and to a great extent, politically) and continues to place an economic burden on them in what
has been described as a monetary trap—the CFA franc currency considered the last relic of
colonial rule in the continent [20]. The CFA franc monetary system was designed to guarantee
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the stability of the French franc currency in the international markets, while simultaneously
preventing overdraft and inflation in CFA member countries. With the currency being
guaranteed by the French, it has also been manipulated by France clearly to ensure the stability
of its currency. For example, in 1994, France devalued the CFA franc, raising the parity rate
from 50 CFA francs to 100 CFA francs per French franc. Public debt in CFA franc countries has
increased; however, it has remained manageable and the CFA franc parity to the French Franc
does not appear overvalued, thus, the level of required reserves is considered adequate.
Members are not making the most of the monetary union, since intra-zone trade flows appear
below what a monetary union would grant in five out of eight countries. The requirement to
maintain reserves in the French Treasury is one of the thornier issues on this subject. Both
economic and monetary zones want to exert more control over their currency.
Although the CFA monetary union is not an optimal currency area, it has allowed member
countries to benefit from the convertibility guaranteed by the French Treasury and from
enhanced policy credibility in achieving low inflation rates. Both benefits may be under threat.
The convertibility is under threat due to the harder budgetary commitments imposed on France
by its membership in the Eurozone and the dwindling political interest in the CFA franc zone
shown in France. The policy credibility is becoming costlier as evidenced by output-inflation
trade-offs, which, although still more favorable than in comparable sub-Saharan African
countries, have been declining since the 1994 devaluation [9].
The obvious open questions around the use of this currency are tied to the larger Françafrique
policies that echo ethical and moral issues around the relationships. This worry was summed
up by the guilt of Jacques Chirac, the 22nd president during the 21st Africa-France summit in
Yaoundé, Cameroon in January 2001 where he uttered the following:
Nous avons saigné l'Afrique pendant quatre siècles et demi. Ensuite, nous avons pillé ses
matières premières; après, on a dit: ils (les Africains) ne sont bons à rien. Au nom de la religion,
on a détruit leur culture et maintenant, comme il faut faire les choses avec plus d'élégance, on
leur pique leurs cerveaux grâce aux bourses. Puis, on constate que la malheureuse Afrique n'est
pas dans un état brillant, qu'elle ne génère pas d'élites. Après s'être enrichi à ses dépens, on lui
donne des leçons. [We bled Africa for four and a half centuries. Next, we plundered its raw
materials. After that, we said: they (Africans) are good for nothing. In the name of religion, we
destroyed their culture and now, as we [must] act with elegance, we are picking their brains
with scholarships. Thereupon, we are claiming that the unfortunate Africa is not in a brilliant
condition and is not producing elites. Having enriched ourselves on their backs, we are now
lecturing them.] [2].
These words uttered by Chirac whether intentionally or not, are quite sharp and telling of the
nature of the relationship that France longs for in the 14 African nations. France has minimized
its African commitments, and these nations that use CFA franc have cultivated new
relationships with other countries in the European Union [15].
CONCLUSIONS
There are opposing views amongst economists and intellectuals about the continuation of the
monetary agreements. Some have advanced arguments to improve the viability of the currency,
while others argue for its replacement. The advocates and opponents target different
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Dzekashu, W. G. (2021). French Economic and Monetary Policies in Francophone Africa: A Barrier to Economic Development in the Central and West
African Monetary Zones. Archives of Business Research, 9(11). 51-68.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/abr.911.11280
challenges of the currency to include exchange rate independence, inflation stabilization, GDP- growth incentives, and capital free flow [18]. Those who support the continuation of the use,
see monetary cooperation, rather than neocolonialism [20]. Signé, [18] adds that advocates for
keeping the currency with enhancements have proposed that the currency could be pegged to
multiple stable currencies with a potential to increase the relative stability, restructure the
reserve requirement, separate the WAEMU and CAEMU into optimum currency areas, and
establish an African Monetary Union. Whether this approach is sustainable can only be
addressed through analysis of the short- and long-term plan in a manner that will address
interest groups in both Africa and Europe. There are some arguably strong reasons for
continuing the use of the currency, such as reduction of uncertainty and stabilization of
domestic prices due to fixed exchange rate, low inflation compared to other neighboring African
states, and the reduced risk of foreign investments due to unlimited convertibility of the CFA
franc.
The critics of the currency base their analysis on three separate arguments: the absence of
monetary sovereignty, a neocolonial device, and negative contribution to democracy [20]. All
three arguments point to the fact that the currency has a negative historical ties. The currency
is seen as a lingering vestige of colonialism that must be removed to confirm that the promise
of independence is real, and not window dressing. The instruments of the accords for the
continuation of colonization have outlived their usefulness in the 21st Century, hence increasing
sentiments that it must be done away with. The continued use of the currency has been
described to border around crimes against human rights, and “radical critics perceive the
currency as an odious remnant of the colonial era that encroaches on the sovereignty of African
states” [11]. As opposition mounts over the use of the CFA franc in the 14 African nations, the
future of the currency is questionable [11]. France lacks the moral authority to continue to
control the resource of these African nations and it is an aberration to employ the reckless
method of destruction of nations’ infrastructure in the name of an experience Guinea went
through [14], for nonpayment of colonial debt. What is most certain is that the CFA franc does
not have a future in Africa.
Abbreviations
AGOA: Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, BRI: Belt and Road Initiative, CAEMU: Central
African Economic and Monetary Union, COVID-19: Coronavirus, 2019, EU: European Union,
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment, US: United States, WAEMU: West African Economic and
Monetary Union, XAF: Central African CFA franc, XOF: West African CFA franc.
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