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Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal – Vol.7, No.11

Publication Date: November 25, 2020

DOI:10.14738/assrj.711.9364.

Azhari, Y., & Ghazalie, (2020). International Law of the Sea in North Natuna Sea. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 7(11)

354-367.

International Law of the Sea in North Natuna Sea

Yulian Azhari

Indonesian Defense University,

Jakarta, Indonesia

Ghazalie

Indonesian Defense University,

Jakarta, Indonesia

ABSTRACT

The dispute that occurred in the North Natuna Sea has attracted

international attention, including the superpower United States of

America and the People's Republic of China and countries in the

Southeast Asian region. This escalation of tensions occurred when the

People's Republic of China built military bases in areas considered the

nine dash lines that the PRC claims as part of their country. International

law continues to fail to enforce the North Natuna Sea. It is clear that

international law has so far tried - and failed - to contain China's

advances in the North Natuna Sea. Existing confidence-building

measures must match China's increasingly hegemonic claims. If not, the

rules-based order will face continued erosion and smaller countries in

Southeast Asia will suffer the consequences. This study uses a

qualitative approach with socio-historical analysis to reveal past events,

especially in the field of maritime law, which are unknown to the

international community.

Keywords: China, International Law, North Natuna Sea, and USA.

INTRODUCTION

The North Natuna Sea is a sea that has tremendous potential and is in the Southeast Asia region.

Where there are many natural and mineral riches that are beneficial to the surrounding

superpowers. Now the North Natuna Sea is a dispute between countries in Southeast Asia. China as

the owner of the sovereignty of the sea area based on its history. In 2011, the Philippines filed a

North Natuna Sea lawsuit to the arbitration court in The Hague, Netherlands. However, hearing the

lawsuit from the Philippines, China could not reject the lawsuit and finally the Arbitration Court

decided that the Philippines won the lawsuit and China lost the lawsuit. Six years later in 2017, a

new dispute emerged in the North Natuna Sea where the Indonesian state claimed the sea area as

its territory and changed its name to the North Natuna Sea. However, again the Chinese state did

not accept this so that the Chinese State protested against the Indonesian State.

In international relations there is a problem called a dispute, the dispute itself means things that

cause different opinions, disputes and objections. Conflict or sengekta arise or often occur because

of differences in perceptions about an area or environment which are carried out consciously and

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URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.711.9364 355

Azhari, Y., & Ghazalie, (2020). International Law of the Sea in North Natuna Sea. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 7(11) 354-367.

the environment is a physical and social environment (Koentjaraningrat, 1982). When Philippine

President Rodrigo Duterte and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet in Beijing on August 29, there are

high hopes for making progress on the South China Sea territorial dispute. What's more, under

increasing domestic pressure, Duterte has promised - for the first time - that he will present the

arbitral tribunal's 2016 ruling during his meeting with Xi. Disputes that occur involving 2 or more

countries are called international disputes, international disputes are situations in which the two

countries have different opinions, views regarding an implementation of an agreement that must

be carried out or not carried out in its implementation. (Huala Adolf, 2004)

The decision, made in 2016 by the Permanent Court of Arbitration under Annex VII of the United

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), supports the Philippines' claim. The court

ruled that there is no legal basis, including international law, for China's claim to historic rights to

the territory under the Nine Dashes, and that China has violated its obligations under the

Convention on International Regulations to Prevent Collisions at Sea (COLREG).

Despite the ruling, China has continued to assert its claims to more than 80 percent of the South

China Sea, building military facilities in the disputed territory and deploying more than 300 naval

vessels: the largest in the Asia Pacific. China has also deployed so-called "fully equipped boat

militias" disguised as fishing vessels that patrol, supply, monitor and provoke incidents.

During the meeting, Duterte called the ruling "final, binding and not subject to appeal". Recently,

however, Duterte reneged on his commitment to the decision after Xi promised a 60-40 split scheme

in oil exploration that benefited the Philippines. It is clear that international law has so far tried -

and failed - to contain China's advances in the South China Sea. Existing confidence-building

measures (CBM) must match China's increasingly hegemonic claims. Otherwise, a rules-based order

will face continued erosion and Southeast Asia's smaller economies will suffer the consequences.

The main framework guiding the management of the North Natuna Sea dispute lies in the

ASEANChina Code of Ethics (COC). Although it was first discussed in 2014, China only started taking

its approach to COC more seriously in late 2016 in an attempt to shift its rejection of the arbitral

tribunal's ruling.

China's participation in COC negotiations since then has also served two purposes - greater

engagement between China and ASEAN countries is able to support the narrative that the dispute

in the Utaramurni Natuna Sea is regional, and that foreign intervention is unnecessary. In August

2018, ASEAN and China adopted a draft negotiating text for the COC.

In the draft, there was agreement on the need to build a rules-based framework and work within

international norms - however, the interpretation of such broad terms has created room for what

appear to be unsolvable disputes between claimant states. For example, Vietnam has called for a

ban on building artificial islands and the deployment of defensive weapons such as surface-to-air

missiles. China has done both.

Vietnam and Indonesia have also jointly called for respect for the coastal zones of these maritime

nations, including the exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles from their coast, which directly

enters China's Nine-Dash Line. Undeterred by their differences, the 11 parties consolidated the draft

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and conducted the first reading in July 2019. Senior officials from each country will next meet in

October 2019 to discuss how the second reading will proceed. Xi even unilaterally called for the COC

to be signed by 2021.

Regardless of the progress made, COCs are inherently flawed to be used as a vehicle for dispute

management. In addition, not all ASEAN members are claimants of the South China Sea, although

ASEAN as a whole is involved in the process of discussing the COC. Of the ten countries that are

members of ASEAN, only four officially consider themselves claimant states, including Vietnam,

Brunei, the Philippines and Malaysia.

It is difficult to understand a world where overlapping claims to seabed and waters can be resolved

effectively, when one side of negotiations is inherently divided in their favor - and the other is China.

First, it leaves claimant and non-claimant states vulnerable in negotiations with China, which has

recently exploited divisions in ASEAN's negotiating stance. Second, with ASEAN negotiations as a

unit, non-claimant countries are drawn into disputes unrelated to them. How do countries fight

collectively for their claims, when their claims conflict with one another?

Moreover, COCs are inherently limited in terms of their achievements. The COC must be recognized

for what it is - a dispute management framework. This is not a dispute resolution mechanism. The

final resolution of claims to sovereignty and maritime boundaries under UNCLOS terms could be

reached "many years from now" according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies

(CSIS). Therefore, all parties must engage in the COC "without prejudice to the final settlement of

claims" and emphasize that any agreement "will not impact the parties' current legal position on

the dispute".

Nonetheless, it is clear that the prosecution's actions outside of COC involvement completely nullify

any such plans. This has created something of a ―two-way path‖ in South China Sea policy, where

various confidence-building (CBM) measures, such as the COC, are undermined by the plaintiff's

―erosion of confidence‖ activities, such as the construction of Vietnamese outposts in water

territories. that is disputed. The current ineffectiveness of CBM in limiting their parties can mask

and even accelerate activities that undermine this trust.

And it's not just COC. Various other CBMs that were supposed to regulate activities in the North

Natuna Sea are victims of the same narrative of ineffectiveness. China's Coast Guard and People's

Liberation Army-Navy, and Chinese maritime militia ships continue to violate COLREGs Regulations

2, 6, 7, 8, 15, and 16, and thus violate UNCLOS Article 94.

This is evident, for example, when the Chinese operation "poses a serious risk of collision for

Philippine ships navigating around the Scarborough Shoal". It was also substantiated and

condemned by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016. Furthermore, the Code for Unplanned

Meetings at Sea (CUES) - another treaty often applied to South China Sea disputes - has no binding

character and does not apply to coast guards, although most of the incidents involved coast guard

and other maritime law enforcement vessels.

There may be relevant precedents for detaining China from continuing to carry out trust-eroding

activities in the South China Sea. One interesting precedent is the Guiana vs Suriname arbitration