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Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal – Vol.7, No.10
Publication Date: October 25, 2020
DOI:10.14738/assrj.710.9144.
Mbabazi, P. (2020). Gender Relations and Intra-Household Resource Allocations: Women’s Access To Agriculture Extension And Advisory
Services In Kabale District, Uganda. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 7(10) 467-494.
Gender Relations And Intra-Household Resource Allocations:
Women’s Access To Agriculture Extension And Advisory Services In
Kabale District, Uganda
Peace Mbabazi
Researcher, Faculty of Interdisciplinary Studies
Mbarara University of Science and Technology, Uganda
ABSTRACT
Gender relations embody and justify unequal power relations in intra- household allocation and livelihood improvement strategies. While
women are the main actors in agriculture production in the Kabale’s
dominant smallholder farmer households, they are restricted from
control and use of the production resources necessary to access
Agriculture Extension and Advisory Services. Household and higher
level institutional structures are within patriarchal power setting and
women have to bargain through explicit and implicit ways to access
household resources, each with implications on accessibility to support
services needed to improve livelihood. There are however, some few
cases of mutual cooperation with positive ramifications on access to
extension services as well as on household livelihood outcomes. While
this paper recognizes eminent reforms during the era of agriculture
modernisation, these have not yet fully achieved power and
institutional transformation for the meaningful positioning of women
with regard to control and use of resources needed to access extension
services at household level.
Keywords: Gender relations, Intra-household allocation, Smallholders,
Household resources, Agriculture extension and advisory services.
INTRODUCTION
The subject of gender relations in intra-household resource allocation and how this influence
accessibility to Agriculture Extension and Advisory Services (AEAS) is very pertinent in the
development paradigms particularly in the debates of improving agrarian livelihoods (Tripp et al.,
2009; GFRAS, 2010; Anderson, 2007; Swanson, & Rajalahti,2010; Adekunle et al., 2013) This is
mainly because gender relations form resource power which in turn shape the gender roles and
division of labour, decision-making power, rights and freedom of individual actors (Whitehead et
al., 1981; Sen, 1990; Agarwal, 1997; Levin, Ruel, & Morris 1999; Tripp, 2000; Agarwal, 2003;
Kabeer, 2005). This paper posits that, gender relations define the ways men and women interact
with one another and come to be recognized as men and as women in the community. Thus how
these determine access and use of AEAS are pronounced at household (HH) level where a husband
and wife work together in pursuit of better livelihood. While both gender roles and relations are
reinforced by social institutions, they are socially constructed and are historically specific; they
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Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal (ASSRJ) Vol.7, Issue 9, September-2020
embody and justify unequal power relations. Thus the interaction of men and women in public for
instance, with extension agents, can be different both within and across countries.
Diverse discourses on agricultural extension service provision are embedded in a larger debate
about the HH unit and the definitions used to establish exactly who should be eligible to receive
AEAS. For example in Doss' perspective, social beliefs are perceived to be instrumental in shaping
the perceptions about who is “the farmer”. In her viewpoint, a farmer is defined as; a head of
farming HH, the owner of land that is farmed, or the individual who is entitled to the revenue earned
from the sale of produce (Doss, & Morris, 2001; Doss, 2002). However, each of these denotations
poses challenges for providing equitable AEAS at HH level.
While the PMA was premised through DSIP (2010/11 to 2014/15) to reduce poverty to a level
below 28% by 2014 (DSIP, 2010/11- 2014/15; NAADS, 2002), that notwithstanding, the successive
transformation, agriculture production has not met the country’s target. Discourses like (Semana,
1997; Benin et al., 2007; Bategeka,, Kiiza,, & Kasirye, 2013) posit that, aalthough AEAS play a major
role in agricultural development, particularly in food production in Uganda, the main challenge in
transferring agricultural knowledge and information to farmers has been influenced by the cultural
environment in which farmers and the agricultural extension system operate. This study analyses
the effect of intra-HH resource allocation in access to NAADS which was premised to reduce poverty
to less than 10% by 2018. This paper suggests that, in the Ugandan predominantly smallholder- based agriculture economy, a HH is a basic social institution and bedrock of production thus a
strategic unit for livelihood transformation.
How resources are distributed and utilised at HH level have implication on livelihood improvement
strategies. Literally a HH is characterised by varying social and power relations with regard to intra- HH resource allocation that are essential to access AEAS for enhancing productivity. Previous
analysis on extension service provisioning in Uganda majorly focused on higher institutional level
shortfalls like; corruption, accountability, bad governance and fiscal glitches obscuring intra-HH
gender power relations (Asuming-Brempong, Sarpong & Asante, 2006; Nkonya et al., 2008). This
paper thus attempts to examine and gender relations and intra-HH allocation and how this may
affect men and women farmers’ access to AEAS in Bubare Sub County which can be replicated to
other agrarian communities.
Methods
This paper derives from a lengthy research covering the last six years, in order to capture the
interface of gender relational dynamics and access to extension services with regard to the long- time NAADS and its gradual transformation into Operation Wealth Creation (OWC). This period is
also important because it marked a shift from purely state-controlled to a liberalized extension
system. This paper attempts to analyse what this extension system reform implied for HHs
livelihood improvement and specifically the women who are the key in HH production. In-depth
research was undertaken in between 2013 to 2019 in Kabale District, which is a pioneer beneficiary
of the NAADS program in Uganda. Here, purposively sampled respondents provided insights into
the interrelationship between traditional gender relations of the patriarchal Bakiga and the
extension systems. Secondly this research was motivated by a debate in 2013-2015 that marked the
transitioning of NAADS into OWC to restore values of equity and inclusiveness in access to AEAS.
However in this transformation, service institutions were not fully divorced from the specific
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URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.710.9144 469
Mbabazi, P. (2020). Gender Relations and Intra-Household Resource Allocations: Women’s Access To Agriculture Extension And Advisory Services In Kabale
District, Uganda. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 7(10) 467-494.
patriarchal relations of society which could explain the less success. Subsequently, participatory- based research was carried out in Bubare, Bukinda, Ikumba and Maziba to follow-up service trends
in in both HH and service institutions. This paper also used secondary data sources to analyse trends
of women in the extension service arena specifically under the NAADS which replaced the old-style
state controlled system.
CONCEPTUALISING INTRA-HOUSEHOLD ALLOCATION
This paper situates the in intra-household co-operative and non-co-operative/conflict bargaining’
conceptual framework to explain the volatile gender power relations in HH allocation and access to
AEAS at HH level. The “intra-HH bargaining” theory and the “co-operative-conflict” theory by
(Agarwal, 1997; Kabeer, 1992: 19 and Sen, 1990) are used to construct and explain the relationship
between intra-HH allocation and the likely trajectories to access extension services for agrarian
livelihood improvement at HH level. These theories focus on intra-HH allocations and explain the
power and roles in such allocations of endowments, preferences, human resource investment, HH
resource levels, opportunities, and conjugal affiliations. Drawing from these denotations,
differently positioned HH members engage in processes of conflict and co-operation; bargaining
and reciprocity; resistance and negotiation; dissent and tolerance (Hartmann, 1981; George and
Jaswal, 1995; Steil, 1997). Thus the recognition that, HH bargaining takes place through a chain of
HH bargaining models, and not one “unitary” model. Notably the two theories highlight the
problems posed by a ''unitary'' conceptualization of the HH that is quite relevant to this paper. This
analysis enables exploration of a continuum of shifting gender relations in resonance allocation in
resonance with the principles of the social relations paradigm (Miller and Razavi, 1998).
Under the two notions like in the game theory, the dynamic relationships between men and women
are analysed as a cooperative and non-cooperative game in distribution of resources and decision- making power. In the cooperative bargaining models (altruism/collaborative decision-making), the
outcomes of negotiations are more equally beneficial to all HH members and have therefore been
considered a more "natural" means of analyzing the family unit in comparison to non-cooperative
models (Sen, 1987; Becker, 1973). This paper argues that, HH members bargain over many diverse
resources and outcomes, whether the bargaining is explicit or implicit (Steil, 1997; Agarwal, 1997).
These outcomes may include consumption and expenditure, production (such as the use of inputs),
labour allocation, asset ownership, children’s health and education, decision-making, and violence
within a HH (Doss et al., 2012). Chafetz (1990) articulates that, access and control of resources is a
cardinal determinant in HH bargaining and balance of power. Thus “provisioning” and access to
resources are considered as the basis for legitimacy to exercise authority over other HH members.
Accordingly, resource allocation and bargaining models assume that women’s access to resources,
income and credit increased their power and ‘voice’ in a HH (Kabeer, 1992; Doss et al., 2012; World
Bank, 2016).
Although discourses like standard demand analysis”, neo-classical economics derived models
presume a HH of individuals who pool resources, live in agreement on how to combine time and
share resources to maximize a common good (Schultz, 1994), this model can be termed as a
“common preference”, “altruism”, in which a single decision-maker acts for the good of the entire
HH. However this outlook obscures differentiation, inequality and conflict in HH gender
relations.Whereas this model assumes that all members have the same needs and thus
interventions and policies targeting the head of a HH will benefit all members, this may not