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Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal – Vol.7, No.6
Publication Date: June 25, 2020
DOI:10.14738/assrj.76.8134.
Wambu, C. G., & Ecoma, C. S. (2020) Chukwuma Nzeogwu In The Throes Of Contemporary Nigerian History. Advances in Social Sciences
Research Journal, 7(6) 22-31.
Chukwuma Nzeogwu In The Throes Of Contemporary
Nigerian History
Chiemela Godwin Wambu, Ph.D
Department of History and International Relations,
Abia State University, Uturu, Nigeria
Chinyere S. Ecoma, Ph.D
Department of History and International Relations,
Veritas University, Abuja, Nigeria
ABSTRACT
For the greater part of its existence as a sovereign state, Nigeria has
witnessed more years of military than civilian rule. An excursion into
this very important aspect of our national history must, of necessity,
interrogate the circumstances and dramatis personae that led to the
military’s intervention in national politics. One name that has never
escaped the scrutiny in this effort is that of Major Chukwuma Kaduna
Nzeogwu. Though a posthumous research, the intention of this paper is
to attempt a reappraisal of the often ignored, misinterpreted and
maligned intentions of the principal actors of the January 15, 1966
military coup d’etat, especially the role of Nzeogwu. In order to achieve
this objective, the research made use of both primary and secondary
sources of data. These were subjected to initial qualitative analysis. The
research concludes that part of the reasons for the misinterpretation of
Nzeogwu’s role is the need to justify the failure of the government of the
First Republic to satisfy the basic human and material needs of Nigeria.
In addition, it establishes the fact that subsequent political equations
and configurations in Nigeria have evidently been to the benefit of those
who have been at pains to justify the brutality that attended the January
1966 coup d’etat.
Keywords: Nzeogwu, Civil War, Military, Regime, Nigeria, Army.
INTRODUCTION
The personality of Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu emerged in political limelight after the coup d’etat
of January 15 1966 that terminated the First Republic. The coup received varied interpretations. It
was seen in some quarters as an ethnically-motivated political move by the Igbo to dominate other
Nigerians while for others, it was a response to the ills of the leaders and government of the First
Republic. Central in the various opinions about the coup is the role played by Chukwuma Kaduna
Nzeogwu, one of the five original Majors that conceived the putsch. Chukwuma’s popularity was not
only because he successfully executed his own roles in the coup, but also because he was the only
one among the five Majors that was opportuned to read the aims of the revolution to the populace.
Also, Chukwuma was the only one among the coupists that established a government in the
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northern region until the General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army eventually assumed
control in Lagos. Events that followed subsequently marked the beginning of military intervention
in Nigerian politics and a civil war that altered coexistence and national peace for almost three
years, with consequences and implications for contemporary Nigerian history. The coup and the
war exacerbated ethnic divisions and exclusions among the major ethnic nationalities that make up
the Nigerian State and has lingered on in the throes of contemporary Nigerian history.
NZEOGWU AS AN ENIGMA: HIS BIRTH UP TO ENLISTMENT
Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu was born on 26 February 1937 to the family of James and Elizabeth
Nzeogwu who lived in Argungu Road Kaduna, close to St. Joseph’s Catholic Church where
Chukwuma was baptised as Patrick. His baptismal name was preceded by an informal name‒
“Kaduna”‒ which became the preferred name for neighbours and acquaintances. Peter Okeleke
Nzeogwu is of the view that the name ‘Kaduna’ came as ‘Dan Kaduna’ and was conferred on
Chukwuma during the interregnum between his birth and baptism when neighbours awaited his
christening. He was to be called ‘Dan Kaduna’ (son of Kaduna) until the formal conferment of a
Christian name [1]. Neighbours and friends came to learn that the names “Chukwuma” and “Patrick”
after “Kaduna” had become a common name for infant Chukwuma. One notable adjustment was the
dropping of the prefix “Dan”. Chukwuma Kaduna Patrick Nzeogwu became the name of James
Nzeogwu’s first son. Names come with significance in African societies. Aside the conferment of such
English names as Augustine, Patrick and others which signify the wish by contemporary churches
that new borns behave like the saints who they are named after, other Igbo names are explanatory
and are informative of circumstances, feelings, dispositions and or sentiments. For instance,
“Chukwuma,” meaning “God knows,” signifies the Omni-knowledge of the Supreme Being. It denotes
that God knows and has a purpose for which he embarked upon the creation of the person in view.
The name was an exaltation of a sort by Chukwuma’s parents who believed that his birth was pre- designed for a great purpose, implying therefore that God alone knew the purpose for which
Chukwuma was born. The growing Chukwuma perhaps inadvertently obliterated Patrick from his
name. He rather preferred Chukwuma and Kaduna as most of his official documents and letters bore
Major C. K. Nzeogwu [2].
Chukwuma’s birth brought his family to closer ties with severe hardship. Unable to cope with the
very meagre remuneration from his teaching job, Mr James, with the help of Rev. Father McCarthy,
secured another job at the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria (ECN), Kaduna where he trained as an
apprentice technician and was fully employed after a short time [3]. Elizabeth, Chukwuma’s mother,
was a native of Ugbolu, a village close to Okpanam, Delta State where his father hailed from. After
marriage rites, James took Elizabeth to Kaduna. In Kaduna, she initially relied wholly on James to
provide all financial needs of the home. This became a source of tension for the young family. James’
inability to provide all that was needed amidst rumours of his benevolence to colleagues and
associates angered his wife. She was always willing to engage her husband in a heated argument
until he provided what she considered manageable for the home. Economic conditions of the times
forced the Nzeogwus into intense frugality. Only the necessary needs of the house were provided.
The family was deeply troubled by the difficulty of managing their meagre resources when
Chukwuma and his siblings began growing into dependent infants. Most necessary needs were not
available in the Nzeogwu home for which reason infant Chukwuma got acquainted to frugality. He
adjusted to managing the little his parents could provide and regarded affluence as an unnecessary
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7(6) 22-31.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.76.8134 24
waste. Chukwuma was a very inquisitive and precocious child. As a young primary school pupil in
St. Joseph’s Catholic Primary School, Kaduna, he often asked his teachers endless questions. He also
often wanted to enquire into things that were unclear and also questioned the status quo.
Frustration over things he could not explain was expressed after school when he will withdraw to
himself, evidently perturbed [3].
Chukwuma was a good pupil who easily got on well with arithmetics and writing. He laid good
preliminary foundations for his post-primary education. It seems that Chukwuma’s inclination
towards becoming a soldier was evident in his years as an infant when, after watching soldiers go
through early morning drills, he would gather handy children for a mock demonstration of all they
saw during the parades. It was perhaps at this stage that he made up his young mind to become a
soldier. In 1950, he sat for the test for entrance into college. He gained admission into St. John’s
College, Kaduna. According to Obasanjo [3]:
Saint John’s College in Kaduna was another possibility but the entrance examination
was very competitive. It was conducted throughout the whole of Northern Nigeria, but
the school hardly admitted more than sixty children at a time, so a child had to be
exceptionally brilliant to get in. Even for children of Catholics, admission was not
automatic.
True to the above testimony by his friend, Chukwuma sat for the interview and gained admission
on merit. St. John’s missionary outlook and features meant a strong emphasis on discipline and
religion. Chukwuma did not find any of these two strange for, right from home, his disciplinary
disposition was enough foundational training. He was severally subjected to corporal punishment
by his father whenever he erred. Similarly, the family’s travails over issues and problems arising
from child mortality subjected Chukwuma’s parents to regular prayers of atonement and other
Christian activities that could attract God’s mercies and intervention. Therefore, religion and
discipline in St. John’s was only a continuation [1], even though Chukwuma only partially
participated in the post-class disciplinary activities because his father could not afford the £33
required for one to live in the dormitory. Chukwuma went to school from an improvised
accommodation. His father could only afford the £11 fee for day students.
Chukwuma lived with a guardian to whom his father gave latitude and freedom to discipline him.
Mr Hyacinth Odigwe, his guardian, had the philosophy that if you spare the rod, you spoil the child.
He meted strict disciplinary measures on Chukwuma who sometimes challenged his
highhandedness and disciplinary disposition. Chukwuma’s attitude tilted towards revolt, especially
towards behaviours he discerned as harsh and incompatible with freedom and liberty. In school, he
often challenged students who derived pleasure in bullying the vulnerable. Similarly, his teachers
attracted his rebellious characteristics when he perceived their actions as oppressive. He did not
waste time to tacitly or overtly express disagreement over acts of, or perceived intimidation and
oppression. He was narrowly able to escape the consequence of his revolutionary attitude until his
final year in school when he was caught up in a web of conflict of authority and quest for liberty and
fairness. First was his disagreement with his school’s training instructor for which he organised a
boycott in protest against his highhandedness. Next was his expulsion from school because he led a
revolt against the school’s authorities. This was the height of the indication that adolescent
Chukwuma Nzeogwu, who was nicknamed “Major” had serious predilection for oppression by
authorities and men in high places. In 1955, St. John’s operated a syllabus on the basis of six years
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for school certificate. When several efforts by Chukwuma’s class to write the examination in the fifth
year failed and yet the same privilege sought was granted to the immediate junior class, Chukwuma
led a revolt of his classmates. This led to the suspension of members of his class. While other
members of the class tendered apologies and were subsequently reabsorbed, Chukwuma insisted
that the cause he fought for was just. This was the reason why Chukwuma wrote the school
certificate examination from home. He did not plead for leniency and was therefore not forgiven.
Chukwuma studied hard and his efforts were reflected in his good grades. His parents were happy
that his distraction did not adversely affect his grades. They were more bewildered to discover that
he declined to use his school certificate result to secure a job because he was studying for the
Nigerian Army Cadetship examination. His father refused his several entreaties to be allowed to join
the army. In fact, his detestation for his son’s choice led him to hide Chukwuma’s successful
cadetship examination results until Chukwuma personally found out and insisted on enlisting. In
March 1957, Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu enlisted as an officer cadet in the Nigerian Regiment of
the West African Frontier Force [4]. After few months in Lagos, the new recruits were taken to
Ghana for a preliminary training. Successful ones, including Chukwuma, were to move to Mons in
Aldershot and Sandhurst for officer training. Training in these prestigious military academies was
designed to broaden the cadet’s knowledge and outlook and was characterised by British military
traditions which were vocally sermonizing and admonishing against communism. Officers were
encouraged and in fact, coerced to openly declare aversion for communism.
After the trainings, Major Nzeogwu’s Commanding Officer‒ Colonel Turbull‒ remarked that he was
“a confident, mature and sound cadet and a good trier at most activities” [3]. From Mons and
Sandhurst, Chukwuma proceeded for infantry and weapons training in Hythe in Kent, England. His
success in Hythe gave passage to another‒ a platoon commander course in Warminster where it
was reported that, “Nzeogwu should make a good platoon commander who has learnt a lot and who
will improve with experience” [3]. Chukwuma was among the Nigerian contingent deployed to the
Congo in 1960 under the command of Colonel Aguiyi Ironsi. Upon his return, he was posted to the
Army Training Depot in Zaria and later to the Army Headquarters, Lagos to take charge of Military
Intelligence. His obvious lack of knowledge in the new area prompted his training in Britain for
which he was commended to be “an alert and interested student... who was not afraid to ask
questions... he should make a good counter Intelligence Officer” [1].
Major Nzeogwu returned from training in India Staff College in 1964 to face disenchantment from
the unimpressive political, economic, and social situations in Nigeria. His training in the Intelligence
Unit endowed him with the proficiency to assess the rate of progress or otherwise within his
country. Similarly, his exposure to certain books framed his views about political and social
developments in immediate post-independence Nigeria. His choice of books were for instance, Eoka,
a text on the Greek underground movement in Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, the Malayen insurgency
and uprising, Giap people’s war and People’s Army, the Guerrilla activities in Algeria and in
Portuguese African territories. These books convinced him that it was not just necessary but also
possible to fight and liberate Nigeria which was at the time, immersed in a deluge of disheartening
corruption, nepotism, ethnicism and brigandage. The revolutionary tendency was, perhaps,
exacerbated by news of successful military uprisings elsewhere in Africa in the 1960s and earlier.
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NZEOGWU’S INTENTIONS AND ROLES IN THE JANUARY 1966 MILITARY COUP
In the early morning of Saturday 16th January 1966, Nigerians woke up to the news of the overthrow
of the First Republic by some rebellious elements of the Nigerian Army. News had it also that the
Prime Minister of Nigeria, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, and the Minister of Finance, Chief Okotie-Eboh,
were missing. There was also news of the assassination of some senior military officers, followed
by an acceptance speech by the General Officer Commanding (GOC) the Nigerian Army. Amidst this
confusion, Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu announced over the Northern Radio Service that, “in
the name of the Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces, I declare martial
law over the Northern Provinces of Nigeria” [5]. The new Martial Law over the Northern provinces
was a direct contradiction of the announcement from the Army GOC [6] that,
The government of the Federation of Nigeria having ceased to function, the Nigerian Armed Forces
have been invited to form an interim military government for the purposes of maintaining law and
order... this invitation has been accepted and I, the GOC have been formally invested with authority
as Head of Federal Military Government.
According to a special Branch report of the Nigerian Police, Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna, Okafor and
Captain Oji were the original members of the conspiratorial group that came up with the idea of
Nigeria’s first military coup in August, 1965 [7]. Siollun [8] believes that while Major Ifeajuna was
certainly one of the originators of the plot, the participants admitted that they had discussed the
idea of a coup for several years before 1965. Events became clearer when minds began to discern
the text of the Northern Martial Law in which the reasons for the coup were contained and wherein
Major Nzeogwu made it clear that:
The aim of the Revolutionary Council is to establish a strong, united and prosperous
nation, free from corruption and internal strife. Our method of achieving this is strictly
military, but we have no doubt that every Nigerian will give us maximum cooperation
by assisting the regime and not disturbing the peace during the slight changes that are
taking place.
Further on the aim of the coup, Nzeogwu’s speech stressed that:
You will hear and probably see a lot being done by certain bodies charged by the
Supreme Council with the duties of national integration, supreme justice, general
security and property recovery.
To allay the fears of ordinary citizens on the exact targets of the coup, the Major further pronounced
that:
Our enemies are the political profiteers, swindlers, the men in the high and low places
that seek bribes and demand ten percent, those that seek to keep the country divided
permanently so that they can remain in office as ministers and VIPs of waste, the
tribalists, the nepotists, those that make the country look big for nothing before
international circles, those that have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian
political calendar back by their words and deeds [9].
Major C. K. Nzeogwu’s objective in achieving national rebirth through a revolution was truncated
by the failure of the eastern and western contingents of the coup [10]. Loyal troops led by General
J. T. U. Aguiyi Ironsi took over governance while Nzeogwu, convinced by an old friend, Conrad
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Nwawo, submitted to the new military government and was subsequently incarcerated for his
actions that led to the end of the First Republic.
A police special report on the coup suggests that the idea of a coup began in about 1964. It equally
believes that the original initiator of the idea that metamorphosed into the coup was Major
Emmanuel Ifeajuna. Like-minded soldiers were incorporated into the plan usually by ascertaining
their opinion about the government of the First Republic. Alex Madiebo reveals that the most
efficient strategy was that either Nzeogwu or Ifeajuna would initiate an anti-government discussion
where a cooperative co-discussant was seen as a friend while those whose opinions favour the
government were regarded as uncooperative. It was largely through this means that most of the co- conspirators were initiated. Similarly, initiation and incorporation were made easy by the dominant
feeling of disenchantment over happenings in the government of the First Republic and in the
Nigerian State of the 1960s. For instance, by 1964, tension had risen over disagreements arising
from the general elections. Events following were the disagreements by the Northern People’s
Congress (NPC) and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) which almost
brought governance to a halt. Also, the Western Region was engulfed in the political squabble
between S. L. Akintola and his erstwhile leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo for which the Balewa
government took sides with the former. These later events did not trivialise the high level of
corruption, repugnant rate of favouritism, nepotism and palpable ethnic divisions.
Spurred on by his detestation for the degree of decadence in Nigeria, and encouraged by his inability
to endure the rot, Major Nzeogwu yielded to the idea of putting an end to the government that was
believed to have infested Nigerians with wrath. No doubt, some people believe that Nzeogwu’s
actions had ethnic motives, but one can understand his ideals in Muffets words:
Any officer who knew him (Chukwuma) could tell you that this man was a pure
nationalist who burned within with love of his country... he gave scant regard to the
place of origin of his countrymen, having been born in Kaduna and raised in an era of
nationalistic consciousness. He was sophisticated in his analysis of history and of
political events in the country [11].
Chukwuma believed that some people were undesirable for the future progress of the country. He
believed that some people had to be sacrificed for Nigeria to move forward. Furthermore, he sought
to cleanse Nigeria of the corrupt generation of politicians and replace same with those considered
apt for Nigeria. One of the men in this category, by his rating, was Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a Yoruba.
According to Nzeogwu:
Neither myself nor any of the other lads was in the least interested in governing the
country. We were soldiers and not politicians. We had earmarked from the list known
to every soldier in this operation who would be what. Chief Obafemi Awolowo was, for
example, to be released from jail immediately and to be made the executive provisional
President of Nigeria... [12]
In the same vein, Captain Nwobosi, one of the conspirators and coupists, attests that:
We planned that after the coup, none of us was going to be the Head of State. Awolowo
was in Calabar Prison and in our own minds, this was the man. We wanted to put
somebody who was sincere... Awolowo was our man, our man for the job [13].
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Similarly, Odia Ofeimun, Awolowo’s personal secretary confirmed that the plan of the coup makers
was to release Awolowo from jail and make him their own leader [14]. Available evidence indicates
that the intention of the coup plotters was to replace the leaders of the First Republic leaders with
people they believed could give better governance. The group reasoned that Chief Awolowo was
oppressed by the Balewa government due to his aversion for corruption and the retrogressive
polices of the government. For this, and the belief that he possessed the dexterity for good
governance, they sought to entrust Nigeria in his hands, but the failure of the coup ushered in more
deplorable socio-political and economic conditions for Nigeria and Nigerians. Six months after
General Ironsi led loyal troops to foil the Nzeogwu coup, he, Ironsi was killed in the first ethno- nationalistic coup by northern elements in the Army. The following periods in Nigerian history were
marked by ethno-religious and regional politics characterised by the ascendancy of the hegemonic
Hausa-Fulani oligarchy in Nigerian politics.
THE PARADOX OF THE JANUARY 1966 COUP AND SUBSEQUENT POLITICAL PERMUTATIONS
AND EQUATIONS IN NIGERIA
Contrary to the motives and intentions of the detribalised January 15 coup, the Nigerian state from
July 1966 became a veritable ground for ethnic nationalism. This was a product of many reasons
including the manipulation and false reasoning that the coup was an Igbo coup meant to ensure Igbo
domination over other Nigerians. This misconception coincided with the emergence of Ironsi which
exacerbated fears within northern elements in and outside the army, drawing from the fact that he
was Igbo. It is plausible that this accounted for the “re-match” which saw the killing of General
Ironsi, as well as its aftermath, the Civil War, after which the following political equations and
configurations followed: ethno-religious and regional politics since 1970 and the ascendancy of the
Fulani oligarchy in Nigerian politics from the days of military regimes up to 2015. Ethno-religious
politics in Nigeria did not commence after the Civil War, rather it assumed more intense dimensions
after the war. Earlier in 1959, party politics had assumed an ethno-regional dimension. The National
Council of Nigerian Citizens lost its national outlook to become more of an Igbo party as was the
Northern People’s Congress, a predominantly northern Nigerian party, while the Action Group was
the party for the Yoruba. A similar trend was repeated in 1964 and formed part of the subterfuge
for military incursions into Nigerian politics. The Civil War that followed was also fought along
ethno-regional and to lesser extents, religious dimensions. The Federal Government by this time
dominated by the north, itself dominated by the Hausa-Fulani, refused the secessionist moves of the
Igbo and Christian-dominated Eastern region. The end of the war saw the north victorious after
which the Hausa-Fulani carefully manipulated the political configuration in their favour.
Yakubu Gowon, the war-time northern ruler, retained power until 1976. His regime was notorious
for its exclusion of easterners, especially the Igbo [15]. In fact, he was believed to have taken a
compensatory posture in favour of those who planned the coup that brought him to power. The
regime paid lip service to the much renditioned “No victor, no vanquished” slogan. Ethno-regional
politics at some point took the dimension of economic, social and political emasculation targeted
against the perceived enemy‒ the former Biafra. Both the timing of the indigenisation policy of 1972
and the preceding issuance of £20 to Biafrans irrespective of amounts they had in the banks were
aimed at dehumanising the Igbo. As if these were not enough, the Second Republic became another
example of demographic and ethnic superiority. Shehu Shagari’s emergence was, no doubt, a
product of the inflated census figures of the 1950s and 60s. This accounted for demographic
imbalance in favour of the north. That regime was succeeded by another military regime (General
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Muhammadu Buhari) whose Supreme Commander was also a northerner. By the time its life span
was forcefully terminated in 1985, the regime was succeeded by another northern regime. General
Babangida, a northerner, ruled for eight years and was succeeded by another northerner. His
interim successor peacefully stepped aside after three months, ostensibly to realise another ethno- regional agenda– the installation of another northerner. The Abacha regime, with its numerous
flaws and unacceptability, threw Nigeria into deeper ethnic divisions. It was another era of
heightened ethno-nationalism and ethnic conflicts. General Abacha’s death gave the impression that
there would be a natural shift of political power, or at most that the following periods would mark
the sharing of power among the various ethnic areas that make up Nigeria. A contrary situation
emerged shortly as Abdulsalami Abubakar succeeded the late dictator.
Olusegun Obasanjo’s tenure was perhaps a compensation for the west’s help in the 1967‒70 war
against the Igbo, or a recompense for denying Chief M. K. O. Abiola, the supposed winner of the 1992
elections, the opportunity of emerging as Nigeria’s President. That compensation lasted for only
seven years, after which power returned to the acclaimed “natural owners”. By the end of the
Obasanjo-led administration, itself preceded by the Abdulsalami Abubakar-led military regime,
Umaru Musa Yar’Adua emerged as President. A detribalised Nigerian, Yar’adua could not live to
fulfil his dream of national integration. His Vice, Goodluck Jonathan, from the South, completed the
tenure and had another before power was returned to the Hausa-Fulani oligarchy.
The emergence of the Fulani oligarchy in Nigerian politics is more of a design and a long-borne
aspiration than an accident of history. The force suppressed the established Hausa civilisation and
took over governance of the upper Niger until their suzerainty was subdued by British colonialists
who, on exit, found favour in them [16]. The Hausa-Fulani were encouraged by their British
overlords to, not just ensure the indivisibility of Nigeria, but also the imposition of a purportedly
larger numerical strength over the south. The admonition by the British accounted for the
withdrawal of intentions to secceed from Nigeria by the Hausa-Fulani. The 1959 election marked a
manifestation of the mischievous advice by the British. It was during that year that the results of the
elections made it difficult for neither the north nor the south to emerge as a defined winner of the
general elections. A coalition was arranged to create a marriage that was pampered for only four
years before the strange bedfellows disagreed again. The disagreements and surrounding events
accounted mostly for the intervention by Nzeogwu and others. The coup was erroneously
condemned mostly on the ground that it was an Igbo coup, but awaits commendations on the
ground that it marked the emergence into power of another class within the Hausa-Fulani.
The Nzeogwu coup that saw the death of the allegedly corrupt leaders of the First Republic marked
an end to the era of rulership by the religio-traditional aristocracy. It ushered in the growth of a new
oligarchy, mostly from the Army. Most of these leaders, for their efforts and birth, were not by any
imagination to rule over the conservative Muslim society. Nzeogwu, himself from a humble
background, inadvertently achieved the creation of a new cream of the Hausa-Fulani oligarchy who
assumed power and still remain in or around the corridors of power in Nigeria till date.
Unfortunately, rather than express gratitude to Nzeogwu, contemporary Nigerian historians have
ascribed the place of a monster to the man whose revolutionary activities recreated Nigerian history
in many ways including creating the opportunity for the Hausa-Fulani new oligarchy to remain in
power. The argument here is that the political ascendancy of northern Nigeria could not have
assumed its current status but for the Nzeogwu-led coup. It is true that the British were paternalistic
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to the northerners and wholeheartedly planted them as their successors, but this does not obfuscate
the fact that but for the coup of 1966, the south would most likely not have endured the northern
dominance for long. The disintegration of the country may have come earlier by any means,
violently or peacefully. That would also have brought an end to the Fulani hegemonic domination
of Nigeria, but the January 1966 coup put paid to that. Therefore and as stated earlier, contemporary
political developments in Nigeria cannot and should not ignore the patriotic role of Nzeogwu in
keeping Nigeria one, as it were. The coup he led was well intentioned but was misinterpreted by the
eventual beneficiaries of the exercise. For many decades after 1967, Nigeria’s military rulers came
from the former northern region. Even when democratic governance was restored in 1979, it was
still the north that produced the President. But for the brief period of 1999 to 2007, and 2010 to
2015, Nigeria has remained under the firm grip of the Fulani-dominated northern oligarchy. That is
the legacy that was initiated by the British but which the quelling of the January 1966 coup restored.
Also, Ahmadu Bello’s Fulanization policy in northern Nigeria was truncated by the coup. In that
regard, non Fulani northerners owe gratitude to Nzeogwu and his colleagues. For the Igbo, the war
of 1967 to 1970 which was a direct consequence of the January 1966 coup earned them the
admiration of the world for their ability to exhibit their innate ingenuity in improvising materials
and weapons which enabled them to survive the war. For this too, they owe a lot to Nzeogwu. The
legacy of State creation is traceable to the 1966 coup which brought benefits to regions after the
war.
CONCLUSION
Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu’s revolutionary mind changed the order not just in contemporary
Nigerian history but also in Nigerian politics. His rebellious streaks, manifest from infancy, were
outrageously uninhabitable. The same urge that manifested in his rebellion against his teachers in
St. James manifested again during the problem infested First Republic. To end the era of poverty,
cronyism, ethnicity and corruption, Nzeogwu joined the plan to execute a coup. By January 1966,
the Majors struck, bringing to an end, the rule by the Hausa-Fulani religious aristocracy. Yakubu
Gowon, Murtala Mohammed, Muhammadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida, Sani Abacha, and other such
names made unprepared appearances in Nigerian politics, thereby marking the emergence of a new
Hausa-Fulani oligarchy. This group, till date, directly or indirectly determine their successors.
Rather than pay deserving tributes to the Major that pulled the trigger that marked the unexpected
change, Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu’s place in the throes of contemporary Nigerian history is yet
to be properly appreciated. Similarly, one wonders what would have been the lot of the average
core northerner, those in the Middle Belt and Nigerians generally if the coup had not occurred when
it did. Would the north have achieved the monumental development strides it has today if the ultra- conservative elements had remained? What would have been the fate of the non Fulani of the north?
Would the north have had more States than the south or dominated the military? Here lies the
historical relevance of Nzeogwu in contemporary Nigeria.
[1] Peter Okeleke Nzeogwu, Major C. K. Nzeogwu: Fighting the Illusive Nigerian Enemy (Ibadan: Spectrum Books
Limited, 2003), 23 – 25.
[2] Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu signed all his cheques and documents as Major C. K. Nzeogwu. See Peter
Okeleke Nzeogwu, Major C. K. Nzeogwu, 26.
[3] Olusegun Obasanjo, Nzeogwu: An Intimate Portrait of Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu (Ibadan: Spectrum
Books Limited, 1987), 11.
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[4] Nigerian Army Education Corps and School (NAECS), History of the Nigerian Army, 1963 – 1992 (Abjua: Nigerian
Army Headquarters, 1992), 67.
[5] Major Kaduna Nzeogwu, Broadcast over Northern Broadcasting Service declaring Martial Law over Northern
Region on 16th January, 1966.
[6] General J. T. U. Aguiyi Ironsi’s acceptance speech as the Head of the Federal Military Government- 17/1/1966.
[7] Police Special Branch Report on the 15 January 1966 coup quoted in Max Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence:
Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture, 1966 – 1976 (New York: Algora Publishing, 2009), 31.
[8] Max Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence, 32.
[9] Speech by Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu declaring martial law over the North quoted in A. H. M. Kirk Green, Crisis
and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Source Book, Vol. 1 January 1966 – July 1967 (London: Oxford University
Press, 1971), 127.
[10] For more on the failure of the coup in the west and east, see Adewale Ademoyega, Why we Struck: the Story of
the First Nigerian Coup (Ibadan: Evans Publishers, 1981). See also Ben Gbulie, Nigeria’s Five Majors: Coup d’etat of
15th January 1966, First Inside Account (Onitsha: Africana Educational Publishers, 1981).
[11] D. J. M. Muffet, Let the Truth be Told: The Coup d’etat of 1966 (Zaria: Hudahuda, 1982), 17.
[12] Nigerian Tribune, July 2 1967.
[13] Hafiz Momoh (ed), The Nigerian Civil war 1967 – 1970: History and Reminiscences (Ibadan: Bookman Publishers
2000), 737 – 739.
[14] See Guardian, May 6 2007, cited in Max Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence, 38.
[15] Max Siollun, Soldiers of Fortune (Abuja: Cassava Republic Press Book, 2013), 76.
[16] See Chibuike Uche, “Oil British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War”, Journal of African History, Vol. 49 (2008),
111-35.