Page 1 of 19
87
Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal – Vol.7, No.6
Publication Date: June 25, 2020
DOI:10.14738/assrj.76.7882.
Vivian, J. A., & Muis, K. R. (2020) Epistemic Beliefs Moderate Mediations Among Attitudes, Prior Misconceptions, and Conceptual Change.
Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 7(6) 87-105.
Epistemic Beliefs Moderate Mediations Among Attitudes,
Prior Misconceptions, and Conceptual Change
James A. Vivian
Department of Educational & Counselling Psychology,
Faculty of Education, McGill University, Montreal, Canada.
Krista R. Muis
Department of Educational & Counselling Psychology,
Faculty of Education, McGill University, Montreal, Canada.
ABSTRACT
We investigated the mediating and moderating roles of attitudes and
epistemic beliefs in conceptual change during learning about genetically
modified foods (GMFs). One hundred twenty undergraduate students
participated. To measure misconceptions about GMFs, students first
completed a prior knowledge test. Students then completed self-report
inventories to measure their attitudes and topic-specific epistemic
beliefs regarding GMFs. Students were then randomly assigned to read
a refutation or expository text about GMFs. Following reading, students
completed a test to assess conceptual change. Results of a repeated
measures ANOVA revealed participants who read a refutation text
changed more misconceptions at post-test than participants who read
an expository text. A moderation mediation analysis revealed attitudes
toward GMFs significantly mediated the relationship between prior
misconceptions and conceptual change, and that this relationship was
moderated by learners’ beliefs regarding the source and justification of
GMFs knowledge. Theoretical and educational implications are
discussed.
Keywords: attitudes; epistemic beliefs; conceptual change; genetically
modified foods
INTRODUCTION
The public’s increasing mistrust in science has become a particularly challenging problem for
learning and science education. An example is the recent increase in measles outbreaks in America
and Europe (World Health Organization, 2018) due to misconceptions that the measles, mumps,
and rubella vaccine (MMR) causes autism (Kata, 2012). The vaccine-autism misconception can be
traced back to a fraudulent study by Wakefield et al. (1998), published in the Lancet medical journal.
wherein they asserted that a temporal association exists between administration of the MMR
vaccine and the onset of autism. Despite its retraction and substantial research evidence to the
contrary, many individuals continue to hold misconceptions about vaccines, and consequently, have
been increasingly refusing to get vaccinated.
Page 2 of 19
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.76.7882 88
Vivian, J. A., & Muis, K. R. (2020) Epistemic Beliefs Moderate Mediations Among Attitudes, Prior Misconceptions, and Conceptual Change. Advances in Social
Sciences Research Journal, 7(6) 87-105.
Misconceptions represent inaccurate knowledge, understanding, or faulty reasoning that departs
from scientific knowledge or understanding of a topic (Heddy, Danielson, Sinatra, & Graham, 2017).
Such errors in reasoning are typically acquired during previous learning and can negatively predict
new learning (Krause, Kelly, Corkins, Tasooji, & Purzer, 2009). Misconceptions can be
counterproductive for learning when individuals are unable to recognize and revise their
misconceptions and discriminate between information based on evidence and information derived
from opinion, including knowledge that has been contorted to meet social, political, and/or
economic gains (Ecker, Hogan, & Lewandowsky, 2017; Sinatra & Seyranian, 2016).
Many individuals hold misconceptions about a variety of complex socioscientific topics, including
vaccines, climate change, stem cell research, and genetically modified foods (GMFs). Indeed, due to
a lack of accurate knowledge (i.e., misconceptions), many individuals believe GMFs are unsafe for
human consumption and, as a result, hold negative attitudes towards them (Heddy et al., 2017). In
addition to negative attitudes, individuals’ epistemic beliefs (i.e., beliefs about the nature of
knowledge and knowing) may lead them to reject scientifically accurate information about GMFs if
they believe their own knowledge or understanding to be just as valid as those of experts. Taken
together, attitudes and epistemic beliefs may play a role in terms of how individuals process,
interpret, and evaluate various sources of knowledge related to a variety of complex socio-scientific
topics of global significance.
Attitudes refer to positive or negative evaluations of objects, people, or events that predispose
individuals to respond to attitudinal objects in preferential ways (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fishbein
& Icek, 1975). Epistemic beliefs, on the other hand, refer to personal theories (or individual doxastic
assumptions) related to the nature of knowledge (structure and certainty) and the nature of
knowing (i.e., source and justification; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Attitudes predict the types of
information individuals are likely to select, perceive, process, and encode (Maio & Haddock, 2010),
whereas epistemic beliefs play a role in how individuals interpret and evaluate knowledge claims.
In other words, beliefs are the building blocks of attitudes (Dole & Sinatra, 1998). Indeed, an
individual’s attitude toward an object includes an evaluative component (“I don’t like GMFs...) that
is tied to a cognitive component that may be an unjustified belief (i.e., a misconception, “because
they are not safe to eat”) or a justified true belief (i.e., a correct conception [Sinatra & Syranian,
2016]). Changing individuals’ misconceptions about a topic requires shifting an unjustified belief to
a justified true belief where justification is the central mechanism by which this occurs (Authors,
2012).
However, individuals tend to seek out information that is congruent with their attitudes while
ignoring attitude-incongruent information (Maio & Haddock, 2010). Similarly, individuals are likely
to interpret and evaluate discrepant knowledge claims within the context of their own personal
systems of epistemic beliefs, and subsequently, to reject information that does not conform to their
own understanding or topical knowledge. As such, systems of beliefs (and emergent attitudes) can
reflect judgements of fact or processes of evaluation that may be derivative of conjecture (Rockeach,
1968). Given this link, individuals’ epistemic beliefs may interact with their attitudes to predict
whether conceptual change occurs. That is, misconceptions may be less amenable to change when
tied to individuals’ negative attitudes about that topic (Sinatra & Seyranian, 2016). To date,
researchers have not explored the possibility that attitudes and epistemic beliefs may interact to
predict conceptual change. Additionally, few studies have investigated whether individual learner
Page 3 of 19
89
Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal (ASSRJ) Vol.7, Issue 6, June-2020
characteristics such as attitudes and epistemic beliefs interact with the quality of a message (i.e.,
message characteristics of an assigned text) to predict conceptual change. Therefore, we included
two types of texts as a treatment measure in our study: a refutation and an expository text. The
refutation text was used as an instructional approach to support conceptual change by directly
confronting a misconception using causal explanations to refute incorrect knowledge. The
expository text served as a control and included the same content as the refutation text, but without
the refutation content. Decades of research in the conceptual change literature has shown refutation
texts to be an effective strategy for supporting conceptual change (see Tippet, 2010 for a full
review). As such, we examined whether conceptual change would vary as a function of learners’
attitudes and epistemic beliefs (i.e., learner characteristics) and type of instructional text (i.e.,
message characteristics).
In a post-truth era when public distrust in science has led to the proliferation of misinformation,
fake news, and erroneous knowledge, expounding a working model of the roles of attitudes and
epistemic beliefs in learning and conceptual change is imperative to understanding how these
factors can be leveraged to enhance learning outcomes for individuals who hold inaccurate
conceptions, negative attitudes, and limited epistemic strategies for interpreting and evaluating
knowledge and knowing related to complex scientific issues (see WHO, 2018 for example).
Therefore, the present study examined the direct, indirect, and conditional indirect effects of prior
misconceptions on conceptual change via learners’ attitudes and epistemic beliefs when learning
about GMFs from refutation and expository texts. Prior to delineating our research questions and
hypotheses, we present relevant theoretical and empirical work.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
Conceptual Change
Conceptual change involves revising misconceptions and updating inaccurate knowledge to reflect
more accurate representations of knowledge regarding a topic (Kendeou & O'Brien, 2014).
Typically, conceptual change is provoked when a state of cognitive conflict arises between
misconceived prior knowledge and the learning of new, discrepant information (Chan, Burtis, &
Bereiter, 1997). When incorrect prior knowledge comes into conflict with newly acquired, accurate
conceptions of a topic, the ensuing incongruity leads to attempts to reconstruct inaccurate
knowledge to reflect more accurate configurations within a conceptual network (Chan et al., 1997;
Chi, 2008; Lombardi, Nussbaum, & Sinatra, 2016).
Regarding science learning, the notion of conceptual change implies that individuals have pre- existing misconceptions—inaccurate mental representations of a topic—that contradict scientific
understanding of that topic (Lombardi et al., 2016). Science misconceptions are often quite
enduring, resistant to change, and can have particularly deleterious effects on learning and decision- making behaviors (Ecker, Hogan & Lewandowsky, 2017; Vosniadou, 1994). To change science
misconceptions, conceptual change is necessary.
Refutation texts are one method used by researchers to investigate and support conceptual change.
Refutation texts help learners reconcile cognitive conflict regarding a topic by directing
metacognitive awareness away from inaccurate knowledge and toward more accurate conceptions
of a topic via the structured presentation of causal explanations to refute incorrect knowledge.
Although effective, research examining the processes involved in conceptual change has shown that
Page 4 of 19
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.76.7882 90
Vivian, J. A., & Muis, K. R. (2020) Epistemic Beliefs Moderate Mediations Among Attitudes, Prior Misconceptions, and Conceptual Change. Advances in Social
Sciences Research Journal, 7(6) 87-105.
successful revision of misconceptions is not merely a product of refuting inaccurate knowledge (i.e.,
simply stating knowledge to be incorrect) (Ecker et al., 2017; Kendeou & O’Brien, 2014). Rather,
successful conceptual change depends in large part on an interaction between individual learner
characteristics (i.e., prior knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, motivation) and message characteristics
(i.e., comprehensibility, coherence, plausibility, and rhetorical structure of a message) (Dole &
Sinatra, 1998). The dynamic and interdependent relations among learner and message
characteristics in conceptual change are delineated in Dole and Sinatra’s (1998) Cognitive
Reconstruction of Knowledge Model (CRKM).
Cognitive Reconstruction of Knowledge Model (CRKM)
According to Dole and Sinatra (1998), individuals differ in the quantity and quality of their prior
knowledge (i.e., misconceptions), and this prior knowledge can interfere with learning and the
interpretation and evaluation of new information (see also Krause et al., 2009; Sinatra et al., 2008).
In their Cognitive Reconstruction of Knowledge Model (CRKM), Dole and Sinatra (1998) described
how interactions between learner characteristics (i.e., existing knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, and
motivation) and message characteristics (i.e., comprehensibility, plausibility, coherence, and
rhetorical structure) determine the likelihood individuals will cognitively reconstruct or revise
previously acquired, inaccurate knowledge.
Individual learner characteristics, such as the strength and coherence of previously acquired
information (i.e., the richness and explanatory power of a conception), as well as an individual’s
commitment to their existing knowledge (i.e., an individual’s attitudes and beliefs regarding the
value of a conception) determine the likelihood individuals will change pre-existing
(mis)conceptions. The stronger and more conceptually coherent an individual’s prior conceptions,
as well as the degree of commitment an individual has toward previously acquired conceptions, the
less likely conceptual change is to occur (Dole & Sinatra, 1998).
Regarding message characteristics, several factors are also likely to affect whether an individual will
revise their existing knowledge, including (1) the comprehensibility and plausibility of a message;
that is, whether the message is conceptually palpable and individuals view the message as credible
(source evaluations), (2) the coherence of the message and whether the message has explanatory
power and effectively links back to larger conceptual structures (elaborative complexity), and (3)
whether the message is rhetorically compelling; that is, whether the message’s structure, sources
of information, and justification of arguments are sufficiently persuasive. In short, a message that is
elusive, ambiguous, incoherent, or disconnected will not likely facilitate conceptual change.
Conceptual change is an iterative process involving dynamic interactions between both learner
characteristics and message characteristics. For example, a comprehensible and plausible message
may be personally relevant for one individual but not another. Additionally, an individual may have
a strong, coherent prior conception to which he or she is strongly committed despite a plausible and
rhetorically compelling counter message. Further, an individual may be dissatisfied with a
previously acquired conception but not find a new message sufficiently plausible or coherent to
warrant replacement of the existing conception. Finally, a message may be considered rhetorically
compelling, but perceived as implausible. As previously noted, one method researchers have found
to be effective in facilitating conceptual change and promoting deeper engagement while processing
a message is via the use of refutation texts, which are described next.
Page 5 of 19
91
Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal (ASSRJ) Vol.7, Issue 6, June-2020
Refutation Texts
Refutation texts are rhetorical devices designed to target misconceptions and facilitate conceptual
change (Kendeou et al., 2014). Numerous studies have shown use of refutation texts to be an
effective method for changing misconceptions related to a variety controversial socio-scientific
topics including GMFs (Heddy et al., 2017; Heddy & Sinatra, 2013; Trevors et al., 2017a; Authors,
2016). Unlike expository texts that present information in a descriptive manner, refutation texts
integrate elements of argumentation to draw metacognitive awareness towards misconceptions or
inaccurate beliefs (Tippet, 2010). According to Kendeou et al. (2013, 2014), a refutation text must
include the following three components to be effective. First, it must directly confront a
misconception (i.e., draw metacognitive awareness toward inaccurate knowledge). Second, it must
explicitly state the falseness of the misconception (i.e., create disequilibrium). Third, it must provide
causal explanations based on empirical evidence to refute the misconception (i.e., to make the
message more plausible; Kendeou et al., 2013, 2014). Causal explanations in refutations represent
to-be-learned information and are intended to create a rich tapestry of information to help reduce
cognitive conflict and the activation of previously acquired, incorrect information to aid in the
reconfiguration of inaccurate knowledge structures within a conceptual network (Kendeou et al.,
2013, 2014).
Although refutation texts are designed to be comprehensible, coherent, plausible, and rhetorically
compelling, an individual’s motivation to revise previously acquired misconceptions significantly
determines their relative depth of engagement with a message (Dole & Sinatra, 1998). At the highest
level of engagement, individuals are more likely to critically evaluate the content of a message to
assess the validity of the knowledge claims as well as the quality of its source. At the lowest level of
engagement, individuals are likely to process only that information that is congruent with their
prevailing attitudes or underlying beliefs (Dole & Sinatra, 1998). In other words, learner
characteristics such as attitudes and epistemic beliefs also predict the probability that learners will
conceptually change and revise previously acquired misconceptions.
Attitudes
Attitudes refer to positive or negative evaluations of people, events, or ideas that lead individuals
to respond with some degree of favor of disfavor (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fishbein & Icek, 1975;
Heddy et al., 2017). In lieu of the oft cited tripartite model of attitudes, which presupposes attitudes
to be made up of orthogonally distinct cognitive, affective, and conative components, attitudes
herein are construed as distinct entities existing separately from cognitive, affective, and behavioral
elements, and specifically, to serve an evaluative function in the appraisal of information derived
from these distinct factors (Fabrigar, Macdonald, & Wegener, 2005). In this way, attitudes are
described in terms of simple object-evaluation associations that are typically embedded within
larger semantic networks of associated knowledge structures (i.e., beliefs, affective states, and
representative behavioral schemas).
The structural view of attitudes as simple object-evaluation associations can be concisely described
as follows: an attitudinal object (say, GMFs) represents one node within a semantic network, the
evaluation of the object (say, beliefs about GMFs) represents the other node, and the link between
the two nodes represents the relative strength of the association (Fabrigar, et al., 2005). For
example, GMFs (the object of evaluation) could be evaluated based on a set of beliefs that GMFs are
Page 6 of 19
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.76.7882 92
Vivian, J. A., & Muis, K. R. (2020) Epistemic Beliefs Moderate Mediations Among Attitudes, Prior Misconceptions, and Conceptual Change. Advances in Social
Sciences Research Journal, 7(6) 87-105.
unsafe for human consumptions (attributes of the object), and the strength of these beliefs
associated with the topic of GMFs could result in an overall negative attitudinal appraisal of GMFs.
As previously mentioned, attitudes are commonly embedded (or linked) to larger networks of
associated knowledge structures (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fabrigar et al., 2005). For example,
specific attributes associated with the representational nature of an object (e.g., cognitive, affective,
or conative properties) are also associated with local evaluations of these representational features
in addition to the overall (global) appraisal of the attitudinal object. In other words, the structure of
an attitude comprises not only object-evaluation associations, but also interconnected knowledge
structures (such as systems of epistemic beliefs), that vary as a function of the strength and pattern
of associative links between the attitude and related structures (Fabrigar et al., 2005). Thus,
attitudes are shaped by both general (global) evaluations of a focal object, and more specific (local)
appraisals of an object’s attributes (or interconnected knowledge structures) that situate the
attitudinal object within a larger semantic network, as shown in Figure 1. In theory, any changes in
knowledge (or conditions under which an object of knowledge and knowing is evaluated) at either
the global or local level should lead to changes in the overall object-evaluation association, and
subsequently, to changes in the representational nature of knowledge for which an attitude has
been formed.
Attitudes serve an evaluative function in the processing of information related to a topic. For
example, evaluations related to the credibility of a scientific claim (attributes of the object) could be
biased by pre-existing attitudes (and associated beliefs), and thus, individuals may ignore evidence
that contradicts their own understanding or conceptions (Sinatra, Kienhues, & Hofer, 2014).
Consequently, attitudes can interfere with new learning, including individuals’ interpretations of
information (i.e., perceptions of certainty or complexity), evaluations of source credibility, and
judgements regarding the veracity of scientific information (Sinatra et al., 2014). In other words,
attitudes are likely related to an individuals’ epistemic beliefs. Moreover, research has shown that
epistemic beliefs predict individuals’ understanding, learning, achievement, and conceptual change
(Stathopoulou & Vosniadou, 2007).
Epistemic Beliefs
Epistemic beliefs reflect individuals’ beliefs about knowledge and knowing, are relatively stable
over time, and include doxastic assumptions regarding the nature of knowledge and knowing (Hofer
& Pintrich, 1997; Authors, 2007, 2018; Schommer, 1990; Sinatra & Hofer, 2016). Whether explicit
or implicit, epistemic beliefs play a central role in how individuals reason about knowledge and
knowing (Chinn, Buckland, Samarapungavan, 2011; Sinatra et al., 2014), including evaluations and
judgments regarding the veracity of information obtained from multiple sources (Greene, Yu, &
Copeland, 2014), and are predictive of both learning processes and achievement outcomes (Chinn
et al., 2011; Hofer, 2000; Authors, 2004, 2007).
Based on the work of Hofer and Pintrich (1997), epistemic beliefs are defined as personal theories
related to beliefs about the structure of knowledge, certainty of knowledge, source of knowledge,
and justification for knowing. The first two dimensions (structure and certainty) concern beliefs
about the properties of knowledge, and the second two dimensions (source and justification)
concern beliefs regarding processes of knowing. Beliefs regarding the structure of knowledge
concern whether knowledge is believed to be made up of discrete (simple) facts, or whether
knowledge is multifaceted and composed of highly complex and interrelated concepts. For the
Page 7 of 19
93
Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal (ASSRJ) Vol.7, Issue 6, June-2020
certainty of knowledge, individuals may view knowledge as static and unchanging (steady state
knowledge) or evolving and perpetually changing (entropic knowledge states). For the source of
knowledge, individuals may believe knowledge is generated and disseminated via authority figures
(externally generated), or personally constructed via reason and logic (internally generated).
Finally, beliefs regarding the justification for knowing refer to whether individuals view knowledge
as justified by expert authority, subjective experience, or via multiple sources of information (Hofer
& Pintrich, 1997; Trevors et al., 2017b).
Research has shown that more constructivist epistemic beliefs (i.e., knowledge is complex, highly
interrelated, uncertain, derived and justified via multiple sources of information) are correlated
with various facets of learning and achievement (Franco, et al, 2012; Stathopoulou & Vosniadou,
2007), including self-regulated learning (see; Authors, 2007, 2010, 2018), conceptual change
(Mason & Gava, 2007; Mason, Gava, & Boldrin, 2008), emotions (Authors, 2015, 2016), complex
problem-solving (Authors, 2008), and digital literacy (Greene et al., 2014). In terms of conceptual
change, numerous studies have found that individuals who hold more constructivist epistemic
beliefs change more misconceptions after reading refutation texts than individuals who hold less
constructivist epistemic beliefs (i.e., knowledge is simple, certain, derived and justified via authority
or personal judgement; see Franco et al., 2012; Authors, 2011; Mason & Gava, 2007; Mason et al.,
2008; Murphy & Alexander, 2016; Trevors et al., 2017).
Epistemic beliefs serve as a focal lens for understanding scientific topics and play an integral role in
how individuals interpret and evaluate scientific knowledge, including discrepant knowledge
claims (Sinatra et al. 2014), and predict the ways in which individuals engage in scientific inquiry,
evaluate theories against evidence, interpret explanatory models of theoretical constructs, and
develop understanding of complex science topics in relation to multiple, often discrepant sources
of information (Stathopoulou & Vosniadou, 2007). Given the important role of epistemic beliefs in
learning and understanding of scientific knowledge (Stathopoulou & Vosniadou, 2007), including
the role attitudes play in how individuals select, interpret, process and encode information (Maoi &
Haddock, 2010), more research is needed to examine how, in what ways, and for whom epistemic
beliefs and attitudes work together to predict conceptual change. Such understanding could provide
deeper knowledge of the structural and functional links between individuals’ underlying systems of
epistemic beliefs and the emergent attitudes by which they appraise objects of knowledge and
knowing. The relationship between attitudes and epistemic beliefs in conceptual change is
discussed next.
Theoretical Relationship Between Attitudes and Epistemic Beliefs
Common assumptions in the research on attitudes is that beliefs (i.e., cognitions and related
knowledge structures) and attitudes are functionally consistent with one another. For example, a
belief that GMFs are harmful for human consumption typically elicits a negative attitude, and
changes to inaccurate beliefs (or misconceptions) can lead to a concomitant shift in the valence of
attitudes (see Heddy et al., 2017 and Sinatra & Seyranian, 2016). According to Ajzen (1989),
however, attitudes and beliefs are not merely consistent with one another; rather, attitudes
systematically vary as a function of individuals’ beliefs such that individuals’ beliefs have a direct or
causal effect on attitudes. In other words, attitudes are conditional upon individuals’ beliefs.
Page 8 of 19
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.76.7882 94
Vivian, J. A., & Muis, K. R. (2020) Epistemic Beliefs Moderate Mediations Among Attitudes, Prior Misconceptions, and Conceptual Change. Advances in Social
Sciences Research Journal, 7(6) 87-105.
While beliefs are typically tacit in exerting their effects on learning and behavior (Ajzen, 1989),
attitudes tend to remain highly accessible to readily guide learning and decision-making behaviors
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). For example, previously formed attitudes regarding GMFs (the object of
evaluation) are automatically activated during encounters with knowledge claims about GMFs
(attributes of the object), and these readily available object-evaluation associations mitigate the
need for individuals to metacognitively process all attributes of an argument vis-a-vis their
predominant underlying epistemic beliefs each time they encounter a knowledge claim about GMFs.
In this way, beliefs moderate attitudinal processing of information during learning and conceptual
change, whereas attitudes serve a heuristic function for learning by enabling individuals to quickly
process topical knowledge and to make quick decisions regarding whether to accept or reject
knowledge claims related to a focal topic.
Although individuals’ beliefs might not necessarily be veridical (i.e., beliefs may be biased or
inaccurate), once an individual has developed a system of beliefs, these beliefs provide the cognitive
substrate from which congruent attitudes are cultivated in a consistent fashion (Ajzen & Fishbein,
2005). Once an attitude is shaped, it can work backwards and influence the development of new
systems of beliefs, or provoke a revision to incompatible systems. In other words, the information
processing qualities of attitudes and epistemic beliefs result in recurring and reciprocal processes
during conceptual change that create feedback loops to enable learners to metacognitively monitor,
adapt, target and revise inaccurate knowledge structures during conceptual change.
THE CURRENT STUDY
Attitudes and epistemic beliefs predict how individuals process, interpret, and evaluate scientific
information, and therefore, play a significant role in learning and conceptual change. Fulmer (2014),
for example, found that students’ attitudes toward science predicted their epistemic beliefs
pertaining to the uncertainty of scientific knowledge, including their subsequent evaluations of
sources of scientific knowledge. Additionally, Kapucu and Bahçivan (2015) found that students’
epistemic beliefs about science positively correlated with their attitudes towards learning physics,
and that students who held more constructivist epistemic beliefs regarding scientific knowledge
tended to self-report more positive attitudes. Although these studies (and others; see Broughton et
al., 2013; Franco et al., 2012) have revealed predictive and directional relationships between
attitudes and epistemic beliefs in science education, few studies have directly investigated how, in
what ways, and for whom these factors function to facilitate or constrain conceptual change while
learning about complex science topics from refutation or expository texts. As previously noted, the
unique rhetorical structure of refutation texts (i.e., message characteristics) has been shown to
effectively support conceptual change (Tippet, 2010). Therefore, we used refutation and expository
texts to examine whether text type (i.e., message characteristics) would interact with individual
learners’ characteristics (i.e., attitudes and beliefs) to predict conceptual change.
Examining relations between attitudes and epistemic beliefs in conceptual change can provide
invaluable insights into how these factors predict socio-scientific reasoning and public
understanding of science, especially regarding whether attitudes systematically vary as a function
of individuals’ epistemic beliefs, and in turn, whether attitudes predict the processing of scientific
information during conceptual change vis-a-vis the evaluative function of learners’ underlying
epistemic beliefs. The current study thus examines potential mediating and moderating effects of
Page 9 of 19
95
Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal (ASSRJ) Vol.7, Issue 6, June-2020
attitudes and epistemic beliefs in conceptual change while learning about GMFs, a complex socio- scientific topic.
Based on theoretical and empirical considerations, the following hypotheses were generated: (H1)
Participants who read a refutation text will change more misconceptions at post-test than
participants who read an expository text, and (H2) learners’ attitudes towards GMFs will mediate
between their prior misconceptions regarding GMFs and post-test conceptual change, but this effect
will be conditional upon text condition and learners’ epistemic beliefs such that participants with
less constructivist epistemic beliefs will report more negative attitudes toward GMFs, and in turn,
revise fewer misconceptions at post-test than learners with more constructivist epistemic beliefs
and more positive attitudes toward GMFs. However, learners with less constructivist beliefs in the
refutation condition should change more misconceptions that individuals with less constructivist
beliefs in the expository condition. See Figure 2 for the hypothesized model.
METHODS
Participants
One hundred twenty undergraduate students participated in the study (n = 32 males) with a mean
age of 21.29 years (SD = 3.83). Nineteen were in their first year of university, 24 were in their second
year, 37 were in their third year, and 40 were in their fourth year. Students were drawn from an
eclectic range of majors. Participants were recruited from a public university using an
advertisement posted to the university’s online classifieds.
Materials
Demographics Survey
A brief demographics survey was administered to capture participants’ background information
including gender, age, degree major/minor, cumulative GPA, first and second languages spoken and
written, political affiliation.
Prior Knowledge Test
The prior knowledge measure included a 10-item multiple-choice test about GMFs (adapted from
Heddy et al., 2017) and was used to assess participants’ misconceptions related to GMFs.
Participants were required to select the correct answer from a multiple-choice list of four possible
answer choices. The three incorrect options were common misconceptions about GMFs. An example
item included: “Processes used by scientists to modify the genetic makeup of plants and animals
include which of the following?” One point was awarded for each correct answer, and zero points
were awarded for incorrect answers. Participants’ scores were summed, and an overall average
score was calculated. The reliability index for the prior knowledge measure was moderately low
(Cronbach’s = .60; see Nunnally, 1978), yet this level of reliability is expected when participants’
level of prior knowledge is also low, or when the topic being tested is sufficiently complex, as is the
case with the topic of GMFs.
Attitudes Toward GMFs
The attitudes measure included four Likert-type items (adapted from Heddy et al., 2017) and was
used to assess attitudes toward GMFs. An example item included, “I approve of genetically modified
foods.” Participants self-reported their attitudes toward GMFs on a scale ranging from “1 = strongly
Page 10 of 19
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.76.7882 96
Vivian, J. A., & Muis, K. R. (2020) Epistemic Beliefs Moderate Mediations Among Attitudes, Prior Misconceptions, and Conceptual Change. Advances in Social
Sciences Research Journal, 7(6) 87-105.
disagree” to “5 = strongly agree.” The attitudes measure showed very good reliability (Cronbach’s
= .92).
Topic-Specific Epistemic Beliefs Questionnaire
A modified version of the Topic-Specific Epistemic Beliefs Questionnaire (TSEBQ; Strømsø, Bråten,
& Samuelstuen, 2008) was used to assess participants’ epistemic beliefs related to GMFs. The TSEBQ
includes 24 items organized along four belief dimensions including the certainty of knowledge (6
items), complexity of knowledge (6 items), source of knowledge (5 items), and justification for
knowing (7 items). Participants rated each item on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from “1 = strongly
disagree” to “10= strongly agree.” Psychometric analyses of the TSEBQ revealed low to moderate
reliability estimates for each factor, including certainty (Cronbach’s α = 0.68), complexity
(Cronbach’s α = 0.48), source (Cronbach’s α = 0.62), and justification (Cronbach’s α = 0.71).
Experimental Texts
The experimental texts presented information regarding GMFs and included one expository and
one refutation text (Heddy et al., 2017). Both texts were comparatively equivalent in length (617 vs.
624 words, respectively). In terms of ease of readability, each text obtained Flesch-Kincaid ease of
reading scores of 42.1 and 42.2, respectively (Flesch, 1948). Both the refutation and expository texts
included the same information, but the refutation text presented information by directly identifying
a common misconception and refuting it using three empirically validated causal explanations. An
example refutation included the following: “You may think that injecting hormones into a plant or
animal is involved in the production of genetically modified foods. This belief is also incorrect.
Injecting hormones into a plant or animal can increase its growth rate or its size. However, injecting
hormones does not modify the genetic makeup of the plant or animal. In contrast, genetically
modified foods have had some of their characteristics changed at the gene level.” The expository
text presented the same information as the refutation text, but without the refutation content. For
example: “The production of genetically modified foods does not involve injecting hormones into a
plant or animal. Injecting hormones into a plant or animal can increase its growth rate or its size.
However, injecting hormones does not modify the genetic makeup of the plant or animal. In
contrast, genetically modified foods have had some of their characteristics changed at the gene
level.” The refutation text presented participants with a total of four refutations that targeted
common misconceptions related to GMFs.
Post-knowledge Test
To assess post-test learning (i.e., conceptual change), participants completed the same prior
knowledge test. Psychometric reliability for the post-test measure was modest (Cronbach’s α = .71).
Procedure
Participants first provided informed consent and subsequently received instructions on how to
complete the study. Next, participants completed the GMFs prior knowledge test, the attitudes
toward GMFs survey, and an adapted version of the TSEBQ (Strømsø et al., 2008). Following this,
participants were randomly assigned to a refutation (n = 62) or expository (n = 58) text condition.
After reading, participants completed the same GMFs prior knowledge test to assess conceptual
change. Finally, participants completed a demographics survey to obtain basic background
Page 11 of 19
97
Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal (ASSRJ) Vol.7, Issue 6, June-2020
information. At the end of the session, participants were thanked for their participation and
compensated $10 for their time.
RESULTS
Preliminary Analysis
Each continuous variable was inspected for skewness and kurtosis. Analyses revealed the GMFs
knowledge post-test to be negatively skewed (-4.88). Given the post-test assessment included a true
0-value (answers were tabulated as being either correct or incorrect), no transformation was
applied to normalize the distribution. No issues were observed regarding kurtosis. Descriptive
statistics for all variables can be found in Table 1. Inspection of the data revealed univariate outliers
for the following variables: attitudes (n = 3, z = -2.53), uncertainty of knowledge (n = 2, z = -2.69),
complexity of knowledge (n = 1, z = -2.55), and the post-test knowledge assessment (n = 3, z = -3.29).
In lieu of deletion, all cases were kept given the values were not extreme and equated to less that
2% of n (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). There were no multivariate outliers in the data, and
examination of the Pearson correlation matrix revealed no issues of multicollinearity among
variables of interest. See Table 2.
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to assess whether there were any significant group
differences in conceptual change from pretest to posttest between learners who read a refutation
text versus learners who read an expository text (H1). Time was used as a within-subjects factor (2
levels, pretest and post-test) and text condition (refutation and expository) as the between-subjects
factor. Results revealed a significant Time by condition interaction, indicating that learners in the
refutation text condition changed significantly more of their misconceptions at post-test than
learners in the expository text condition, Wilks’ Lambda = .850, F(1,118) = 20.76, p < .001, η2 = .15.
Post hoc analyses revealed a significant mean difference (M = .17, SD = .04) in post-test conceptual
change between conditions, t(118) = 4.56, p < .001. Overall, 15% of the variance in post-test
conceptual change was accounted for by text condition whereby learners who read a refutation text
changed significantly more misconceptions regarding GMFs at post-test than learners who read an
expository text.
Moderated Mediation Analyses
To examine whether attitudes mediated between prior misconceptions and post-test conceptual
change and, in turn, whether this relationship was moderated by text type and learners’ epistemic
beliefs (H2), moderation mediation analyses were conducted using Hayes and Preachers’ (2014)
PROCESS macro for SPSS. See Figure 2 for the hypothesized model, and Figure 3 for the final model
with standardized effects.
Results revealed a significant regression of prior misconceptions on attitudes towards GMFs (β =
.38, t(118) = 4.47, p < .001). Findings also revealed a significant regression of prior misconceptions
on post-test conceptual change (β = .20, t(115) = 2.10, p = .04). There was also a statistically
significant regression of attitudes towards GMFs on post-test conceptual change, β = .27, t(115) =
3.08, p = .003. The overall model was significant, F(4,115) = 10.41, p < .001, R2 = .27, with a medium
effect size showing that 27% of the variance in post-test conceptual change could be accounted for
by both the variables in the model.
Page 12 of 19
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.76.7882 98
Vivian, J. A., & Muis, K. R. (2020) Epistemic Beliefs Moderate Mediations Among Attitudes, Prior Misconceptions, and Conceptual Change. Advances in Social
Sciences Research Journal, 7(6) 87-105.
With regard to the moderated mediation analyses, no statistically significant moderated mediation
was detected for type of text. However, results revealed a statistically detectable conditional
indirect effect (Index = -.06, with 95% bootstrap CIs from -.14 to -.01) of prior misconceptions on
post-test conceptual change via learners’ attitudes toward GMFs that varied as a function of their
epistemic beliefs regarding the source of GMFs knowledge at levels of the mean (effect = .12, with
95% bootstrap CIs from .04 to .25) and 1SD below the mean (effect = .18, with 95% bootstrap CIs
from .06 to .36). Overall, findings show that the more learners believed GMFs knowledge to be
internally generated and derived via subjective experience, the less positive their attitudes towards
GMFs, and in turn, the less misconceptions they revised at post-test.
Results also revealed a statistically detectable conditional indirect effect (Index = -.11, with 95%
bootstrap CIsfrom -.23 to -.02) of prior misconceptions on post-test conceptual change via learners’
attitudes that varied as a function of their beliefs regarding the justification of GMFs knowledge at
levels of the mean (effect = .15, with 95% bootstrap CIs from .05 to .26) and 1SD below the mean
(effect = .26, with 95% bootstrap CIs from .09 to .47). Overall, findings showed the more learners
believed GMFs knowledge to be justified via personal judgement, the less positive their attitudes,
and in turn, the less misconceptions they revised at post-test. Implications, future directions, and
limitations of these findings are discussed next.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of our study was to advance knowledge about the roles of attitudes and epistemic
beliefs in conceptual change while learning about GMFs. Based on Dole and Sinatra’s (1998) CRKM
of conceptual change, as well as our hypothesized conceptual model of relations among attitudes
and epistemic beliefs, we examined whether attitudes mediated between prior misconceptions and
post-test conceptual change, and in turn, whether this relationship was moderated by learners’
epistemic beliefs. Additionally, we examined whether refutation texts were an effective intervention
for facilitating conceptual change The results supported our hypotheses, which have theoretical
implications for understanding how individuals interpret, evaluate, and make sense of complex
socio-scientific information.
Refutation Texts and Conceptual Change (Message Characteristics)
Although some findings in the extant literature have shown refutation texts can inadvertently
strengthen learners’ misconceptions (i.e., backfire; Hart & Nisbet, 2012; Nyhan, Reifler, & Ubel,
2013), the clear majority of research indicates that refutation texts are an effective strategy for
facilitating conceptual change (Tippet, 2010). Refutation texts support conceptual change by
directly targeting misconceptions and presenting a rich network of causal explanations based on
scientific evidence to refute inaccurate knowledge (Kendeou et al., 2013, 2014). The causal
explanations in refutation texts compete with previously-acquired misconceptions and begin to
dominate the conceptual network by reducing (or suppressing) activation of previously-acquired
misconceptions, thus facilitating a change in knowledge within a conceptual network. In our study,
we hypothesized (H1) that learners who read a refutation text would change more misconceptions
at posttest than learners who read an expository text. Our results supported this hypothesis, and
provided support for previous studies that have shown refutation texts to be effective rhetorical
devices for facilitating conceptual change (Heddy et al., 2017; Heddy & Sinatra, 2013; Kendeou et
al., 2014; Trevors et al., 2016, 2017b).
Page 13 of 19
99
Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal (ASSRJ) Vol.7, Issue 6, June-2020
Additionally, our findings provided added support for Dole and Sinatra’s (1998) CRKM by
highlighting the importance of message characteristics for aiding in conceptual change (Dole &
Sinatra, 1998). Building from this, we argue that learner characteristics such as attitudes and
epistemic beliefs serve as focal lenses through which causal explanations in refutation texts are
processed, interpreted, and evaluated during conceptual change. As such, future studies should
augment and organize refutation texts with the goal of scaffolding both attitudinal change and
learners’ development of epistemic strategies for critically evaluating information regarding
complex scientific topics.
Moderating and Mediating Roles of Attitudes and Epistemic Beliefs in Conceptual Change
(Learner Characteristics)
Based on theoretical considerations and previous research, we additionally hypothesized (H2) that
attitudes would play a significate (mediating) role in learners’ processing of socio-scientific
information and while learning about GMFs from refutation texts and, in turn, that epistemic beliefs
would moderate the interceding effects of attitudes on post-test conceptual change. Our findings
supported this hypothesis. Specifically, our findings revealed a learning differential from pre-test to
post-test that was mediated by participants’ attitudes towards GMFs, and this relationship was
moderated by learners’ epistemic beliefs regarding the source and justification of GMFs knowledge.
Accordingly, learners in our study who self-reported more positive attitudes towards GMFs and
who believed GMFs knowledge to be derived and justified via empirical evidence and multiple
sources of information revised more misconceptions at post-test than learners with negative
attitudes who believed GMFs knowledge to be derived and justified via personal judgement, opinion
and anecdotal evidence. Although no effects were observed for beliefs about the complexity or
certainty of GMFs knowledge in our study, it is possible that learners in our study with positive
attitudes and who possessed the skills necessary to critically evaluate and judge the veracity of
diverse sources of information inherently viewed scientific knowledge as sufficiently complex and
uncertain, despite our null results. Whatever the case, our findings nonetheless lend support for the
structural and functional roles of attitudes and epistemic beliefs as vital factors involved in the
processing socio-scientific information, and highlight the importance of both learner and message
characteristics as vital factors in the reconstruction of knowledge.
Educational Implications
Our results underline the importance of considering the role of differential attitude structures in
relation to specific dimensions of epistemic beliefs (rather than general systems) in conceptual
change research. Results from our study show that individuals who believe GMFs knowledge to be
derived and justified via empirical evidence and multiple sources of information also tend to
express more positive attitudes toward GMFs and, in turn, experience greater learning gains in
terms of conceptual change. Our findings suggest that designing refutation texts with persuasive
attitudinal and epistemically-related content (i.e., content designed to change attitudes and improve
epistemic evaluations and judgements regarding the veracity of information) could help equip
learners with more robust strategies for learning and understanding complex socio-scientific topics.
Although attitudes have important implications for how individuals select, perceive, interpret,
encode and retrieve information related to complex science topics, epistemic beliefs play an
important role in how individuals evaluate and judge sources of knowledge. Overall, changing
attitudes (object-evaluation associations) reciprocally influences changes in underlying systems of
Page 14 of 19
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.76.7882 100
Vivian, J. A., & Muis, K. R. (2020) Epistemic Beliefs Moderate Mediations Among Attitudes, Prior Misconceptions, and Conceptual Change. Advances in Social
Sciences Research Journal, 7(6) 87-105.
beliefs (evaluative knowledge structures), and the reciprocal interaction between these factors
predict learning and conceptual change.
Therefore, developing interventions to foster the development of more positive attitudes, as well as
more constructivist epistemic beliefs, has the potential to positively predict learning in relation to
negatively charged, controversial socio-scientific topics that otherwise tend to elicit negative
attitudes and conflict with individuals’ personal, doxastic beliefs. In short, targeting individuals’
sourcing and justification beliefs related to complex socio-scientific topics has the potential for
endowing learners with the skills to critically evaluate and judge the veridicality of complex
scientific information instantiated in diverse media and obtained from multiple sources.
Understanding knowledge and knowing to be comprised of uncertain and complex processes,
learners may better appreciate the diversity of methods for justifying scientific claims, and thus,
become more open to discrepant sources of knowledge and information and, in turn, be more
receptive to revising inaccurate knowledge.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Several caveats should be considered while interpreting the results of our study. First, we used self- report inventories to measure attitudes and epistemic beliefs. Although self-reports of attitudes are
generally reliable indicators of individuals’ attitudes, they can be somewhat unreliable indicators of
epistemic beliefs (Greene et al., 2014). Indeed, for this sample, reliability estimates for epistemic
beliefs were not particularly high. That said, the low to modest reliabilities for the epistemic beliefs
measure could potentially reflect the relative diversity of participants’ epistemic beliefs regarding
GMFs. Alternatively, utilizing think aloud protocols (TAPs) could have provided richer, more
reliable data from which to generalize findings regarding the attitudinal and epistemic processes at
play during conceptual change as TAPs are particularly effective for observing emergent cognitive
and metacognitive processes that arise during learning without interfering with the focal learning
task (Chi, 1997).
Next, no measures of emotions towards GMFs were included in this study. The preponderance of
research in the conceptual change literature has shifted focus away from examining exclusively
‘cold’ cognitive constructs of conceptual change (i.e., information processing) to investigations that
additionally include ‘hot’ constructs, such as emotions and motivation (Broughton et al., 2013;
Pintrich et al., 1993; Sinatra & Seyranian, 2016; Heddy et al., 2017). Although attitudes (a lukewarm
construct) were a primary variable of interest in the present study, the roles of emotions (a hot
topic) and their relationship to attitudes was not included in this research. Including measures of
emotions, however, could have otherwise provided more explanatory power regarding the
processes at play during conceptual change, especially considering that affect serves an evaluative
function in the appraisal of information related to an attitudinal object.
Finally, we did not measure values toward GMFs in the present study. According to Rockeach
(1968), values are an important factor to consider when examining relationships among attitudes
and beliefs because value systems inevitably inform individuals’ systems of beliefs and, in turn, the
emergent attitudes that influence and shape individuals’ processing of information and decision- making behaviors. Arguably, circumventing value systems and their relations to beliefs and
attitudes provides a rather myopic focus on problems of persuasion at the expense of larger issues
related ‘education and re-education’ (Rockeach, 1968). As such, findings from the present study
Page 15 of 19
101
Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal (ASSRJ) Vol.7, Issue 6, June-2020
provide only a limited account of the potential multivariate factors that may influence conceptual
change. Future research should address this issue by seeking to uncover how and for whom values
predict epistemic beliefs, and in what ways these value-laden belief systems most profoundly
predict subsequent attitudinal appraisals of complex socio-scientific topics. In closing, future
research should focus more explicitly on the dynamic, functional and structural relations among
emotions, values, attitudes, and epistemic beliefs to obtain a more inclusive understanding of how
these factors operate to predict learning, conceptual change, and the processing of socio-scientific
information.
References
Ajzen, I. (1989). Attitude structure and behavior. In A.R. Pratkanis, S. J. Breckler, & A. G. Greenwald (Eds.), Attitude
structure and function (pp. 241 – 274). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (2005). The influence of attitudes on behavior. In D. Albarracín, B. T. Johnson, & M. P. Zanna
(Eds.), The handbook of attitudes (pp. 173-221). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Broughton, S. H., Sinatra, G. M., & Nussbaum, E. M. (2013). “Pluto has been a planet my whole life!” Emotions, attitudes,
and conceptual change in elementary students learning about Pluto’s reclassification. Research in Science Education,
43(2), 529–550.
Chan, C., Burtis, J., & Bereiter, C. (1997). Knowledge building as a mediator of conflict in conceptual change. Cognition
and Instruction, 15(1), 1 - 40.
Chi, M. T. H. (1997). Quantifying qualitative analyses of verbal data: A practical guide. Journal of the Learning Sciences,
6(3), 271–315.
Chi, M.T.H. (2008). Three types of conceptual change: Belief revision, mental model transformation, and categorical
shift. In S. Vosniadou (Ed.), Handbook of research on conceptual change (pp. 61-82). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Chinn, C. A., Buckland, L. A., Samarapungavan, A. L. A. (2011). Expanding the dimensions of epistemic cognition:
Arguments from philosophy and psychology. Educational Psychologist, 46(3), 141–167.
Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. (2003). Applied multiple regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral
sciences (3rd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
Dole, J. A., & Sinatra, G. M. (1998). Reconceptualizing change in the cognitive construction of knowledge. Educational
Psychologist, 33, 109–128.
Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of attitudes. Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College
Publishers.
Ecker, U. K. H., Hogan, J. L., & Lewandowsky, S. (2017). Reminders and repetition of misinformation: Helping or
hindering its retraction? Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 6(2), 185–192.
Fabrigar, L., Macdonald, T., & Wegener, D. (2005). The structure of attitudes. In D. Albarracin, B.T. Johnson, & M.P.
Zanna (Eds.), The handbook of attitudes (pp. 79 – 124). London, UK: Routledge.
Fishbein, M. & Icek, A. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention and behavior: An introduction to theory and research. California,
US: Addison-Wesley.
Flesch, R. (1948). A new readability yardstick. Journal of Applied Psychology, 32(3), 221-233.
Greene, J. A., Yu, S., & Copeland, D. Z. (2014). Measuring critical components of digital literacy and their relationships
with learning. Computers & Education, 76, 55-69.
Hart, P. S., & Nisbet, E. C. (2012). Boomerang Effects in Science Communication: How Motivated Reasoning and
Identity Cues Amplify Opinion Polarization About Climate Mitigation Policies. Communication Research, 39(6), 701–
723.
Nyhan, B., Reifler, J., & A Ubel, P. (2012). The Hazards of Correcting Myths About Health Care Reform. Medical care,
51(2), 127-32.
Page 16 of 19
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.76.7882 102
Vivian, J. A., & Muis, K. R. (2020) Epistemic Beliefs Moderate Mediations Among Attitudes, Prior Misconceptions, and Conceptual Change. Advances in Social
Sciences Research Journal, 7(6) 87-105.
Hayes, A. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A regression-based approach.
New York, NY: Guilford.
Hayes, A. F., & Preacher, K. J. (2014). Statistical mediation analysis with a multicategorical independent variable.
British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 67, 451–470.
Heddy, B. C., Danielson, R. W., Sinatra, G. M., & Graham, J. (2017). Modifying knowledge, emotions, and attitudes about
genetically modified foods. Journal of Experimental Education, 85(3), 515-533.
Heddy, B. C., & Sinatra, G. M. (2013). Transforming misconceptions: Using transformative experience to promote
positive affect and conceptual change in students learning about biological evolution. Science Education, 97(5), 723–
744.
Hofer, B. K. (2000). Dimensionality and disciplinary differences in personal epistemology. Contemporary Educational
Psychology, 25(4), 378–405.
Hofer, B. K., & Pintrich, P. R. (1997). The development of epistemological theories: Beliefs about knowledge and
knowing and their relation to learning. Review of Educational Research, 67(1), 88–140.
Kapucu S. & Bahçivan E. (2015). High school students’ scientific epistemological beliefs, self-efficacy in learning
physics and attitudes towards physics: A structural equational model. Research in Science & Technological Education,
33(2), 252-267.
Kata, A. (2012). Anti-vaccine activists, Web 2.0, and the postmodern paradigm: An overview of tactics and tropes used
online by the anti-vaccination movement. Vaccine, 30(25), 3778–3789.
Kendeou, P., & O'Brien, E. J. (2014). The knowledge revision components (KReC) framework: Processes and
mechanisms. In D. Rapp, & J. Braasch (Eds.), Processing inaccurate information: Theoretical and applied perspectives
from cognitive science and the educational sciences (pp. 353-377). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kendeou, P., Walsh, E. K., Smith, E. R., & O’Brien, E. J. (2014). Knowledge revision processes in refutation texts.
Discourse Processes, 51, 374-397.
Kendeou, P., Smith, E. R., & O’Brien, E. J. (2013). Updating during reading comprehension: Why causality matters.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 39(3), 854–865.
Krause, S., Kelly, J., Corkins, J., Tasooji, A., & Purzer, S. (2009). Using students’ previous experience and prior knowledge
to facilitate conceptual change in an introductory materials course. Paper presented to the Frontiers in Education
Conference, San Antonio, TX.
Lombardi, D., Nussbaum, E. M., & Sinatra, G. M. (2016). Plausibility judgments in conceptual change and epistemic
cognition. Educational Psychologist, 51(1), 35–56.
Maio, G. R. & Haddock, G. (2010). The influence of attitudes on information processing and behavior. In G.R. Maio & G.
Haddock (Eds.), The psychology of attitudes and attitude change (pp. 47-66). London, UK: SAGE Publications Ltd.
Mason, L. & Gava, M. (2007). Effects of epistemological beliefs and learning text structure on conceptual change. In S.
Vosniadou, A. Baltas, & X. Vamvakoussi (Eds.), Reframing the problem of conceptual change in learning and instruction
(pp. 165-196). Oxford, UK: Elsevier Science.
Mason, L., Gava, M., & Boldrin, A. (2008). On warm conceptual change: The interplay of text, epistemological beliefs,
and topic interest. Journal of Educational Psychology, 100, 291- 309.
Murphy, P. K., & Alexander, P. A. (2016). Interrogating the relation between conceptual change and epistemic beliefs.
In J. A. Greene, W. A. Sandoval, & I. Bråten (Eds.), Handbook of epistemic cognition (pp. 439-459). New York, NY:
Routledge.
Nunnally, J.C. (1978). Psychometric theory (2nd ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Pintrich, P. R., Marx, R. W., & Boyle, R. A. (1993). Beyond cold conceptual change: The role of motivational beliefs and
classroom contextual factors in the process of conceptual change. Review of Educational Research, 63(2), 167–199.
Rokeach, M. (1968). A theory of organization and change within value-attitude systems. Journal of Social Issues, 24(1),
13–33.
Page 17 of 19
103
Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal (ASSRJ) Vol.7, Issue 6, June-2020
Schommer, M. (1990). Effects of beliefs about the nature of knowledge on comprehension. Journal of Educational
Psychology, 82(3), 498-504.
Silverman, J. C. (2007). Epistemological beliefs and attitudes toward inclusion in pre-service teachers. Teacher
Education and Special Education: The Journal of the Teacher Education Division of the Council for Exceptional Children,
30(1), 42–51.
Sinatra, G. M., Brem, S. K., & Evans, E. M. (2008). Changing minds? Implications of conceptual change for teaching and
learning about biological evolution. Evolution: Education and Outreach, 1(2), 189–195.
Sinatra, G. M., & Hofer, B. K. (2016). Public understanding of science. Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 3(2), 245–253.
Sinatra, G. M., Kienhues, D., & Hofer, B. K. (2014). Addressing Challenges to Public Understanding of Science: Epistemic
Cognition, Motivated Reasoning, and Conceptual Change. Educational Psychologist, 49(2), 123–138.
Sinatra, G. M., & Seyranian, V. (2016). Warm change about hot topics: The role of motivation and emotion in attitude
and conceptual change about controversial science topics. In L. Corno & E. Anderman (Eds.), Handbook of educational
psychology (pp. 245–256). Washington, DC: Taylor & Francis.
Stathopoulou, C., & Vosniadou, S. (2007). Conceptual change in physics and physics-related epistemological beliefs: A
relationship under scrutiny. In S. Vosniadou, A. Baltas, & X. Vamvakoussi (Eds.), Advances in learning and instruction
series: Reframing the conceptual change approach in learning and instruction (pp. 145-163). New York, NY: Elsevier
Science.
Strømsø, H. I., Bråten, I., & Samuelstuen, M. S. (2008). Dimensions of topic-specific epistemological beliefs as
predictors of multiple text understanding. Learning and Instruction, 18(6), 513–527.
Tippett, C. (2010). Refutation text in science education: A review of two decades of research. International Journal of
Science and Mathematics Education, 8, 951–970.
Trevors, G. J., Kendeou, P., & Butterfuss, R. (2017a). Emotion processes in knowledge revision. Discourse Processes,
54(5–6), 406–426.
Trevors, G. J., Kendeou, P., Bråten, I., & Braasch, J. L. G. (2017). Adolescents’ epistemic profiles in the service of
knowledge revision. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 49, 107–120.
Vosniadou, S. (1994). Capturing and modeling the process of conceptual change. Learning and Instruction, 4(1), 45–69.
Wakefield, A., Murch, S., Anthony, A., Linnell, J., Casson, D., Malik, M., & ... Walker-Smith, J. (1998). RETRACTED: Ileal- lymphoid-nodular hyperplasia, non-specific colitis, and pervasive developmental disorder in children. The Lancet,
351(9103), 637-641.
World Health Organization. (2018). Europe observes a 4-fold increase in measles cases in 2017 compared to previous
year. Retrieved March 18, 2018, from http://www.euro.who.int/en/media-centre/sections/press- releases/2018/europe-observes-a-4-fold-increase-in-measles-cases-in-2017-compared-to-previous-year
TABLES
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for all Variables
Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis
Prior knowledge .44 .20 2.30 .32
Post-test knowledge .77 .20 -4.88 3.08
Attitudes 4.48 1.37 -2.09 .06
Complexity of knowledge 4.12 .70 .42 -0.68
Uncertainty of knowledge 4.71 .82 -1.13 .71
Source of knowledge 4.17 .86 .40 -.13
Justification for knowing 5.36 .70 -1.56 -.47
Note. Prior knowledge and post-test knowledge are reported as proportion of correct conceptions.
Page 18 of 19
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.76.7882 104
Vivian, J. A., & Muis, K. R. (2020) Epistemic Beliefs Moderate Mediations Among Attitudes, Prior Misconceptions, and Conceptual Change. Advances in Social
Sciences Research Journal, 7(6) 87-105.
Table 2: Correlations Among All Variables (N = 120)
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Attitudes — .215* .131 .076 .138 .380** .389**
2. Structure of Knowledge .215* — -.005 .506** .341** .427** .358**
3. Certainty of Knowledge .131 -.005 — .011 .247** .097 .155
4. Source of Knowledge .076 .506** .011 — .350** .351** .108
5. Justification for Knowing .138 .341** .247** .350** — .344** .248**
6. Prior Knowledge .380** .427** .097 .351** .344** — .391**
7. Post-test Knowledge .389** .358** .155 .108 .248** .391** —
*p < .05. **p < .01. Two-tailed.
Figure 1. Object-evaluation association embedded in a semantic network.
Object
(GMFs
Knowledge)
(Epistemic Beliefs about GMFs)
Evaluation of Object Attributes
Strength of
Association
Structure of Knowledge
Certainty of Knowledge
Source of knowledge
Justification for Knowing
Evidence that GMFs
cause health problems,
environmental issues,
and consumer rights
violations.
GMFs research
is conducted
primarily by
biotechnology
companies.
No scientific
consensus
regarding GMFs
knowledge.
The science behind
GMFs is based on easy to
understand facts.
Object Attributes (Knowledge Claims)
Evaluation
(Beliefs about
GMFs)
LOCAL OBJECT-EVALUATION ASSOCIATION
GLOBAL OBJECT-EVALUATION ASSOCIATION
Page 19 of 19
105
Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal (ASSRJ) Vol.7, Issue 6, June-2020
Figure 2. Hypothesized moderation mediation model.
Figure 3. Final moderation mediation model.
Note: All values represent standardized coefficients. Coefficients labelled at the top for the
moderators represent 1SD below the mean, coefficients in the middle represent the mean, and
coefficients at the bottom for the moderators represent 1SD above the mean.
** p < .001 * p < .05.
Prior
Knowledge
Post
Knowledge Attitudes
Justification
for Knowing
Complexity of
Knowledge
Source of
Knowledge
Certainty of
Knowledge
Text
Condition
Prior
Knowledge
b = .20**
b = .38** b = .27**
Post
Knowledge Attitudes
Source of
Knowledge
b = ns
b = .12
b = .18
Justification
for Knowing
b = ns
b = .15
b = .26