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Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal – Vol. 10, No. 12
Publication Date: December 25, 2023
DOI:10.14738/assrj.1012.16027
Vrij, A., Leal, S., & Fisher, R. P. (2023). Interviewing to Detect Lies About Opinions: The Devil’s Advocate Approach. Advances in
Social Sciences Research Journal, 10(12). 245-252.
Services for Science and Education – United Kingdom
Interviewing to Detect Lies About Opinions: The Devil’s Advocate
Approach
Aldert Vrij
Department of Psychology,
University of Portsmouth,
PO1 2DY, Hants, United Kingdom
Sharon Leal
Department of Psychology,
University of Portsmouth (UK)
Ronald P. Fisher
Department of Psychology,
Florida International University
Writing this article was funded by the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats
(ESRC Award: ES/N009614/1)
INTERVIEWING TO DETECT LIES ABOUT OPINIONS: THE DEVIL’S ADVOCATE APPROACH
The verbal cues lie tellers spontaneously report during interviews are weak and unreliable
(DePaulo et al., 20023; Vrij, Hartwig, & Granhag, 2019). Researchers therefore asked for
interview protocols to be developed that would elicit such verbal cues (Vrij & Granhag, 2012).
Ten years later several interview protocols have emerged (Vrij, Granhag et al., 2022), including
Cognitive Credibility Assessment (Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017; Vrij, Mann et al., 2021), Reality
Interviewing (Bogaard et el., 2019; Colwell et al., 2007), the Strategic Use of Evidence (Granhag
& Harwig, 2015; Hartwig et al., 2014) and the Verifiability Approach (Nahari, 2019; Palena et
al., 2021). All these interview protocols focus on distinguishing between truthful and deceptive
statements about alleged activities. However, practitioners are also interested in detecting lies
when people discuss their opinions. The Devil’s Advocate Approach is the only interview
protocol we are aware of aimed to distinguish between truthful and deceptive opinions. In this
article we present the (scarce) Devil’s Advocate Approach research conducted to date.
THE IMPORTANCE OF DETECTING LIES ABOUT OPINIONS
Being able to distinguish between truths and lies about opinions can be important in various
security settings, for example when deciding whether (i) an informant is really against the
network of people s/he is willing to spy upon; (ii) an applicant is really committed to the aims
of the intelligence organisation s/he wants to join; (iii) the sole reason for entering the country
is indeed to study at a university; (iv) the person convicted of terrorism has really given up
terrorism and therefore can be released from prison; (v) the activist is indeed against violent
protests; (vi) and the person is really against corruption. Incorrect veracity judgements can do
a lot of harm. Take for example Humam Khalil al Balawi, a medical doctor who grew up in
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Jordan. Balawi was meant to give information about Ayman al Zawahiri, al-Qaida’s number two
at that time. American and Jordanian intelligence services were keen to debrief Balawi at a
secure location in Khost, Afghanistan. At arrival, he blew himself up (30 December 2009) killing
seven CIA agents and one Jordanian officer. Balawi had posted (under a different name)
extreme anti-American views on the internet and the CIA tipped off the Jordanians about this.
Jordan intelligence services wanted to turn Balawi into a double agent to penetrate al-Qaida.
Balawi convinced the Jordanians that he was the asset they were looking for. Jordanian and
American intelligence agencies became increasingly tempted to believe that he had become a
reliable double agent who could lead them to Zawahiri. The possibility that his views remained
unchanged was discounted (Riedel, 2019).
THE DEVIL’S ADVOCATE APPROACH RATIONALE
The Devil’s Advocate interview protocol consists of three questions (Leal et al., 2010; Mann et
al., 2022). The first question is an expression attitude question in which the interviewee
expresses to be in favour or against the opinion-topic, e.g. “Are you in favour or against Covid
vaccinations?” This question is followed by an eliciting-opinion question in which the
interviewee is invited to report the arguments in favour of the view s/he just expressed, e.g.
“OK, you say to be in favour of Covid vaccinations. Please can you tell me all the reasons you can
think of that led you to having this opinion?” This question is followed by the third and final
question, the Devil’s Advocate question, in which the interviewee is invited to report arguments
against the view s/he just expressed. “OK, now try to play the devil’s advocate and imagine that
you are against Covid vaccinations. Please tell me all the reasons you can think of that goes
against Covid vaccinations?
In the Devil’s Advocate interview protocol, the answers to the eliciting-opinion and devil’s
advocate questions are compared. Truth tellers provide honest answers to both the eliciting- opinion question (the arguments that support their opinion) and the devil’s advocate question
(the arguments that go against their opinion). When answering the eliciting-opinion question
they provide arguments they believe in. Although they present arguments in the devil’s
advocate answer they do not believe in, they are telling the truth because they do not pretend
to believe in these answers. Lie tellers try to fool interviewers and have an opinion opposite to
what they express. They lie when answering both the eliciting-opinion and devil’s advocate
questions. In the eliciting-opinion answer they provide arguments they do not believe in whilst
trying to convince the interviewer that they endorse these arguments. When providing the
Devil’s Advocate answer they are invited to give arguments against their alleged opinion, which
is an invitation to express their true opinion. Yet, they are lying because they must pretend not
to believe in the arguments they present when answering the devil’s advocate question.
Truth tellers should find it easier to respond to the eliciting-opinion question than to the devil’s
advocate question. Arguments that support someone’s attitude (eliciting-opinion question) are
typically more readily available than reasons that oppose someone’s attitude (devil’s advocate
question) (Ajzen, 2001). This is the result of a confirmation bias, people’s tendency to seek
information that confirms rather than disconfirms their views (Darley & Gross, 1983;
Nickerson, 1998; Wason, 1960). A complete search of all available information is required to
arrive at an entirely justified belief. However, this is impossible because there is far too much
information available on all sides of a topic (Sommer et al., 2023). People thus must decide
which information to search, and searching for information in alignment with their beliefs
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Vrij, A., Leal, S., & Fisher, R. P. (2023). Interviewing to Detect Lies About Opinions: The Devil’s Advocate Approach. Advances in Social Sciences
Research Journal, 10(12). 245-252.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.1012.16027
makes sense. This is similar to someone who is looking for his/her keys and believes they are
in the kitchen. It makes then sense to start looking in the kitchen rather than in the bedroom
(Sommer et al., 2023). The confirmation bias makes people more practiced in thinking about
arguments that confirm their views than arguments that oppose their views and as such pro- arguments are processed at a deeper level than anti-arguments.
Another explanation why truth tellers should find it easier to respond to the eliciting-opinion
question than to the devil’s advocate question leads to the same outcome. Arguments that
confirm people’s views are more compatible with their other related views and beliefs than
arguments that disconfirm their views (Knobloch-Westerwick, 2015; Knobloch-Westerwick,
Mothes, & Polavin, 2020). Truth tellers may touch upon those compatible views and beliefs to
answer the eliciting-opinion question. The Devil’s Advocate Approach therefore expects that
for truth tellers, responses to the eliciting-opinion question sound more eloquent than
responses to the devil’s-advocate question (eloquence is the collective term for plausibility,
immediacy, and clarity).
For lie tellers, the devil’s advocate question is an invitation to give their true opinion and the
arguments should be readily available to them. Yet, lie tellers’ responses are unlikely to show
the opposite pattern to truth tellers’ responses, because lie tellers will be motivated to use at
least two counter-interrogation strategies: Preparation and consistency (Deeb et al., 2018). Lie
tellers attempt to come across as being sincere during interviews (Leins et al., 2013), and they
could achieve this is by preparing themselves for interviews (Clemens et al., 2013; Granhag &
Hartwig, 2008). This preparation typically takes place by preparing answers to questions
expected to be asked in the interview (Clemens et al., 2013). It is therefore likely that lie tellers
will think, prior to the interview, about arguments they can present that support their
pretended opinion. This should improve the eloquence of their replies to the eliciting-opinion
question. Lie tellers typically think that inconsistency is considered a sign to deceit (Strömwall
et al., 2004) and therefore strive to be consistent (Deeb et al., 2017; Vrij et al., 2021).
Consistency in the Devil’s Advocate interview would mean providing replies of similar
eloquence to the eliciting-opinion and devil’s advocate questions. The Devil’s Advocate
Approach therefore expects that lie tellers may attempt to produce responses of similar
eloquence to the eliciting-opinion and devil’s advocate questions.
THE DEVIL’S ADVOCATE APPROACH: TWO TYPES OF COMPARISON
In the Devil’s Advocate Approach two types of veracity differences can be distinguished. First,
veracity differences in eloquence when comparing answers to the eliciting-opinion and devil’s
advocate questions. It is expected that truth tellers are more eloquent when answering the
eliciting-opinion question than when answering the devil’s advocate question, whereas such
difference is less noticeable in lie tellers. This is the type of comparison we made in the previous
section and is a so-called within-subjects comparison. However, a between-subjects
comparison can also be made: Measuring veracity differences when answering the (i) eliciting- opinion question and (ii) the devil’s advocate question. It is expected that truth tellers are more
eloquent than lie tellers when answering the eliciting-opinion question; Veracity differences
may not necessarily occur in answering the devil’s advocate question.
In real life practitioners mostly have a statement of a single individual. The absence of other
individuals to compare the statement with rules out making a between-subjects comparison.
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The only option available to practitioners is to compare within a single individual different
parts of a single statement (Vrij, 2016). Such within-subjects’ comparisons are rare in research
and typically between-subjects comparisons are made: In a typical deception experiment, the
responses of groups of truth tellers and groups of lie tellers are compared (Vrij, 2008). The
within-subjects comparison in the Devil’s Advocate Approach is therefore a useful exception to
this common research practice.
In real life making within-subjects comparisons is still not straightforward due to the absence
of cut-off scores (Vrij, Fisher, & Leal, 2023). That is, what is the lowest score an individual can
have and still qualify as a truth teller? In a Devil’s Advocate Approach context, the perfect cut
off score would be that truth tellers are always more eloquent in answering the eliciting- opinion question than in answering the devil’s advocate question, whereas lie tellers are always
equally eloquent when answering both types of question. However, this is not the prediction.
The prediction is that the difference is larger in truth tellers than in lie tellers, whereas no
prediction can be made how large this difference should be to judge someone as a truth teller.
The absence of cut off scores is a general problem in lie detection based on analysing speech or
observing behaviour (Vrij, Fisher, & Leal, 2023), the two types of lie detection typically available
to interviewers in interview settings.
THE DEVIL’S ADVOCATE APPROACH EXPERIMENTS
Table 1 presents the results of the six experiments we are aware of that measured eloquence
in telling the truth or lying about opinions. Two experiments only asked eliciting-opinion
questions and are, strictly speaking, not Devil’s Advocate Approach experiments, but the other
four experiments are. The six experiments measured eloquence in terms of plausibility,
immediacy, and clarity and a variable about which the Devil’s Advocate Approach makes no
prediction: The number of arguments reported. Plausibility was defined as “Does the answer
sound reasonable and genuine and was there enough of an answer to sound convincing”;
Immediacy was defined as “Is the answer given from a personal perspective and not distanced”;
and Clarity was defined as “How clearly does the reader understand what the participant was
saying by the end of the answer”. The number of arguments refer to the number of arguments
reported in favour of the alleged opinion (pro-arguments) and against the alleged opinion (anti- arguments). In the experiments, participants told the truth or lied about controversial societal
issues such as being in favour or against (i) Covid vaccinations, (ii) euthanasia, (iii) CCTV
cameras in public areas, (iv) conspiracy theories, (v) minimum age for alcohol use, and (vi)
violent protests. Participants first expressed their true opinion about each of these issues on 7-
point Likert scales ranging from [1] very much against to [7] very much in favour. The
experimenter then chose a topic the participants expressed a strong view about (scores of 1, 2,
6 or 7 on the Likert scale) and asked the participant to either tell the truth or lie (pretend to
have the opposite view) about it in the subsequent interview. Participants were given as much
preparation time as they wanted.
Table 1 presents a summary of the results. It includes Cohen’s d-scores which reflects how large
an effect is (Cohen, 1988). Cohen stated that d-values around .20 represent small effects; d- values around .50 represent medium effects; and d-values of .80 or higher represent large
effects. Small effects are real effects but barely visible, the difference in height between 15- and
16-year-old girls. Medium effects are large enough to be visible to the naked eye, the difference
in average height between 14- and 18-year-old girls (about an inch). Large effects are grossly
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Vrij, A., Leal, S., & Fisher, R. P. (2023). Interviewing to Detect Lies About Opinions: The Devil’s Advocate Approach. Advances in Social Sciences
Research Journal, 10(12). 245-252.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.1012.16027
perceptible, such as the difference in average height between 13- and 18-year-old girls (about
two inches) (Cohen, 1988, p. 81). From a real-life perspective, veracity effects around d = 0.20
are not useful, but d-effects around d = .50 or larger are useful. d-scores do not represent
accuracy rates. d = 0.50 represents a higher accuracy than 50% and d-scores can exceed d =
1.00.
Table 1: Summary of Results of the Devil’s Advocate Experiments
Leal et al.
(2010)
Mann et al.
(2022)
Leal et al.
(2023)
Mann et al.
(2023)
Mann et al.
(2024)
Vrij et al.
(2022)
Eliciting-opinion question (EO)
Pro-arguments ns t > l d = 0.37 t > l d = 0.94 ns ns
Anti-arguments ns ns ns t > l d = 0.26 l > t d = -0.50
Plausibility t > l d = 0.72 t > l d = 1.15 ns (0.28) t > l d = 1.64 t > l d = 0.58 t > l d = 0.69
Immediacy t > l d = 0.56 t > l d = 0.59 ns (0.27) t > l d = 1.11 t > l d = 0.30 t > l d = 0.75
Clarity t > l d = 0.50 ns t >l d = 1.22 ns t > l d = 0.75
Devils’ advocate question (DA)
Pro arguments ns ns t > l d = 0.79
Anti-arguments ns ns ns
Plausibility l > t d = -0.86 t > l d = 0.55 l > t d = -0.41 t > l d = 1.50
Immediacy l > t d = -1.31 ns ns t > l d = 1.18
Clarity ns l > t d = -0.34 t > l d = 1.00
EO minus DA
ProMinusAnti
arguments
t > l d = 0.45 ns t > l d = 0.99
Plausibility t > l d = 1.59 t > l d = 0.47 t > l d = 0.51 ns
Immediacy t > l d = 1.95 t > l d = 0.48 t > l d = 0.38 ns
Clarity ns t > l d = 0.48 ns
Note: t > l: higher scores for truth tellers than lie tellers; l > t: higher scores for lie tellers than for truth tellers; ns:
No significant difference between truth tellers and lie tellers; blank spaces means that no veracity comparison was
made
Table 1 presents the results of three comparisons between truth tellers and lie tellers: Veracity
effects in (i) answers to the opinion-eliciting question, (ii) answers to the devil’s advocate
question and (iii) differences in answering the opinion-eliciting and devil’s advocate questions.
The first two comparisons are between-subjects comparisons, whereas the third comparison is
a within-subjects comparison. The Devil’s Advocate Approach predicts differences in the first
and third comparison, but not necessarily in the second comparison. In both the first and third
comparisons, truth tellers are expected to obtain higher eloquence scores than lie tellers.
First, Table 1 shows that in five out of six experiments, truth tellers were more eloquent than
lie tellers when answering the eliciting-opinion question, particularly in terms of being more
plausible and more immediate. The effect sizes ranged from d = 0.58 to d = 1.64 for plausibility
and from d = 0.30 to d = 1.11 for immediacy.1 This supports the hypothesis. In addition, truth
tellers presented their arguments more clearly than lie tellers in three out of five experiments.
The findings for pro- and anti-arguments do not present a clear picture.
1
In Leal et al. (2023) the effect sizes were d = 0.28 for plausibility and d = 0.27 for immediacy.
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Second, although several significant veracity effects emerged in the devil’s advocate question,
the results were conflicting and do not present a clear picture. Third, regarding the within- subjects comparison, in truth tellers more substantial differences emerged in being plausible
and immediate when answering the eliciting-opinion than devil’s advocate question than in lie
tellers, supporting the hypothesis. No clear picture emerged for number of arguments and
clarity.
One more devil’s advocate experiment was carried out which is not presented in Table 1
because it measured consistency rather than eloquence (Deeb et al., 2017). In all experiments
listed in Table 1 participants took part individually, whereas in Deeb et al. (2017) the
participants were pairs. Pairs were formed from participants who shared the same opinion
about a topic. Truth tellers were asked to express their true opinion in the interview whereas
lie tellers were asked to present in the interview the opposite view than they in fact have. The
pairs were given time to prepare themselves and were interviewed individually. The overlap in
their answers (consistency) was measured. Confirming what the researchers had predicted,
truth telling pairs were more consistent with each other in response to the opinion-eliciting
question than to the devil’s advocate question, whereas deceptive pairs were equally consistent
with each when answering the eliciting-opinion and devil’s advocate questions.
CONCLUSION
The experiments carried out to date showed that lying about opinions can be detected by
paying attention to how plausible and immediate the responses are. A between-subjects
comparison revealed that truth tellers sounded more plausible and more immediate than lie
tellers when answering the eliciting-opinion question. A within-subjects comparison revealed
that truth tellers, more than lie tellers, sounded more plausible and more immediate when
answering the eliciting-opinion question than when answering the devil’s advocate question.
The effect sizes showed that these differences are large enough to be detected with the naked
eye during interviews. However, the absence of cut-off scores could still create problems when
making veracity judgements in real life.
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