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Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal – Vol. 10, No. 5

Publication Date: May 25, 2023

DOI:10.14738/assrj.105.14620.

Stelgias, N. (2023). Erdoğan’s Authoritarian Neoliberalism Goes to Cyprus. What are the Chances of Success of The Imported

Authoritarian Neoliberal Model? Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 10(5).47-62.

Services for Science and Education – United Kingdom

Erdoğan’s Authoritarian Neoliberalism Goes to Cyprus. What are

the Chances of Success of The Imported Authoritarian Neoliberal

Model?

Nikolaos Stelgias

ABSTRACT

The study seeks to advance the notion of authoritarian neoliberalism by discussing

how the exportation of the authoritarian neoliberal model interacts with a closed

society experiencing socio-economic upheaval. The paper follows the efforts made

by a foreign power, such as Turkey, to assure the survival of an internationally non- recognised entity, such as the 'TRNC', via the neoliberal transformation of its

economy and the imposition of alien political strategies and social values. The

paper intends to argue that the authoritarian imposition of conservative and

neoliberal policies on a society by a foreign actor doesn’t necessarily produce the

desired outcome. Instead, by leaving behind accumulated unsolved problems and

by reproducing social and political inequalities it can raise concerns about the

sustainability of the structure that the neoliberal policies were designed to support.

Keywords: Turkish Cypriots, Turkey, authoritarianism, neoliberalism, conservatism

INTRODUCTION: THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITARIAN NEOLIBERALISM

MEETS THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS

In early 2011, Cemil Çiçek, the Turkish government's deputy prime minister in charge of the

Turkish Cypriot affairs stated that the internationally non-recognised 'Turkish Republic of

Northern Cyprus (TRNC)' which was founded in the northern part of Cyprus in 1983 with the

help of his country was at risk of bankruptcy. A few years earlier, the attempts to solve the

Cyprus Issue based on a bizonal, bi-communal federation failed when the majority of the Greek

Cypriot community rejected the Annan Plan in 2004. Had the Annan Plan been approved, and

the reunification of the island realised, it would probably have led to the influx of funds and

investments from abroad thus helping to solve some of the Turkish Cypriot community’s

chronic economic issues. However, in 2011 having no other alternative stream of funds, the

'TRNC'' was, according to Çiçek, on the verge of economic collapse. The Turkish politician

argued the necessity for extensive reforms in Cyprus’ second-largest community to reduce the

risk of an impending economic catastrophe (Cemil Çiçek’ten şok açıklama, 2022).

Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister asserted in the same statement that the strategy Turkey had

previously employed to address its own economic problems was the appropriate one for the

Turkish Cypriot community also. Çiçek claimed that the Turkish Cypriots should enact

neoliberal policies that would allow for the shrinkage of the public sector and the expansion of

private capital in Northern Cyprus. Regardless of how the endeavour to resolve the Cyprus

Problem would progress, Çicek and Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP)

asserted that the 'TRNC' required fundamental reforms like those previously applied in Turkey.

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The JDP, which had been raising concerns about the future of the 'TRNC' since the early 21st

century, took over the Turkish government in 2002 under the charismatic leadership of Recep

Tayyip Erdoğan with the promise of evading the economic crisis. The previous Turkish

governments worked with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to avert the looming

economic collapse of the 1990s and the early 2000s. The JDP followed in the same vein during

the initial phase of its governance by employing neoliberal strategies aiming on the one hand

to tackle the ongoing economic issues and on the other to democratise the country. Having

secured the backing of the IMF and other international actors, JDP moved on to change its

country by implementing its own governance formula which combined neoliberalism,

conservatism, and authoritarianism in equal parts. Nevertheless, when Çicek was arguing for

fundamental reforms in the 'TRNC' in 2011, the neoliberal authoritarian traits of the JDP

governments had not only increased significantly but also begun being exported to the 'TRNC'.

This paper aims to discuss these developments which have had minimal impact in most of the

scientific studies focusing on the Turkish-Turkish Cypriot relations. The study seeks to advance

the notion of authoritarian neoliberalism by discussing how the exportation of the

authoritarian neoliberal model interacts with a closed society experiencing socio-economic

upheaval. The paper follows the efforts made by a foreign power, such as Turkey, to assure the

survival of an internationally non-recognised entity, such as the 'TRNC', via the neoliberal

transformation of its economy and the imposition of alien political strategies and social values.

The paper intends to argue that the authoritarian imposition of conservative and neoliberal

policies on a society by a foreign actor doesn’t necessarily produce the desired outcome.

Instead, by leaving behind accumulated unsolved problems and by reproducing social and

political inequalities it can raise concerns about the sustainability of the structure that the

neoliberal policies were designed to support.

TURKEY'S AUTHORITARIAN NEOLIBERAL MODEL

The implementation of authoritarian neoliberalism in Turkey has attracted the attention of

many researchers. As it is well established in academic literature, after the military coup in

1980 Turkish governments focused on the reconstruction of the Turkish economy based on the

Western neoliberal model (Şenses, 2012). Starting from the rise of the Motherland Party in

power up until the Justice and Development Party’s era, Turkish governments focused on the

goal of rebuilding the Turkish economy by pushing for the establishment of a free market

economy. Indeed, they promoted a free market economy with limited state intervention in both

the economic and social affairs. Also, they committed to the freedom of trade and capital both

within the Turkish economy and in the country's trade and economic relations with the rest of

the world (Stelgias, 2020). As maintained by Tansel, neoliberal policies such as restraining the

welfare state, restricting labour rights, giving priority to capital interests, and a wave of

privatisations were implemented by the JDP governments throughout their time in power

(Tansel, 2018). In fact, 'authoritarian institutional structures, practices with neoliberal

ideology, powerful political alliances, Islamic values, and repressive practices' were frequent in

the history of modern Turkey according to Özkiziltan (Özkiziltan, 2019).

The neoliberal reconstruction of the Turkish economy has been accompanied by the imposition

of conservative values in Turkish society. From the period of the military coup in 1980 to the

years of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's rule, Turkish governments have put an emphasis on religion

and the conservative values that bind society in order to legitimise their decisions and to

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Stelgias, N. (2023). Erdoğan’s Authoritarian Neoliberalism Goes to Cyprus. What are the Chances of Success of The Imported Authoritarian

Neoliberal Model? Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 10(5).47-62.

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.105.14620

counter the side-effects of the neoliberal reconstruction of the economy and society. As Acar

and Altunok argue, in modern Turkey there is an 'interaction between neoliberalism and

neoconservatism, two political rationalities that play key roles in the structuring or control of

public and private domains, and the connections within these domains (Acar & Altunok, 2013)'.

Öniş adds that once in power the JDP gradually 'transformed toward a typical conservative

party in the tradition of the centre-right parties which have been a dominant feature of the

Turkish party system ever since the inception of the multi-party era in 1950 (Öniş, 2009)'. Kaya

(Kaya, 2015) and Uzer (Uzer, 2020) confirm the emergence of the conservative identity of the

AKP throughout time. According to them, the JDP, which started off having a democratic

outlook, gradually became an anti-democratic, authoritarian, conservative party.

In the search for popular legitimacy, Turkish governments also resorted to the adoption of an

authoritarian model of governance. As Bruff maintains, neoliberal policies 'have proven

increasingly difficult to earn the (society's) assent (Bruff, 2012)'. To curve the societies’ hostile

reaction to the new policies, especially during the post-1945 era, neoliberals, instead of seeking

the cooperation of the people, chose to develop a more explicit authoritarianism. As Kiely

argues this explicit authoritarianism that was developed to resist the demand for democracy

'was designed to de-democratizing the liberal democratic political order (Kiely, 2017)'. Once

the political order is de-democratized it becomes vital to 'build legitimacy' again. To do this, as

Chacko mentions, the supporters of neoliberal economics attempt to apply non-democratic

reinterpretations of the state (Chacko, 2018). According to Bruff the process followed is the

reshaping of the state into a less democratic entity by enacting constitutional amendments that

aim to protect it against social and political unrest (Bruff & Tansel, 2019).

In case of Turkey, since the beginning of the last decade, especially after the Gezi Protests,

Erdoğan governments have taken undemocratic initiatives in terms of individual freedoms and

liberal constitutional values (Kaygusuz, 2018). After the change of the constitution in 2018,

Erdoğan and his allies not only concentrated power in their hands but also, they overshadowed

established principles such as the separation of powers. Adaman and Akbulut interpret this

development as the intensification of the 'interdependent functioning of authoritarianism,

populism and developmentalism (Adaman & Akbulut, 2021)'. Kaygusuz adds that '(under the

JDP government) Turkey has witnessed a steady rise and consolidation of a neoliberal security

state. (In the aftermath of) the 15 June 2016 coup attempt, the post-liberal state weakened, and

the party/state symbiosis has become stronger and more intertwined (Kaygusuz, 2018)'.

Nevertheless, the mixture of neoliberalism, conservatism, and authoritarianism did not yield

the promised outcomes. For instance, the Turkish economy failed to achieve a performance

equal to that under the previous import-substitution strategy or to that of other comparable

countries (Şenses, 2012). In the same vein, as Navarro stresses the reconfiguration of the state

into a less democratic institution not only implies that it is becoming more vulnerable to the

problems of the contemporary era but, in many modern societies, reproduces the social and

political inequalities (Navarro, 2007). The said inequalities, the literature argues, have been

exacerbated in the previous 20 years as income and wealth disparity within countries has

grown due to neoliberal policies which are one of the reasons for the recent global financial

crisis along with the financial globalisation (Fiorentini, 2015). In Turkey, as Şenses emphasises,

the authoritarian neoliberal strategy in addition to causing a democratic deficit resulted also in

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a number of issues such as budget deficits, difficulties in the labour market, problematic

industrial advancement, unequal income distribution, poverty, and inflation.

THE 'TRNC' MEETS THE AUTHORITARIAN NEOLIBERAL MODEL

The 'TRNC' is a product of the unsolved Cyprus Problem and Ankara’s choices that has been

festering since the middle of the previous century. During Cyprus’ decolonization process in the

1950s, the Turkish Cypriots rejected the Greek Cypriot demand for the union with Greece,

proposing instead that the island be divided between Turkey and Greece (Hill, 2010). Towards

the end of the second half of the 1950s in close collaboration with Turkey, they organised their

armed response to the Greek Cypriot demand for union with Greece and clashed both with them

and the colonial government (Stelgias & Antreou, 2019). The short-lived bicommunal republic

failed to bridge the gap in relations between the island's two largest communities. Thus,

between 1963 and 1974, the Turkish Cypriots withdrew to several ghettos dispersed over

Cyprus and with Turkey's help created alternative state institutions. Then in 1974, Turkey

invaded Cyprus after a military takeover toppled the island's legitimately elected government.

36% of the Republic of Cyprus's territory was de facto under Turkish Cypriot rule at the end of

the second wave of the invasion (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). Having concentrated in Cyprus' northern

territories, in 1983 the Turkish Cypriot community proclaimed the establishment of the 'TRNC',

which is not recognised by the international community, except for Turkey. Between 1983 and

2017, the leaders of the two communities negotiated the solution of the Cyprus problem based

on the bizonal, bicommunal federal model. In the early 2000s, discussions on the establishment

of a bizonal, bicommunal federation gained considerable momentum. Indeed, between 2002

and 2017, the two communities engaged in negotiations under the supervision of the UN and

with the support of the three guarantor countries of Cyprus. However, the negotiations did not

yield a positive result. First at the Annan Plan process in 2004 and then at the Crans-Montana

Summit in 2017, the negotiations broke down since the two parties could not agree on crucial

issues such as power-sharing and security (Ergüven & Köprülü, 2023).

As the negotiations for the Cyprus Federation were underway, the Turkish Cypriots faced

international isolation which led to economic bottleneck and increased their multifaceted

dependence on Turkey. The 'TRNC' budget, which is mainly sustained by the assets the Greek

Cypriots forcibly abandoned in the northern part of Cyprus in 1974 and the service sector -the

agricultural and industrial sectors play a supporting role (Economy, n.d.) -, does not cover even

the salary costs of the public civil servants. Therefore, the salaries -the 'TRNC' uses the Turkish

national currency- are paid by both local resources and financial support of Turkey which, since

1974, controls 'TRNC’s' security forces, coast guard, fire department, and civil defence. The

literature emphasises that the 'TRNC' has been on the verge of financial collapse since the early

2000s(Moudouros, 2020), a fact that even its representatives acknowledge (Politik İflas

[Political Bankruptcy], 2022). In the face of the unsurmountable economic problems, two

conflicting schools of thought were formed in Turkish Cypriot society. The nationalist segments

of the society and the Turkish citizens who settled in the northern part of Cyprus after 1974,

put forward the view that the only way out of the problems the community is facing are the

guidelines imposed by Ankara. On the contrary, the Turkish Cypriot Left and the supporters of

the reunification of Cyprus put forward the view that the solution of the Cyprus problem is a

one-way street. In the same vein, Masarogullari stresses that 'while the Turkish Cypriot right

and most settlers adopt the nationalist narrative of the Turkish government, another segment

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Stelgias, N. (2023). Erdoğan’s Authoritarian Neoliberalism Goes to Cyprus. What are the Chances of Success of The Imported Authoritarian

Neoliberal Model? Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 10(5).47-62.

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.105.14620

of the community insists on the significance of a 'separate Turkish Cypriot identity' within a

unified and European federal Cyprus' (Masarogullari, 2011).

In the mid 2000s, Turkey decided to set certain requirements for continuing to offer the much- needed financial aid to the Turkish Cypriot community. With the Cyprus issue still unresolved

the community had no choice than to follow Turkey’s lead. Relying on the cooperation of its

local allies coming from the first school of thought Ankara imposed its authoritarian

governance style in 'TRNC'. Moreover, as we will see below the primary requirement set by the

Turkish government was the neoliberal reconstruction of the Turkish Cypriot economy, whilst

the secondary was the adoption of Ankara’s conservative social values.

THE NEOLIBERAL RECONSTRUCTION OF 'TRNC’S' ECONOMY

At the end of the 2000s, the JDP government warned the leaders of the 'TRNC' that the period

of easy financing had come to an end. As the Turkish deputy prime minister explained, Ankara

would in future make strict demands for offering its financial support. In this framework,

Turkey started channelling to the 'TRNC' not only money but also its neo-liberal strategies.

The first economic agreements and protocols signed in the late 2000s featured key measures

for the Turkish Cypriot economy, which served as the catalyst for transferring neoliberal

policies from Turkey to the 'TRNC'. An innovative system that handles the delivery of Turkish

aid was established by the economic agreements for the years between 2007 and 2022.

Neoliberal policies that call for the shrinking of the public sector and the expansion of the

private sector in the northern part of Cyprus were imposed by Turkey's Vice Presidency (before

the constitutional change in Turkey in 2018, the Deputy Prime Minister), which oversees

Turkish Cypriot affairs, in exchange for financial support. The Turkish Embassy in Nicosia, the

Cyprus Affairs Coordination Office of the Republic of Turkey, and the Turkish and Turkish

Cypriot Technical Delegations worked with the Development and Economic Cooperation Office

(DECO) to implement these agreements. The Office which was established to advise the Vice

President was chaired by the Deputy Minister of Treasury and Finance and included members

from various Turkish ministries (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Lefkoşa Büyükelçiliği Kei Ofisi’nin Genel

Çerçeve İçindeki Yeri (The Place of the Office of the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey of the

Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Lefkosia in the General Framework), 2022). In reality, the

DECO was acting as a shadow government under the chairmanship of the Ambassador of the

Turkish Republic in 'TRNC' tasked to carry out the implementation and monitoring of the

decisions made in Ankara. 'TRNC's' shadow government launched a series of projects to

enhance the community’s financial capacity, such as the development of the road network and

the transfer of water and electricity from Anatolia to Cyprus via a submarine pipeline and

electric cable (“Asrın Projesi” Askılı Boru Sistemiyle Anadolu’dan KKTC’ye Su Taşıyor [’Project

of the Century’ Carries Water from Anatolia to TRNC with Suspended Pipe System], n.d.). It also

attempted the neoliberal reconstruction of the Turkish Cypriot economy.

All the financial agreements made between Ankara and the 'TRNC' for the years 2007–2021

aimed at restructuring the public sector, the social security system, and the local government

whilst at the same time supporting 'TRNC’s' private sector based on the neoliberal model.

Beginning with the first agreement, which covered the period 2007-2009, financial aid of 1.875

billion Turkish Liras (TL) in the form of grants and loans were released to the Turkish Cypriot

community on the condition of lowering public spending and fostering the private sector

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(Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Ile Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti Arasında Ekonomik ve Mali

İşbirliği Protokolü (2007-2009) [Protocol on Economic and Financial Cooperation between the

Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus], 2022).

Moving on to 15 years later, the financial aid of 2022 skyrocket to the amount of 4.25 billion TL

(grants and loans) despite the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and the growing economic

crisis which Turkey was also experiencing (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Ile Kuzey Kıbrıs

Türk Cumhuriyeti Arasında Ekonomik ve Mali İşbirliği Protokolü (2022) [Protocol on Economic

and Financial Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish

Republic of Northern Cyprus], 2022).

In the 2022 agreement the JDP government’s neoliberal policies are evident in several

important clauses. For instance, the agreement calls for the completion of a series of analyses

in which, with the goal of reducing its size, 'the public personnel and the pension system will be

examined, and any required legislative measures will be implemented'. Also, after a review of

the 'TRNC' pension system, a Pension Reform Plan should be created for sustainability, whereas

all salary payments would be subject to tax and insurance cuts. Moreover, applications for

positions in the public sector should be sent to the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia, where the

opinion of the Turkish Cypriot Affairs Coordination Office would be sought. In the private

sector, alterations would be made in the collective bargaining agreements so that they won't be

automatically renewed at the end of their terms. Furthermore, the operation of worker’s unions

should be limited to their original scope and the spilling over to any political activities would

be barred. At the same time, investments were to be encouraged. For this, the privatisation of

the ports and the National Lottery would be assessed whilst the limitations on Turkish

nationals buying property in the 'TRNC' must be loosened.

In line with the provisions of the economic agreements signed by the Turkish Cypriot side with

Ankara, by mid 2022 the number of 'TRNC’s' municipalities were reduced from 28 to 18

(KKTC’de belediye sayısı 28’den 18’e düşürüldü [The number of municipalities in the TRNC was

reduced from 28 to 18], 2022). This, according to Turkish Cypriot analysts, signalled the

beginning of the 2022 agreement terms being put into practice (Şafaklı, 2022). In their opinion,

the downsizing of local government was only to be followed by a fresh round of privatisations

which would include the ports and the 'TRNC' telecommunication authority (Özadam, 2022).

After all, the privatisation of the ports and the electricity and telecommunication authorities

were promised by the 'TRNC's' coalition government. Specifically, at the time of the signing of

the economic agreements between Turkey and the 'TRNC' the two parties of the Turkish

Cypriot right that maintain close cooperation with Ankara stated that: Efforts for privatisation

must be expedited, and government interference with the economy and the existence of a free

market must be minimised. By reducing its size, the state will become more effective. Principles

like boosting output and efficiency, preventing monopolies, fostering competition, and

distributing ownership to the grassroots by giving preference to employees and producers

must be observed during privatisation. It will be intended to boost economic productivity and

to create the ability to earn additional resources by transferring some public services that can

be priced or marketed to the private sector, besides the privatisation of public companies

considered necessary (UBP-DP Hükûmeti Programı [Programme of the UBP-DP Government],

n.d.).

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Stelgias, N. (2023). Erdoğan’s Authoritarian Neoliberalism Goes to Cyprus. What are the Chances of Success of The Imported Authoritarian

Neoliberal Model? Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 10(5).47-62.

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.105.14620

THE IMPOSITION OF THE CONSERVATIVE VALUES

Beyond the neoliberal reconstruction of the 'TRNC' economy, Ankara also intended to

implement its conservative social policies on the island. As in the case of Turkey, Ankara

promoted conservative ideals to gain support and justify its decisions to the Turkish Cypriot

community. Acar and Altunok's observation that neoliberalism and neoconservatism can

coexist is evident in what was happening in Cyprus since the mid 2000s.

In the most recent economic agreement of 2022 provisions were made to promote the notion

of the inextricable link between the 'TRNC' citizens and the Muslim Turkish identity (Türkiye

Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Ile Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti Arasında Ekonomik ve Mali İşbirliği

Protokolü (2022) [Protocol on Economic and Financial Cooperation between the Government

of the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus], 2022). The 'further

strengthening and sustaining of the links deriving from common history, origin, culture,

language, religion, and spiritual values in all areas' were key elements of 'TRNC’s' neoliberal

reconstruction as envisioned by Ankara. In the context of the agreement, the cooperative efforts

for the restoration and preservation of common cultural and social relations would be

deepened whilst the operations of the religious services would be reinforced. As it is clearly

stated in the agreement's 'Social Policies' section:

(The agreement) aims to strengthen intercultural and social ties while preserving and

advancing cultural values. It (also ensures) that the TRNC’s past is maintained and passed onto

future generations by undertaking studies to uncover traditional and cultural values. The

physical and intangible cultural assets of the Turkish-Islamic era shall be identified and

promoted through scientific research. Restoration work will be undertaken to reveal the

remnants of the Ottoman Empire on the island and to strengthen the Turkish presence there.

The mention of the Ottoman Empire and the emphasis given to the Turkish-Islamic past of the

island appear to have a dual purpose. First, to stress the ties between Turkey and the 'TRNC'

which according to Ankara share not only the same past through culture and religion but also

the same present through the shared conservative values. In this framework, other historical

periods such as Cyprus' British colonial era or the Greek Cypriot heritage are being ignored.

Second, to disregard the Turkish Cypriots' devotion to secularism which has been deeply rooted

in the collective identity of the community since its widespread across the island at the

beginning of the 20th century.

Furthermore, Ankara's conservative social policy for the 'TRNC' was implemented in the 2010s

mainly by the reinforcement of local religious institutions, the building of new mosques

(Massive Turkey-Funded Mosque Stirs Unease in Secular North Cyprus, n.d.) and the opening

of the first religious educational institution in the country (KKTC’nin ilk İmam-Hatip Lisesi

açıldı - Yeni Akit [TRNC’s first Imam-Hatip High School opened], 2022). During this time, many

Turkish religious organisations in the 'TRNC' amplified their activities, and there was a rise in

the distribution of material endorsing traditionalist principles (Bu Kitaplar Tarikat

Propagandası Içeriyor [These Books Contain Cult Propaganda], 2012). Ambassador Ali Murat

Basçeri, the highest-ranking official of the Turkish government in the 'TRNC', claimed that these

initiatives were an effort to reconnect the Turkish Cypriots with their 'Turkish' and 'Muslim'

roots:

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started the public debate on changing the name of 'TRNC' (Oktay: “Artık ‘Kuzey’ Demek

Istemiyoruz; Kıbrıs Türk Devleti” [Oktay: ’We Don’t Want to Use (the Term) “North” Anymore;

Turkish Cypriot State’}, 2023). Early in 2023, the Turkish Vice President proposed the idea of

replacing the title 'TRNC' with 'Turkish Cypriot State' under which the Turkish Cypriot side

participates as an observer in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (Relations with The

Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 2023). The Turkish official spoke before the Turkish

Cypriot community had the chance to begin its public consultation on the name change and

before the constitutional reform had received the support of 2/3 of the members of parliament.

The projection of the authoritarian style of rule by the Turkish government to the Turkish

Cypriot community coincided with other anti-democratic interventions. The 'Avrupa', a Turkish

Cypriot newspaper that stands firmly against the partition of Cyprus and Ankara's policy

towards the island, in 2017 published a caricature criticising Turkey's invasion of northern

Syria by comparing it with Turkey’s military actions in Cyprus in 1974 (Afrika gazetesi protesto

edildi [Afrika newspaper protested], 2022). The Turkish President took offence and responded

accordingly by stating that a newspaper 'in the TRNC immorally published a headline. I urge

my brothers in the TRNC to speak out and express their anger. It claims that the Turkish army

invaded another country after Cyprus. This is offensive and immoral. Particularly, I need my

brothers in the TRNC to take a stand and give the required response (Cumhurbaşkanı

Erdoğan’dan KKTC’deki gazeteye çok sert tepki [President Erdoğan reacts very harshly to TRNC

newspaper], 2022).' Erdoğan's call to action was followed by a day of havoc with enraged mobs

attacking the newspaper's offices (KKTC’de Afrika gazetesine saldırı [Attack on Afrika

newspaper in TRNC], 2018). In 2022 the editor-in-chief Şener Levent was given a one-year

prison term for insulting Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in a lawsuit brought by the

Turkish judiciary in Ankara over the said caricature (Şener Levent Ankara’da 1 yıl hapis

cezasına mahkum edildi [Şener Levent Ankara’da 1 yıl hapis cezasına mahkum edildi], 2022).

During the same period came the persecution of Barbaros Şansal. The Turkish fashion designer

and LGBTQI+ activist who was at the time a resident of 'TRNC' is well known for his criticism

of the Turkish conservative government. In 2017 Şansal posted a video on social media in which

he criticised Turkish society. The government in Turkey took offence once again and the

Turkish government-controlled media poured oil on fire inciting Şansal’s snap deportation

from the 'TRNC' to Turkey. The artist was first lynched while he was being escorted by police

to Istanbul's Sabiha Gökçen International Airport and then put in prison (Modacı Barbaros

Şansal’a Havalimanında Linç Girişimi [Lynching Attempt Against Fashion Designer Barbaros

Şansal at the Airport], 2022).

Shortly after a ban was introduced targeting those who supported the former Turkish Cypriot

leader, and the idea of reunifying Cyprus. Several Turkish Cypriots who had supported Akinci's

bid for the presidency and were well known for backing the bi-zonal, bi-communal federal

solution to the Cyprus issue were barred from entering Turkey in 2021–2022. Ali Bizden, a

Turkish Cypriot who was once Akinci's special advisor, was expelled from Turkey. Following

this event, Turkey blocked the entry of many more Turkish Cypriot dissidents (Ali Bizden

Türkiye’ye alınmadı KKTC’ye geri gönderiliyor [Ali Bizden was not allowed into Turkey but is

being sent back to TRNC], 2021).