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Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal – Vol. 10, No. 1
Publication Date: January 25, 2023
DOI:10.14738/assrj.101.13896.
Facco, E., Fracas, F., & Tagliagambe, S. (2023). Consciousness and the Mind-Brain-Body-World Relationship: Towards A
Transdisciplinary and Transcultural Approach. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, Vol - 10(1). 414-433.
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Consciousness and the Mind-Brain-Body-World Relationship:
Towards A Transdisciplinary and Transcultural Approach
Enrico Facco
Studium Patavinum, Dept. of Neurosciences,
University of Padua, Italy, and Inst. Franco Granone,
Italian Center of Clinical & Experimental Hypnosis, Turin, Italy
Fabio Fracas
University of Padua, Italy, and
Scientific Collaboration Manager, Transmutex, Geneve, Swiss
Silvano Tagliagambe
University of Sassari, Italy
ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to overview the main epistemological implications of the
scientific approach to consciousness and the mind-brain relationship, undergone a
lively debate in the past decades by strict materialist monist and dualist stances.
Their limits, as well as the limits of reductionism and the shortcomings of classical
Western thought, suggest the need for a broader perspective. Actually, a
transdisciplinary approach helps overcoming the limits and incompleteness of
single axiomatic disciplines. Likewise, a transcultural, meta philosophical
approach allows to understand key concepts and meanings common to
different philosophies and cultures and properly face them beyond the
multiplicity and ostensible oddity of forms. This approach seems to be
appropriate in the study of consciousness and subjective phenomena, where
the first-person perspective and the meaning of the experience are the condition
sine qua non for their comprehension.
Keywords: consciousness, epistemology, materialism, dualism, metaphilosophy,
metascience
INTRODUCTION
The reflections on the nature of consciousness and soul date back to the beginning of
philosophy in both the East and the West. The term consciousness has a wide range of
meanings, like all terms related to subjective phenomena; as a result, albeit appearing familiar
and conceptually clear, it can hardly be restricted in a comprehensive, simple definition. In fact,
in the history of philosophy, the concept of consciousness greatly overlapped with that of soul
and ego, while in the post-Cartesian thought, they were assigned a different ontology with
respect to the physical reality, leading to their irreconcilable separation and
incommensurability. According to Jaynes, consciousness is also diachronic − i.e., it cannot be
properly comprehended outside history and culture [1,2].
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Facco, E., Fracas, F., & Tagliagambe, S. (2023). Consciousness and the Mind-Brain-Body-World Relationship: Towards A Transdisciplinary and
Transcultural Approach. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, Vol - 10(1). 414-433.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.101.13896
Actually, the foundation of the science of consciousness has involved huge epistemological and
metaphysical issues that have been mainly faced in a lively, still ongoing debate between
materialist monist and dualist stances [3,4], the key point of which has been well defined by
Chalmers in terms of easy problem and hard problem [5,6]. A proper comprehension of
consciousness, especially the hard problem and the relationship between the inner and outer
world, inescapably involves a broader perspective encompassing transdisciplinary and
transcultural aspects in order to exceed the limits of the classic materialist and dualist
interpretations.
The aim of this article is to outline the reasons for such an approach. It is a broad topic that
cannot be analyzed in all details within the space of an article; nevertheless, an overview of its
main aspects may provide some food for further thought, hopefully stimulating deeper analysis
in each specific theme without losing track of the topic as a whole and the close connection
between its components.
ON THE SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
Medicine has a central role in defining the boundaries between health and disease;
nevertheless, the definition of disorders is a hard job endowed with profound cultural and
epistemological implications and a relevant risk of misdiagnosis, especially when psychological
and psychiatric disorders are concerned [7–9]. Furthermore, a variety of anomalous, ostensibly
odd experiences, named Non-Ordinary Mental expressions (NOMEs), are non-pathological in
nature and call for being properly understood rather than psychiatrized [10]. NOMEs are an
inescapable aspect of consciousness, as well defined by William James:
“It is that our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is
but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the
filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. We
may go through life without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite
stimulus, and at a touch, they are there in all their completeness, definite types of
mentality which probably somewhere have their field of application and
adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality can be final, which leaves these
other forms of consciousness quite disregarded” (11, p. 111).
By definition, consciousness is an irreducibly subjective phenomenon, the contents of which
can only be known by inner perception and shared with others through communication of the
experience by first- and second-person perspective (1PP and 2PP, respectively); furthermore,
some essential aspects of the Self may be approached by introspection only [12]. Qualia − the
phenomenological properties of sense data, including perceptual experiences, bodily
sensations, felt reactions, passions or emotions, and felt moods [13] − are of crucial importance
in the comprehension of consciousness, raising a lively debate between physicalists and anti- physicalists in the past decades and leading to several, still unsolved mental experiments (e.g.,
the zombie) being introduced [14–16].
Furthermore, phenomenal experiences and cognition include both unconscious and conscious
levels in an unceasing reciprocal exchange of information, ranging from anoetic to noetic ones,
up to the level of self-reflexive experiences [17]. The transition from anoetic to noetic
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experiences reflects a caudo-rostral integration in the brain. The latter dresses the former with
images, concepts, and metaphors to be consciously experienced and make them meaningful and
communicable. Their essential feature is their meaning, despite quantitative aspects of
perception being also relevant; for example, pain is an exclusively subjective experience
featured by well-known specific quality and intensity. Its unpleasantness and meaning deeply
affect its intensity and tolerability [18].
The foundation of the science of consciousness has entailed a huge debate between materialist
monists, considering it as a plain epiphenomenon of brain circuits, and those considered as
dualists, who think that consciousness and qualia cannot be reduced to brain circuitry. Some
authors have hypothesized an unbridgeable explanatory gap between brain circuitry and
consciousness, leading to physicalist claims being falsified due to the lack of entailment
between them [6,19]. As a result, the gap would call for bridge laws able to properly connect
the reduced theory to the reducing one. On the other hand, other authors think that a
conceptual gap does not necessarily entail an explanatory gap and that the problem can be
solved by theoretical identifications [20] or, anyway, bridge laws are not necessary at all [21].
Nevertheless, Marras has supported his argument pro theoretical identification with the
example of pain, as follows [20]:
For once we have got our theoretical identifications (inductively derived as they
must be), it can’t any longer be a mystery why C-fibers firing should feel like pain:
C-fiber firing is pain; and it is a mystery that pain should feel like pain? As Kim
earlier remarked, ‘Identity takes away the logical space in which explanatory
questions can be formulated’” (Italics in the original text).
Unfortunately for physicalists, pain is a very complex functional phenomenon that cannot be
equated to C-fiber firing. In fact, the universally accepted definition of pain defines it as an
unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage
or described in terms of such damage [22,23]. This definition clearly states that pain is a matter
of sensory and emotional experience and properly avoids tying it to nervous pathways
stimulation. This is tantamount to saying, “no experience, no pain”, implying that pain may be
managed not only by pain killers but also by changing the experience. An outstanding proof is
hypnotic analgesia, which may be as effective as to significantly relieve chronic pain and even
allow for surgery without anesthetic drugs [24,25]. In fact, hypnosis is the result of an
intentional, introspective activity leading to the pain neuro matrix in the brain being controlled
and inputs from C-fibers to the somatosensory cortex being blocked [26]: thus, a maximal
stimulation of C-fibers in the periphery may not be equivalent to even the slightest pain. This
also shows the self-contradictory overriding attitude of the reductionist approach of medicine
to pain, mainly relying on a bottom-up pharmacological manipulation of nociception while
neglecting a top-down change of the experience [18].
The example of pain has also been used in the argument of truth-makers of perceived inner
states [27], though in a questionable way (for criticism, see [12]). Pain is not a plain symptom
of physical damage. Rather, it is the suffering of the individual as a whole, a fact entailing huge
psychological and existential implications that cannot be ignored in clinical practice. Le Breton
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Facco, E., Fracas, F., & Tagliagambe, S. (2023). Consciousness and the Mind-Brain-Body-World Relationship: Towards A Transdisciplinary and
Transcultural Approach. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, Vol - 10(1). 414-433.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.101.13896
has wisely defined pain as an incision of the sacred, ripping one from himself and leading to
face one’s limits, the transience of life and its cost: thus, pain obliges to metaphysics [28,29].
The explanatory gap between brain circuitry and experience also depends on the brain
incalculable complexity, plasticity, and unceasing transformation over the life span. It is the
condition at the basis of the development of human consciousness in a ceaseless exchange of
information with the unconscious and the outer world, making every human being a unique
individual entity. As a result, this complex uniqueness, together with the definition of
consciousness as an emergent property, make it difficult to analyze it in a discrete or
parsimonious manner even when its reduction is in principle admitted [30].
The debate on reductionism in the philosophy of mind includes the problem of reliability of
measures of introspective activity, the uncertainty of which has led Elizabeth Irvine to wonder
whether it is a methodological muddle to be abandoned or even calling for withdrawing
consciousness from scientific practice [31,32]. The problem is far from being new and has
undergone a deep analysis in the past centuries in both Eastern and Western philosophies. It is
well-known that introspection may be self-deceptive, given that the observer has a restricted
perception of his/her inner world (ignoring all that is unconscious) and may alter the
observation of inner states. On the other hand, the validity of perception and understanding of
the outer world is far from being unerring − as the very history of science clearly shows − a fact
reflecting the more general evidence of human fallibility in the process of knowledge as a whole
At any rate, behavioral measurements, despite being useful, are not enough, and the knowledge
of introspective data remains essential for an appropriate comprehension of experience, self- perception, self-awareness, and self-knowledge. Furthermore, the only way to hopefully
recognize self-deception is through metacognition, which remains a matter of introspection,
inner third-person perspective, and critical analysis [12].
Given qualia’s subjective, qualitative nature, Galilean sciences (bonr to investigate the physical
world only) cannot properly investigate and understand them. In this regard, it is worth noting
that their distinction between primary (e.g., shape, size, position, stillness and movement) and
secondary qualities (e.g., colors, smell, taste, sound) was introduced by Democritus first, who
denied qualities other than shape and size belonging to the atoms themselves. However, he
stated that,
“There are two kinds of knowledge, one genuine, one bastard (or ‘obscure’). To the
former belong all the following: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch” (Fragment
DK68B11).
The Democritus’ definition of senses was uncritically adopted by Galileo and Descartes, leading
them to believe that primary qualities, unlike secondary ones, were an objective property of
things compatible with the mathematical model − a distinction supported by their
mathematical apriorism [33] – and the assumption that reality could be objectively known as it
is, an assumption not without an element degree of naïve realism. Therefore, the distinction
between primary and secondary qualities remains questionable since they are similar as
concerns both their neurocorrelates and the relationship observer/observed phenomenon.
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HISTORICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS
Given all this, a short discussion of a few essential aspects of the history of philosophy, science,
and medicine may help envisioning some crucial questions involved in the scientific approach
to consciousness [the topic has been discussed in more detail elsewhere [3,34].
Ancient Greek culture was an inseparable blend of rational philosophy and mysteric doctrines,
including oracles and initiation rites, all great personalities (including Plato and Aristotle) were
admitted to. Likewise, medicine was intimately connected to the sacred for over 3,000 years,
from Imhotep temples in ancient Egypt to Asclepius temples-hospitals in Greece, where
incubation (to be considered as a form of proto-hypnosis) was used together with drugs and
surgery as an inseparable part of a psychosomatic approach [35]. Hippocrates has been the
most outstanding Greek physician introducing the rational approach (loghismós) and rightfully
considered the great father of modern medicine. The paradigm brought by both Hippocrates
and Parmenides contemplated the reality with a non-dualist perspective holding the
inseparability of the whole (ὅλης φύσεως, hólēs physeos), the complementarity of opposites,
and the concept of δύναμις (dynamis, power), a paradigm akin to Taoism1 and traditional
Chinese medicine.
The concept of dynamis, definable as the inseparable, dynamic interrelationship of mind-brain- body-environment, is a surprisingly modern intuition of complex systems, a topic only recently
introduced in medicine and biology [36,37]. The theory of complexity is a topic of paramount
importance in physics as well, recently earning Hasselman, Manabe, and Parisi the Nobel Prize
[38]. Besides spin glasses [39,40], the theory may be applied to life sciences, such as proteins
dynamics, DNA, learning and behavior [41,42]. Therefore, living beings might be better
understood taking a holistic approach and the theory of complexity in due account.
The scientific revolution of the 17th Century has been the cornerstone of the rational knowledge
of the physical world in Western culture. Nevertheless, it was not born of a free epistemological
reflection; instead, it depended on a political compromise with the Church, claiming its
exclusive competence on the soul. This resulted into what has been previously named the
original sin of Galilean sciences[3,43]. Therefore, the split between medicine and religion is only
a relatively recent phenomenon restricted to the Western friction between Galilean Sciences
and the Church (only a close-minded socio-political question, the meaning of religion should
not be mistaken with2). Descartes, strongly concerned about avoiding an irreconcilable conflict
with the Church, assigned different ontologies to the res cogitans and res extensa, making them
scientifically incommensurable − a sort of loophole allowing for the compromise with the
Church, obtained at the cost of splitting what in nature was inseparably interconnected. The
solution was a dualist political parceling, assigning the soul (consciousness) to the Church and
the physical world plus the earthen body machine to the science, safe from the Inquisition. The
Descartes’ errors have not been considered worthy of revision until recent years [3,44], while
the science of consciousness was born in the 1980s’ (i.e., over three centuries after the political
1 There is a clear concordance between the Parmenides’ concept of Being and Tao, as well as between his Light- Dark and the concept of Yin-Yang [12,50].
2 The etymology and meaning of the term religion, also calling for a metareligious approach, has been described
elsewhere [3,35].
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Facco, E., Fracas, F., & Tagliagambe, S. (2023). Consciousness and the Mind-Brain-Body-World Relationship: Towards A Transdisciplinary and
Transcultural Approach. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, Vol - 10(1). 414-433.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.101.13896
compromise with the Church) as a long-term result of a strong cultural filter preventing one to
deal with it.
Then, Western rationalism and Cartesianism moved towards Positivism and materialist
monism – the mainstream science is based on; the latter can be founded only when an
autonomous, independent ontology of matter is metaphysically adopted and, in this regard, it
can be considered as a long-term result of the Cartesian split. However, materialist monism is
metaphysically self-contradictory, in that it a priori rejects what looks to be immaterial
(consciousness) without demonstrating its inexistence − the Ryle’s metaphor of the phantom in
the machine [45] − implicitly admitting it to allow for its refusal. Furthermore, it relies on
“observed” facts and assertions belonging themselves to the refused reality of mental products
[34,46].
Galileo himself accepted the limitation of science to the physical world reluctantly. Has he
stated in his Dialogue Concerning the Two New Sciences (Day 3, corollary 3) [47],
“We must be satisfied to belong to that class of less worthy workmen who procure
from the quarry the marble out of which, later, the gifted sculptor [the theologian;
authors’ note] produces those masterpieces which lay hidden in this rough and
shapeless exterior”.
However, his mathematical apriorism was outstanding and successful in the investigation of
the physical world. On the other hand, its exclusive use in living beings is questionable, in that
it reduces them to a set of equivalent quantitative mathematical parameters only, as well
pictured by Florenskji:
“The rationalistic understanding of life does not distinguish, and is not able to
distinguish, between a person and a thing. More precisely, it has only one category,
the category of thingness, and therefore all things, including persons, are reified by
this understanding, are taken as a thing, as res.” [48].
In this cultural climate, medicine focused more and more on the Cartesian bodily earthen
machine only, reducing human beings to a sort of small clocks [e.g., the Machine Man [49]]
immersed in the big clock of a deterministic Newtonian universe. The resulting mechanist- reductionist stance neglecting the soul has inadvertently led to Hippocrates’ teaching being
betrayed [50]. As a result, the undeniable power and effectiveness of modern scientific
medicine shows its limits in front of subjectivity, which is the inescapable core of psychological
and psychosomatic disorders, suffering, pain, distress, and the existential implications of severe
diseases − i.e., the specter of disability and the perception of one’s doom [51].
The Principle of the Nonoverlapping Magisteria [52] − held by Pope Pius XII in his encyclical
Humani Generis (1950) − can be considered as the long-term result of the forced compromise
between the new sciences and the Church in the 17th Century. It has also been endorsed by the
National Academy of Sciences of the USA:
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“Many scientists are deeply religious. But science and religion occupy two separate
realms of human experience. Demanding that they be combined detracts from the
glory of each” [53].
Gould himself recognized the limits of the Principle of Nonoverlapping Magisteria [52]:
“This resolution might remain all neat and clean if the nonoverlapping magisteria
of science and religion were separated by an extensive no man’s land ... In fact, the
two magisteria bump right up against each other, interdigitating in wondrously
complex ways along their joint border. Many of our deepest questions call upon
aspects of both for different parts of a full answer”.
Hence, the Principle of Nonoverlapping Magisteria remains a mediocre political compromise
rather than a solid, epistemologically well-founded principle. It is constitutively unable to
properly solve the huge problems rising at the surface of friction between science and religion
(or better, the Church), a fact occurring in clinical practice when facing the above-mentioned
conditions and NOMEs, like Mystical and Near-Death Experiences [43,54–57] with their vast
philosophical-existential implications. Furthermore, they cannot be solved within the limits of
scientific reductionism, being it constitutively blind to subjectivity. At the same time, patient
care cannot be reduced to a set of mechanic interventions on the earthen body machine only.
The Mind-Brain Relationship Between Reductionism and Emergentism
Two key concepts define consciousness and the mind-brain relationship in neurosciences:
a) Consciousness as an emergent property of brain complexity;
b) The axiom that any mental state, process, and product is associated with specific
neurocorrelates.
Granted these concepts, no activity of mind and consciousness may occur without activating
the corresponding brain circuits. There is no problem in accepting it, but the correlation is not
synonymous of causality. As the concept of emergent property is concerned, it is a feature of
complex systems, implying the appearance of supervening properties, leading to the fallacy of
division and reduction. The case of consciousness is the most intriguing since there is no area
of consciousness in the brain. Rather, it emerges as a complex interrelationship of many, still
little defined areas and circuits, where the interface and transduction between brain circuitry
and the related mental events with their qualia (how they turn into each other) are unknown.
The mind-brain relationship may only establish their correlation: turning it into a bottom-up
exclusive causality is not logically allowed, while a bidirectional bottom-up and top-down
causation is more plausible. Indeed, a wealth of studies on hypnosis and meditation clearly
shows how the mind may yield intentional activations/deactivation of unconscious brain areas
through introspection, leading one to achieve outstanding goals, one for all the above- mentioned hypnotic analgesia [26,58,59].
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Facco, E., Fracas, F., & Tagliagambe, S. (2023). Consciousness and the Mind-Brain-Body-World Relationship: Towards A Transdisciplinary and
Transcultural Approach. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, Vol - 10(1). 414-433.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.101.13896
If the above discussion is correct, one should refrain from adopting an inflexible axiomatic
stance − be it materialist or not, reductionist or anti-reductionist, or anything else − and a priori
projecting ethnocentric and anthropocentric prejudices, axioms, and mental categories into the
outer world with the illusion of knowing it “objectively”. Instead, the proper way to knowledge
should follow the exemplary concept of Russell’s enlargement of the Self [12, quoted by 60].
Reductionism remains a powerful and effective tool to investigate the causal relationship
between physical events; a crucial error is turning it into a sort of ontology, claiming its absolute
value and a priori rejecting anything ostensibly incompatible with it.
As far as objectivity is concerned, it is worth recalling that the perception of reality is weaker
than commonly believed, for the available information is necessarily partial, while the features
of sense organs (with their filters) and brain coding processes are unconscious, leading to naïve
realism (i.e., the belief that the senses provide us with direct awareness of objects as they
“really” are). If this is the case, the debate between realists and idealists seems flimsy for both
physical and subjective aspects form an inseparable whole in the interpretation of reality,
where everything belonging to the materialist view is made of mind-stuff, and the so-called
objectivity cannot trespass the level of shared Weltbild. Hence, the outer world, as it is known,
is an inseparable co-creation of the physical world (unknowable as it is in itself) and mind [34].
About Reductionism, Metaphysics, and Blindsight
According to van Riel and Gulick, reductionism is ontologically neutral in itself [61]; therefore,
it might be applied to seemingly nonphysical aspects of the world as well. If this is the case, even
idealism and Berkeley’s immaterialism might be regarded as forms of reduction from matter to
mind. The difference between materialists and idealists is in what has been axiomatically
adopted as the primary manifestation of reality (matter or mind, respectively). According to
Popper, materialist reductionism is an example of a “bad ad hoc reduction” in that it claims a
reduction of the mental to the physical on an a priori basis entailing an undue neglect of the
mind-body relationship [62].
Pain has also been used to explain the concept of reduction, as Ernest Nagel did with the
example of headache (Nagel, 1961; quoted by van Riel & Van Gulick, 2019). Indeed, the
definition of headache in neurology establishes that migraine is a complex neurovascular
disorder including genetic, neurophysiological, and neurochemical causes, and anatomical and
physiological features [64]. This is undoubtedly true but conditioned by the reductionist stance
skipping psychological and psychosomatic components: it remains a partial though valuable
view and, as such, not enough for proper comprehension and management. In fact, both
acupuncture and hypnosis have proved to be effective in its treatment [65,66], while 66% of
the effects of CGRP Antibodies − the newest high-cost drug for migraine prophylaxis − depend
on placebo response [67].
The idea that any psychological and biological phenomenon may be explained by disclosing its
most basic physical mechanisms is questionable if one considers that all living beings and
Nature itself are complex systems and, as such, are endowed with emergent properties and
capacity for adaptation and self-transformation. The fact that an emergent property of a system
is a feature of the system as a whole rather than its components poses legitimate doubts about
the reductionist claims of plain reducibility of living beings to their basic physical mechanisms
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and consciousness to brain circuitry. It also poses legitimate doubts about the appropriateness
of the prevailing deterministic inclination of medicine to what may show chaotic, unpredictable
behaviors as well as ceaseless self-transformation and self-organization in the dynamic
relationship with the environment [36,37,68–71]. Indeed, the most outstanding event showing
the inseparable dynamic interrelationship between animals, humans, viruses, and the
environment as parts of a non-determinist self-transforming complex system is the recent
COVID-19 pandemic.
In this context it is worth clarifying that the authors are neither reductionists nor anti- reductionists. Reductionism is a powerful method allowing for valuable knowledge of causal
relationships between facts and mechanisms at their base. But it is only a method to be used
when appropriate, and one should refrain from turning it into ontology, a stance prone to
dogmatic drifts.
The Century-old dispute between opposite metaphysical standpoints (e.g., materialist monism
vs. dualism) reflects their intrinsic limits, being each of them based on partial though plausible
metaphysical principles. Their ostensible incompatibility also stems from the Western logical
strategy of reasoning based on Aristoteles’ tripartite logic. Here, it is worth mentioning that the
principle of non-contradiction has never been demonstrated and is self-contradictory over
time; furthermore, it has been dismantled by quantum physics, demonstrating the photon’s
dual nature particle/wave [72].
In short, Nature disregards the clumsy attempts of humans to know it by imposing a priori
established criteria, mental categories and rules, and constraining it within the narrow limits
of the adopted perspective in the illusion of an “objective” knowledge. This inclination has an
analogy with the physiology of sight, which is based on a narrow clear vision (some 1-2% of the
visual field) surrounded by a blurred field; even if a clear, whole visual field would be available,
nothing existing outside it could be seen. As a result, seeing − with both sight and mind − closely
depends on a limited field of view: thus, it means being blind at the same time. Metaphorically,
it recalls the blindsight due to cortical blindness, where patients are able to respond to some
visual stimuli they cannot see and are not conscious of. In fact, in both everyday life and science,
we adapt to reality only perceiving a small part of it and neglecting what is not perceivable or
seemingly implausible, but with the duty to grasp it in order to improve knowledge, making
visible the invisible.
The way out from Western thought shortcomings calls for a shift of paradigm akin to the one
faced by quantum physics at the beginning of the 20th Century; such a need is witnessed by the
spread of quantum revolution to several disciplines other than physics in recent years,
including biology and the science of consciousness, where both quantum mechanisms and
quantum-like properties may be involved [73].
THE IMPLICATIONS OF QUANTUM PHYSICS AND ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY
The role of the observer has been reintroduced by quantum physicists, the only scientists who
felt the need to study consciousness in the early 20th century and move towards a unified
worldview. The interest of quantum physicists for consciousness is still ongoing, and several
intriguing hypotheses of its quantum implications have been introduced. They include three
main fields of interest:
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Facco, E., Fracas, F., & Tagliagambe, S. (2023). Consciousness and the Mind-Brain-Body-World Relationship: Towards A Transdisciplinary and
Transcultural Approach. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, Vol - 10(1). 414-433.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.101.13896
a) Quantum mechanisms in neurons [74–76]- a topic pertaining to the nascent quantum
biology [77–81]- as well as the observation of ultrafast hydrogen bond strengthening
between neighboring water molecules [82].
b) Epistemological implications of quantum physics, leading to the concept of quantum- like being introduced [73]- e.g., the quantum interpretation of mind processes like
decision making [83].
c) Hypotheses of a unified psychophysical world or a mental universe [84–89].
In short, the quantum implications of consciousness are both physically plausible and
epistemologically sound, despite ostensibly incompatible with classical thought; therefore, they
cannot be a priori rejected. On the contrary, they show the need for overcoming the above- mentioned shortcomings and constraints of Western classical thought, as emphasized by
Appleby:
“To construct an adequate non-Cartesian philosophy would take an enormous
amount of work. However, I believe there is reason to think that if we were to
undertake that project, it would lead to a conceptual revolution equal in magnitude
to the 17th century Cartesian one. In particular, it would lead to conceptions of the
world, and of human nature, which differed as much from the Cartesian conceptions
as the latter did from medieval conceptions” [90].
What Appleby holds from the perspective of modern physics perfectly fits with the above
discussion on the science of consciousness. The entirely new way of reasoning and processing
data brought by quantum physics is at the same time very old. In fact, the paradigm of both pre- Socratic and Eastern philosophies is more compatible with it than Western classical thought,
suggesting the need for seriously reappraising them by a transcultural, metaphilosophical
approach. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the non-dualist approach of Eastern
philosophies allowed for a sound knowledge of the inner world, allowing to recognize the
unconscious and reach high levels of metacognition, resilience, and development of the Self
over 2,000 years ago with results not yet achieved by the Western thought [12,91].
The ancient philosophers-physicists, especially Heraclitus and Parmenides, held the
complementarity of the opposite (a principle reintroduced by physicist Wolfgang Pauli) and
their dynamic coevolution as a manifestation (appearance) of being. Not surprisingly, this is
akin to Taoism with its Yin/Yang polarity. In other words, there is a fil rouge − an
epistemological symmetry − linking the pre-Socratic and Eastern philosophies to quantum
physics; for example, the principle of reciprocal transformation of energy (Yang) and matter
(Yin) had been conceptually well established by Taoism over two millennia ago [73].
The model-dependent realism, recently introduced in physics [92], helps exceeding the
stalemate in the dispute between materialist monists and dualists by encompassing and
merging the physical and the mental worlds in a whole. It establishes that no concept of reality
independent from descriptions and theories may exist; therefore, science may only provide
effective partial models of it able to make correct predictions. The model-dependent realism is
in line with the Neurophenomenological Theory of the Three Worlds (NTTW) − an updated
version of Popper & Eccles’ theory (1977) − and may be considered as a further step towards
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the integration of inner and outer worlds in a whole. It establishes the inseparable
interrelationship between the physical world (World 1) and its mental representation (World
3) allowed by sense organs, brain circuitry, and coding processes (World 2). World 2 behaves
like a recording equipment processing available information (anyway partial) coming from the
outer world. Accordingly, one can draw the following conclusions: a) the nature of the world as
we know is Weltbild; b) the reality is an inseparable co-creation of both World 1 and 3; c)
arguably, there are as many Worlds 3 as sentient beings, depending on the features of their
World 2 − a fact provocatively well pictured by Thomas Nagel’s paper entitled What It Is Like to
Be a Bat? [94].
To summarize, the scientific revolution started by 20th Century physics strongly suggests the
need for a shift of paradigm (or better, its enlargement); one should also wonder whether a
metaphilosophical and metascientific approach exceeding the limits of the Western
ethnocentric perspective may allow for a deeper comprehension of consciousness.
TOWARDS A METAPHILOSOPHICAL AND METASCIENTIFIC APPROACH.
As mentioned above, the appearance of consciousness in the world, as well as its
development, probably started tens of thousands of years ago with an event named the
Sapient Paradox by Darwinian anthropologists, given that human DNA has been much the
same since about 100,000 years ago. Given that the diachronicity of consciousness and its
development is independent of DNA changes, it cannot be properly understood by an
inflexible materialist-reductionist standpoint neglecting the role of mind, experience, and
culture. Rather, it calls for a more comprehensive transdisciplinary approach, in order to
encompass the mind-brain-body-outer world dynamic relationships embedded in the
space-time dimension. If this is the case, the worldwide transcultural and transtemporal
presence of consciousness might be better faced by a metaphilosophical and metascientific
approach. It is worth emphasizing that metascientific does not mean non-scientific; indeed,
it pertains to a rigorous scientific way aimed to overcome the intrinsic limits of any single
discipline.
Generally speaking, it is reasonable to assume that limited ethnocentric perspectives are
no longer tenable in a globalized world, a relevant fact also in foreign policy [95]. Actually,
cultural differences should not be conceived anymore as sources of discrimination but be
appraised as sources of cultural enlargement, widening one’s perspective and allowing for
a better understanding between peoples [96]. In this regard, the “objectivity” yielded by an
inflexible ethnocentric and chronocentric stance, such as the positivist one, is weak at best
and doomed to failure.
Metaphilosophy can be defined as the philosophy of philosophy − viz., the investigation of
the nature of philosophy [97], dealing with the nature and possibility of knowledge and
understanding [98]. The metaphilosophical perspective − previously adopted in the
definition of the Self [12] − aims to recognize key concepts and meanings common to
different philosophies beyond their formal diversities and distinct modes of theorization.
The common field of reflection is aimed to find the problem’s unity in the multiplicity of
forms − i.e., to seek for connections rather than differences − and calls for getting out of
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Transcultural Approach. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, Vol - 10(1). 414-433.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.101.13896
one’s comfort zone, enter a heterotopic common field of reflection to properly understand
other cultures from inside and make them a food for self-transformation [99–101].
The concept of metaphilosophy is in line with that of metascience, an interdisciplinary
approach belonging to the most rigorous scientific stance with the aim to overcome the intrinsic
limits of single axiomatic disciplines. In fact, the Theorems of Incompleteness introduced by
Gödel in the 1930’ have shown the limitations of provability in formal axiomatic systems (see
[102] as a review). They have demonstrated that any consistent formal mathematical system,
a), necessarily includes undecidable, unprovable statements and, b), cannot prove from the
inside that it is consistent. Therefore, theories are intrinsically incomplete, despite including a
set of axioms and the proof relation of the given formalized system to make them decidable.
Gödel’s theorems deal with formal logic systems and mathematics, while their extensions to
other disciplines are more controversial; nevertheless, they set some constraints in empirical
sciences too, showing that they cannot provide demonstrations entailing mathematical
certainty [103].
Given the above limits, knowledge may be improved non-mathematically by enlarging the
theory with sound non-mathematical principles and/or moving towards an interdisciplinary
integration. An interesting example of the inclusion of the trans-scientific principles in science
is the anthropic principle in astrophysics, establishing that the values of physical and
cosmological quantities are not equally probable, but their range is restricted to those
compatible with the appearance of carbon-based life at some stage in its history [104–107]. All
versions of the anthropic principle include empirical trans-scientific assertions supporting a
theory and helping a connection between the “antecedent” and the “subsequent” [106], e.g., the
physical conditions and the biologic constraints, respectively. In other words, the anthropic
principle engenders a meta-level in order to exceed the limits of the discipline it refers to and,
therefore, it may be considered as an epistemological consequence of Gödel’s theorems.
As mentioned above, the application of Gödel’s theorems to disciplines other than mathematics,
such as neurosciences, remains a matter of debate. Still, it clearly lessens the Galilean
“mathematical certainty” and questions the self-sufficiency of any axiomatic discipline. Given
that the new sciences were born to study only physical phenomena with a mathematical
approach, it can be deduced that their paradigm cannot investigate consciousness and the
mind-brain-body relationship properly. Hence, a metaphilosophical and metascientific
approach integrating different disciplines may help improving their study since the 1PP, 2PP,
and the meaning of the experience in their variable cultural and chronological context are the
conditio sine qua non for their proper understanding.
CONCLUSIONS
The study of consciousness is a huge problem endowed with profound epistemological and
metaphysical implications. Even more, one can consider consciousness as the mother of all
problems, since the whole world (as we know it) is a product of consciousness and mind,
depending on what consciousness is and its ceaseless bidirectional relationship with the
physical reality.
The Galilean sciences resulted from the Western century-old rationalism, the Galileo and
Descartes’ mathematical-geometrical apriorism, and the compromise with the Church. As a
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whole, they behaved as powerful a cultural filter preventing the study of the soul
(consciousness) in medicine and leading to the observer being split by the observed fact in
physics until the 20th Century, in the illusion of its independence and neutrality. Thus, science
development was embedded in a prevailing egocentric, anthropocentric, and dualist stance −
the Descartes’ cogito ergo sum and the biblical idea of man’s dominion over nature − driven by
the will of power and calculative thinking [46,108]. According to Heidegger, calculative thinking
is aimed to dominate and manipulate the world, a purpose well defined by Descartes’
statement:
“...Et ainsi nous rendre comme maîtres et possesseurs de la nature” (Descartes,
1637, 6th part, p. 168).
In doing so, the calculative thinking splits the subject and the object, where the value of the
latter, living beings included, only depends on its utility and exploitation. Instead, the
meditative thinking is focused on meaning, which reigns in everything that is; despite not
utilitarian, meditative thinking is no less relevant than calculative one in the comprehension of
the world.
Science underwent a contentious divorce from the Church in the 17th Century; then, a
separation of science from philosophy occurred in the 18th Century, while in the early 20th
Century, physicalism claimed that science should get rid of any remnant of metaphysics (a self- contradictory metaphysical statement in itself). According to Husserl, modern scientific
disciplines can be considered as technical-professional derivation of that unique philosophy
meant as the rational investigation of the world, while any axiomatic discipline remains
inescapably based on metaphysical assumptions and incomplete. In his phenomenological
approach, he questioned the materialist-objectivist stance of positive sciences as a
transcendental naïvety [110], a fact calling for critically reappraising the mental processes
involved in the knowledge of the phenomenal world − i.e., how it appears in its givenness and
how one codifies it. Accordingly, the inseparable mind-brain-world relationship may be
approached starting from Heidegger’s Dasein (“being there” or “presence”) as the primary,
immediately given, condition of the existence in the world from which one cannot give up,
making consciousness and experience non-eliminable − i.e., “no consciousness, no world”, at
least as one can know it. This looks much simpler and tangible than a rationalist, abstract
conceptualization a priori splitting mind and matter, and discarding the former on the base of
a purported logical incompatibility, a fact recalling what Edgar Morin in his theory of
complexity defined as nothing crazier than the delusion of abstract coherence [111].
The separation of science from philosophy has been an unavoidable event, depending on the
increasing amount of information and the need to develop different languages to understand
the explored phenomena. On the other hand, this has resulted in an ever-increasing separation
of knowledge in a plenty of disciplines, specializations, and subspecializations, making
interdisciplinary communication hard, if possible. As a result, many scientists are inclined to
remain firmly anchored in their comfort zone, missing a comprehensive view of the whole, a
fact resembling a sort of dissociative process. Metaphorically, it has been well painted in the
Bible by the mythos of the Babel Tower, with its progressive growth and complexity resulting
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URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.101.13896
into the confusion of languages, the need to abandon it and start building up a new, hopefully,
better one.
Despite the fact that metaphysical speculations seem an ostensibly alien topic from the
perspective of hard sciences, they are entailed in the design of the paradigm at their basis.
Indeed, they were involved in the foundation and development of quantum physics in the early
20th Century to face the apparent absurdity of particles’ behavior. It is no accident that in this
process, quantum physicists seriously faced consciousness as well as pre-Socratic and Eastern
philosophies to implement the needed shift of paradigm with respect to classic Western
thought. Not surprisingly, the latter has been defined as the thought of the sunset of the West
by Heidegger and Severino [46,108], while the pre-Socratic thought, able to contemplate the
being and the nature as a whole, has been considered as the thought of the dawn, hopefully
leading to a new sunrise if properly implemented, a fact needing a new language and paradigm.
Indeed, physics − the most “materialist” and determinist of sciences − has outdone itself,
dismantling the linchpins of the classic thought, encompassing a probabilistic logic and the
complementarity of opposites; this has led to the observer and the observed phenomena being
rejoined in a whole and the place of consciousness in the world being reappraised, up to the
hypothesis of a mental universe [88].
If the above discussion is correct, medicine and life science should start walking in the route
opened by quantum physics and overcome the narrow limits of the conventional mechanist- reductionist approach with its conceptual fragmentation. Of course, the reductionist approach
to consciousness, aiming to solve the easy problem, remains of paramount importance for its
understanding and the capacity to manipulate its disorders. Its results may also help improving
self-knowledge and, thus, help philosophy overcome naïve views of mental faculties (e.g., free
will, cognition, and decision-making) in order to better understand how we are, judge, and
behave. Thus, neuropsychology can help philosophy by a better understanding of the
physiological aspects of higher-order processes and the inner-outer world relationship. On the
other hand, other disciplines such as philosophy, anthropology, and human sciences may
integrate and help neurosciences to better understand consciousness and the mind-brain- body-world relationship by contributing with non-mathematical valuable principles and sound
knowledge of humankind. For instance, it is worth mentioning the systematic exploration of the
inner world and inner-outer world relationship by Eastern philosophies, especially Taoism,
Yoga, and Buddhism, that have provided sound, epistemologically well-founded information on
their nature, also inspiring quantum physics [73]; therefore, they can no longer be evaded by
adopting a narrow ethnocentric and chronocentric stance.
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