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Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal – Vol. 9, No. 9
Publication Date: September 25, 2022
DOI:10.14738/assrj.99.13091. Lynn, T. J. (2022). Negotiated Management as a Tool to Achieve Social Control over Political Protest and Social Movement
Organizations. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 9(9). 191-206.
Services for Science and Education – United Kingdom
Negotiated Management as a Tool to Achieve Social Control over
Political Protest and Social Movement Organizations
Tamara J. Lynn
Associate Professor
Department of Criminal Justice Fort Hays State University
ABSTRACT
Social movement scholars describe negotiated management as a process of
collaboration between those in power and those in resistance. For this research,
content analysis and critical discourse analysis are used to evaluate questionnaire
responses from law enforcement agencies in communities where competing
grassroots political organizations engaged in political protest. Findings indicate
that law enforcement exercise different levels of social control toward those least
likely to engage in, or submit to, a negotiated management model of policing. I argue
that responses toward organizations, as reported in questionnaire responses,
demonstrates a structural permanence of social control. Negotiated management
between the state and competing grassroots political organizations is a tool used to
achieve informal control. Organizations that fail – or choose not – to engage in
informal social control of their members risk escalated force by police agencies that
seek compliance. Results of this research increase understanding of law
enforcement responses to political protest groups.
Keywords: social control, negotiated management, escalated force policing, political
protest.
Americans are afforded the right to engage in political protest, practicing this right even before
the Declaration of Independence was signed. In 1773, marches protesting the Tea Act and East
India Company occurred along the east coast. Bostonians evolved from protesters to criminals
as they threw thousands of dollars of tea overboard one of the ships docked in Boston harbor
(Young, 2015). And so began what remains an issue today: How does government (local, state,
and/or federal) balance one’s right to engage in political protest with the rights of the
community? This article will show how communities in general and police agencies specifically
strive to achieve that balance through coordinated social control.
Citizens – as individuals, or members of informal groups, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), or formal social movement organizations (SMOs) – seek to change the social order
through political protest. Piven (2006) argues that power exercised by protesters through their
anger is intended to disrupt the system of which they are a part. This disruption brings matters
into the “center of political debate” (2006, p. 1). Johnston (2011) argues that protest occurs
within government systems, as political officials are challenged to implement change to resolve
issues of public discontent. Political protest brings about change as citizens seek to reshape
existing power structures (Glasberg & Shannon, 2011).
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Not all political protest is the same, as demonstrators engage in varying levels of disruption at
the same time the state (represented by law enforcement) responds with different levels of
control. The pages of history are written with examples of protests that remained peaceful
while others erupted into violence. Some incidents of violence were at the hands of
demonstrators, including destruction of property or harm to others. However, much of the
violence resulted as police escalated their response toward protesters. This study evaluates
state responses toward groups engaged in political protest, through the theoretical lens of a
culture of control. Law enforcement practices of negotiated management and escalated-force
policing provide clues to better understand dimensions of this culture of control along a
continuum from informal to formal social control.
UNDERSTANDING A CULTURE OF CONTROL
This study evaluates state responses toward political protest within a culture of control. Social
control refers to social processes that regulate individual and group behavior, leading one to
conform to rules that meet the behavioral expectations of society. This research borrows
generously from David Garland’s (2001) thesis that structural elements largely shape outcomes
as states (including law enforcement), corporations, and private citizens engage in a battle for
control, or power. Approaching a culture of control as a structural entity – a pattern of
interaction with some scope and permanence – brings attention to the political processes that
advance formal social control.
With the advent of television, the media invaded American homes, allowing viewers to
experience “more points of reference and higher standards for comparison” to others (Garland,
2001; Meyrowitz, 1985, p. 133). Civil unrest from the 1960s, advanced by anti-war and Civil
Rights protests, created changes both socially and politically, characterized by attitudes of de- subordination (Milibrand, 1978). These attitudes challenge central authority figures and relax
informal social controls often found in “tradition, community, church and family” (Garland,
2001, p. 89). Consequently, concepts of individualism took precedence over community, fueling
overwhelming changes across society and social policies (2001).
The U.S. as a national security state exercises an exceptional amount of control over citizens.
Garland (2001) argues the transformation of four key structural factors that aided in the
transition of the U.S. toward a national security state, including: (1) economic; (2) social; (3)
cultural; and (4) political (pp. 77-78). Garland conceives the changes across these domains as
evidence of a culture of control. Expansion of capitalist markets after World War II, followed by
the financial crises of the 1970s, and superseded by trickle-down policies of the 1980s, created
significant economic inequality between the “top and bottom tiers” of society (p. 82). Families,
in what was regarded as “mainstream America,” experienced a considerable restructuring as
mothers entered the workforce, divorce rates sky-rocketed, and increasingly more children
were born into single parent households (2001). Dwelling patterns changed as families
relocated to suburban housing developments when automobiles allowed for longer commutes.
Americans, once calling for protection from the state, now demanded protection by the state
(Garland, 2001, pg. 12), essentially expanding the power of the state by law enforcement.
Increased government power generally infringes on individual liberties. Gillham and Marx
(2018) argue that “when liberty is reduced on behalf of order, transparency [becomes
increasingly] important” (p. 137).
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Lynn, T. J. (2022). Negotiated Management as a Tool to Achieve Social Control over Political Protest and Social Movement Organizations. Advances
in Social Sciences Research Journal, 9(9). 191-206.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.99.13091
The criminal justice system became a major instrument in the culture of control as the national
security state criminalized an increasing number of social problems ailing society. Intrusive
surveillance of the population became acceptable in the name of security (Hallsworth & Lea,
2011). Efforts by the government to ensure security took precedence over any attempts at
social reform (Zedner, 2009). However, the efforts made to ensure security were not in
response to the kinds of mala in se crimes (that is, inherently wrong acts with clear harmful
outcomes such as murder and rape) but rather for the purpose of control itself – or the lack
thereof – which was of paramount concern (Garland, 2001).
Efforts to Resist Social Control
History includes many instances when individuals and groups attempted to resist the political
processes somehow responsible for shaping their lives in a manner they no longer supported
or chose to tolerate (Piven, 2006). During these times, activism in the form of grassroots
political campaigns or non-government or social movement organizations developed as a
“collective organized attempt to bring about or resist large-scale change in the social order”
(Wilson, 1973, p. 8). Activists often engaged the political process in response to social or
political circumstances viewed as troublesome (McAdam & Snow, 2010). Williamson, Trump,
and Einstein (2018) argue that grievances predict activism or protest in certain locales,
specifically following issues of racial discrimination or inequality. Regardless of what factors
led to these levels of activism, each functions to promote the interests of those who collectively
disagreed with the existing power structures of society (McAdam & Snow, 2010; Staggenborg,
2011). However, resistance against these power structures is often met by counter-resistance,
through a concerted effort to achieve increased social control. This study argues that
negotiated management supports Garland’s thesis of social control.
Decades of research evaluates efforts by the state (i.e., through law enforcement actions) to
repress social movement organizations (i.e., Chenoweth et al., 2017; Gillham & Marx, 2018);
however, the literature has only recently approached responses to political protest from the
perspective of social control (Kienscherf, 2016; King, 2013). King found that the City of Oakland
exercised social control in response to Occupy Oakland’s refusal to engage in negotiations
surrounding protest. This study expands on King’s research, evaluating responses to protest of
competing movements, from municipalities across the United States. This study also supports
King’s position that negotiated management is an exercise in social control, but expands to
demonstrate the consistency of this practice across the U.S. rather than focusing on a specific
location. This study aims to examine efforts to achieve social control by communities as they
respond to protest groups. Findings are important as society seeks to understand police
response to future political protest.
NEGOTIATED MANAGEMENT OF POLITICAL PROTEST
Responses by government actors pose an important element in shaping the fate of most
political activism and movements (McAdam & Snow, 2010). Responses to grassroots activists
take many forms (della Porta & Fillieule, 2004), including but not limited to: 1) action against
participants to reduce movement activities; 2) development of policies that limit some forms of
activism; 3) development of policies that meet participant demands; or 4) a “hands-off”
approach. Within a culture of control (Garland, 2001), these approaches vary in degree of
informal versus formal social control, meaning a significant degree of control is in the hands of
those in power.
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The most visible government responses to political protest are those by law enforcement,
representing the power of the state, and vary along a continuum from repressive to tolerant
(della Porta & Fillieule, 2004). Responses differ according to what groups hold political power
and the type of action promoted by the organization. Protest that includes acts of violence is
often portrayed as “criminal,” legitimating law enforcement response (McAdam, 1982).
Scholarship emphasizing police responses (Earl, Soule, & McCarthy, 2003; Gillham, Edwards, &
Noakes, 2013) and studies that have focused on those engaged in protest (Drury & Reicher,
2009; Macguire, Barak, Cross et al., 2016; Ritter, 2014) describe an interdependence between
law enforcement and protestors. Scholar della Porta (1996) argues that protest movements
and police “adapt to each other through a process of reciprocal influence, involving innovation
and adaptation” (p. 64). Whether protesters or law enforcement initiate this adaptation is not
consistent in the literature.
Government responses to political protest have varied over time from lessor to greater forms
of repression (Rafail, Soule, & McCarthy, 2012). Research by Earl et al. (2003, p. 582) found that
law enforcement frequently “overreacted to and overstepped” levels of violence against
political protest during the 1960s. Earl et al. identified a series of threats that lead to greater
use of government resistance toward protestors, including the size of the protest or use of
confrontational tactics such as sit-ins, office takeovers, or disruptions of meetings. As protest
size increased, the likelihood of a department sending all available units to the site increased
by approximately 21%. When activists employed confrontational tactics, the likelihood of a
department sending all available units to the site increased by approximately 28%. The use of
confrontational tactics by protestors that challenged existing social institutions was “more
likely than not to be met with police violence” (Earl et al., 2003, p. 599; Peterson & Wahlstrom,
2015), reinforcing claims of interdependence (Macguire et al., 2016; Ritter, 2014) or reciprocal
influence (della Porta, 1996) between the government and protestors.
Gillham and Noakes (2007) support findings of earlier research, arguing that law enforcement
responses during the 1960s often resorted to force, or strategic incapacitation, intended to
“disperse protesters and break up demonstrations” (p. 342). This was at a time when society
was ridden with civil unrest, advanced by anti-war and Civil Rights protests that challenged
existing social and political institutions. Johnston (2011) describes this as an era of escalated- force policing, where “protester-police interactions usually resulted in increasingly forceful,
sometimes brutal, repression” (p. 70). The escalated-force model of policing demonstrates
government efforts to exercise formal, and highly visible, social control.
Governments transitioned to a more diplomatic approach for managing political protest from
the mid-1970s through the 1990s. During this era, administrations protected groups’ rights to
protest while “limiting the scale and scope of demonstrations” (Gillham & Noakes, 200, p. 342).
Johnston (2011) describes this approach to managing protest as a negotiated management
model. Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang (2017) argue that repression rarely occurs separate
from other types of actions indicative of negotiated-management. Through this model,
municipalities work directly with protest groups to coordinate events. Representatives of an
SMO or NGO obtain permits, provide plans for when and where demonstrations will occur, and
have contingency plans for addressing unruly behavior, all in exchange for police protections
(2011).
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Lynn, T. J. (2022). Negotiated Management as a Tool to Achieve Social Control over Political Protest and Social Movement Organizations. Advances
in Social Sciences Research Journal, 9(9). 191-206.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.99.13091
Kienscherf (2016) argues that community policing is an example of negotiated management,
where protest groups police themselves to ensure safe protests, exercise informal control and
reduce the need for police presence. Rafail et al. (2012) argue that a “decline in harsh police
responses is partially due to lower levels of police presence” (p. 757). King (2013) argues that
negotiated management is a form of social control, meaning a decreased presence of police does
not equate to less control but rather a different form of control (e.g., informal vs formal).
Responses to politically motivated organizations reverted to more repressive approaches
following protests of the 1999 World Trade Organization (della Porta, Peterson, & Reiter, 2006;
Smith, 2012), when groups “declined to negotiate limits to their protests” (Gillham & Noakes,
2007, p. 341). Similarly, OWS in Oakland, California determined not to engage in the negotiated
management model of protest policing (King, 2013). Administrations turned to strategic
incapacitation (Gillham, Edwards & Noakes, 2013; Smith, 2012), or escalated-force policing
(Johnston, 2011), to control where groups could protest, and to utilize increased surveillance,
use of less-lethal weapons, and arrest of protestors to control the forms of protest.
The use of tactics commonly used through strategic incapacitation support Garland’s (2001)
argument that the U.S. evolved into a national security state. Furthermore, Tarrow (1998)
argues that when the government fears uprising, efforts to control activists would be
strengthened through increased law enforcement and military efforts as well as through strict
legislation that limits rights to public assembly. This creates a “tension between the desire for
order and the desire for liberty” on the part of citizens (Gillham & Marx, 2018). Kienscherf
(2016) argues that militarization or para-militarized policing occurs when informal methods of
control are unsuccessful. Consequently, those organizations that do not engage in or do not
exercise informal control encouraged by negotiated management are more likely to experience
formal social control advanced by municipalities, reinforcing the national security state
(Garland, 2001).
METHODOLOGY
The data for this study were collected as part of a larger research project to identify how media
and state responses toward competing social movement organizations advance a culture of
control. Data collection included case studies of the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street; field
observations of rallies and protest activities by each organization; content and critical
discourse analysis of print news media reports about the organizations; and content and critical
discourse analysis of correspondence with city administrators and police agencies across the
U.S. regarding their policies for managing political protest (Lynn, 2014)i
. This study includes
both content and critical discourse analysis that takes from correspondence with city
administrators or their designated agent.
Studies of power and politics that incorporate content analysis often evaluate how media
influences public opinion and policy development (e.g., McCombs & Shaw, 1972). But, using
content analysis alone comes with limitations. Boreus and Bergstrom (2017) argue that not
everything can be quantified, meaning how information is presented often provides more
insight than the frequency of particular statements. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) analyzes
communication to understand how “power is reproduced or challenged” (Lynn & Williams,
2018), capturing the implied rather than explicit messages (Boreus & Bergstrom, 2017). This
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study considers how municipalities exercise social control (reproduction of power) in working
with protest groups (those challenging power).
Information Request
Indicators of social control were elicited through written, telephone, and email correspondence
with municipalities, where both OWS demonstrations and Tea Party Express bus tours
occurred. Information was retrieved from Guardian News and Media Limited DataBlog
(www.theguardian.com/data) and by the Tea Party Express bus tour schedule
(www.teapartyexpress.org/bus-tours). Efforts to contact city administrators – or designated
agents – were made to identify how municipalities responded to political activists.
Correspondence was sent to administrators of selected municipalities requesting the following
information:
• Does your municipality allow (or encourage or discourage) open protest from
politically motivated activists?
• Does your municipality require activists to limit their demonstrations to specific
locations in the city? If so, where are those locations and what is the purpose for the
limitations?
• What type of protest have political activists participated: civil or violent? What did
these demonstrations “look like”?
• Did these demonstrations result in any arrests? If so, how were these arrests
handled in the court system (such as charges filed)?
• Has your municipality made any changes in terms of reducing or responding to
future demonstrations?
• Do you have any comments that you would like to add?
Answers to these questions aided in analyzing the approaches that municipalities utilized for
managing activities of grassroots political organizations.
A total of 93 letters were sent to municipalities identified as having both OWS demonstrations
and Tea Party Express bus tours. This list was not exhaustive of all activities by the
organizations but those that could be confirmed as previously noted. Locales representing 42
states and the District of Columbia, from the seven geographical regions depicted in figure 1,
received requests for information.
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Lynn, T. J. (2022). Negotiated Management as a Tool to Achieve Social Control over Political Protest and Social Movement Organizations. Advances
in Social Sciences Research Journal, 9(9). 191-206.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.99.13091
https://www.whereig.com/usa/map-the-united-states-regions.html
Figure 1. U.S. Geographical Regions
Seventeen responses were received from the initial request, including correspondence by mail,
phone contact, and email.
To increase the overall response rate, the letter was re-sent to those administrators who had
not yet replied to the original request for information. An additional twelve responses were
received from the second request. A total of 29 responses – representing a 31% response rate
– were received from the request for information. Table 1 indicates the total municipalities that
were contacted, as well as the number of responses received, from each geographical region
depicted in figure 1.
Table 1. Information Requests per Geographical Region
Information Requests Submitted to – and Received from –
Geographical Regions
Region Information
Requested
Response
Received
Percent
Received from
Region
Mid-West 30 12 40%
Mid-Atlantic 11 1 9%
North East 4 2 50%
North West 8 2 25%
South East 18 3 17%
South West 15 7 47%
West 7 2 29%
Total 93 29
Compiled from Responses to Community Request for Information
The data indicates the greatest number of responses (12) received from states in the mid-west
region. However, the greatest percentage of responses (50%) was received from the northeast
region. In contrast, the fewest number of responses (1), as well as the lowest percentage (9%),
was received from Mid-Atlantic States. Responses were received from rural, suburban, and
metropolitan municipalities. Though this research cannot ensure representativeness, nor
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explain why non-respondents did not contribute, information gathered represents unique
anecdotal evidence of how reporting municipalities respond to protest organizations. This
method provides data to assess efforts to achieve social control, at least by some municipalities.
MUNICIPAL RESPONSES TOWARD GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS
Responses were entered into NVIVO qualitative software program. Data was coded and
analyzed to measure methods of protest policing used to manage grassroots organizations.
Managing Grassroots Organizations
Information requested from municipalities across the U.S., where political protest occurred,
yielded varying results. Table 2 provides a quantitative representation of yes/no responses
reported by responding agencies.
Table 2. Community Responses toward Grassroots Organizations
Survey Questions (n = 29)
Number
Responding
Yes
Number
Responding
No
Does your city/community allow open protest
from politically motivated activists? 29 -
Does your city/community require activists to
limit demonstrations to specific locations in the
city?
21 8
Did OWS/TP demonstrations result in arrests? 16 13
Since these demonstrations, has your
city/community made any changes in responses
to future demonstrations?
8 21
Calculated from official responses received in request for information
Date from table 2 are reported strictly according to yes/no responses to questionnaires,
indicating the following: 1) all communities allow groups to engage in politically motivated
activism; 2) the majority of communities limit where political protest can occur; 3) more than
half of communities made arrests of political activists; and 4) the majority of respondents made
no changes in managing political demonstrations.
Communities allow political protest
While all respondents (n = 29) answered yes to allowing political protest, further analysis of
written responses uncovered exceptions. Specifically, comments indicated that municipalities
allow open protest along a continuum from minimal to increasing levels of social control,
demonstrated in figure 2. Comments varied along this continuum as follows: 1)
administrations reportedly allow political protest without conditions (n = 13); 2) allow protest
to the extent participants follow the law (n = 12); and 3) allow protest but do not condone any
actions that may become disruptive (n = 4).
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Lynn, T. J. (2022). Negotiated Management as a Tool to Achieve Social Control over Political Protest and Social Movement Organizations. Advances
in Social Sciences Research Journal, 9(9). 191-206.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.99.13091
Figure 2. Community Tolerance of Political Protest (n = 29)
Minimal Social Control Increased Social Control
Calculated from official responses received in request for information.
The final two points along the continuum, representing just over half (n =16) of the reporting
municipalities, hint at a policing approach that initially encourages informal social control by
encouraging organizations to police their own protestors. These comments support
Kienscherf’s (2016) argument that community policing promotes informal control on the part
of protesters, reducing a need for formal control. Similarly, allowing protest within the law and
with no tolerance for disruption indicates the interdependence between law enforcement and
protesters, where protest policing likely increases, or transitions to strategic incapacitation
(Gillham et al., 2013) or escalated-force policing (Johnston, 2011), as disruption increases. The
direct correlation between the two supports della Porta’s (1996, p. 64) “process of reciprocal
influence.”
Limitations to protest
Quantitative results reporting limitations to protest increased from 21 yes and 8 no to 27 and
2, respectively, when analyzing comments. Reported limitations to protest included one, or a
combination of, the following explanations:
• protesters must respect posted curfews in city parks
• protesters must meet requirements to secure a permit to protest in a public park
• groups are prohibited from camping on public property
• groups must refrain from protest on private property
• participants must leave if asked to do so
• groups are prohibited from protesting in city parks or city owned property
• large groups must secure a permit
• protest events must be scheduled with city hall
The most popular limitations, indicated by eleven respondents, included: 1) protesters may
not block building entrances or pedestrian and vehicular traffic; and 2) activities cannot
unreasonably risk the safety of “demonstrators and non-demonstrators.” These limitations
demonstrate a negotiated management model of protest policing that exerts formal social
control. Specifically, Johnston (2011) argues that within a negotiated management model,
protest groups must secure permits that provide specific plans for where the protest will occur,
as well as having a plan in place if protesters become unruly.
Several municipalities commented on the negotiation process, detailing how administrators
and law enforcement respond to group requests, demonstrating efforts to ensure control.
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Furthermore, comments described how groups may have to adjust their plans when there is
risk of violating local ordinances. This is portrayed in the following response:
A larger demonstration and/or march requires participants to seek an event permit. This
allows the city to work with protestors to block traffic, etc. On some occasions, protestors are
required to adjust their permits. For instance, if they have requested to block the busiest street
during the busiest hour of the day, then the permit will be adjusted to either move to a different
location or for a different time.
While municipalities may engage in negotiated management, they are not relinquishing control
to protest groups. In contrast, they are exercising more control by having laws and ordinances
in place that require compliance from protesters to ensure police protections. If the
organizations submit to the negotiated model of policing, and exercise informal control, they
can advance their message with relatively minimal to no interference from law enforcement;
however, if organizations act outside of what is negotiated, they risk loss of police protection
and may face strategic incapacitation, resulting in a quashing of their purpose.
Several communities referenced the process of managing political protest, with one response
including the term “diplomatic,” as opposed to negotiated, in describing this process.
Diplomacy – or more appropriately, negotiated management – was initiated by developing a
“relationship with politically motivated groups.” The following quote demonstrates this
process of relationship building:
What our department did/does with these protests is to make contact with the leader of these
groups, meeting with the group of leaders regarding ground rules, expectations, etc. We want
to protect their Constitutional rights but to do so without any violence so law enforcement does
not have to get involved. We also include the media in these meetings where we are able to
express our concerns while focusing on how to protect their rights. Oftentimes, the media is
quick to participate under the assumption that meetings will evolve into conflict; however, that
does not occur. We need to be able to protect protestors as well as the community in general
and make this message clear during these initial meetings.
Negotiated management, or diplomacy according to this municipality, does not mean the
absence of limitations and control, clearly indicated by statements such as, “We have
communicated to groups what activity is permitted.” If NGOs or SMOs engage in behavior
outside of that permitted, law enforcement will likely transition to strategic incapacitation
(Gillham et al., 2013) or escalated-force policing (Johnston, 2011). Negotiated management
gives the appearance that municipalities prefer to cooperate with protest groups; however, this
appearance does not mean the absence of social control but rather encourages efforts to
achieve informal control by the organization.
A number of questionnaire responses depict the interdependence or reciprocal influence that
occurs between law enforcement and groups engaged in protest. At the same time, multiple
comments demonstrate the continuum from minimal to increased social control.
Our city does not place limitations on groups. In meeting with group leaders beforehand, we
can make suggestions regarding effective locations that work for both the group and law
enforcement. We also see that leaders are aware of local laws, allowing groups to respond
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Lynn, T. J. (2022). Negotiated Management as a Tool to Achieve Social Control over Political Protest and Social Movement Organizations. Advances
in Social Sciences Research Journal, 9(9). 191-206.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.99.13091
according[ly]. Pre-meetings have been absolutely crucial for getting everyone on the same
page, allowing us to work with them to meet their goals rather than working against them.
First, the statement demonstrates a contradiction. Specifically, the beginning statement – “does
not place limitations” – indicates that groups are free to engage in protest, completely
unfettered by municipalities; however, later references to “aware of local laws” demonstrates
that groups are limited within the confines of the law, through formal social control. In
referencing the literature, the quote includes phrases that indicate attempts at innovation,
which della Porta (1996) describes as part of the process of reciprocal influence. For instance,
“we can make suggestions . . . that work for both,” or “getting everyone on the same page” hints
at negotiations. However, the final sentence – “meet their goals rather than working against
them” – indicates the potential for strategic incapacitation or escalated-force policing,
reinforcing the continuum for increased social control. While the community does not clearly
state that they will resort to more control, the connotation of “against them” implies as much.
Additional comments such as, “letting the leader know that their group has every right to be
here but to do so without violating city ordinances,” reinforces both an interdependence and
increased control. This process is noted by another municipality, as follows:
We often try to get as much background on the group and/or planned demonstration to make
sure there are no indicators of potential violence. We will often have the watch commander
touch base with the group organizer and remind them of potential activities that could get
protesters into trouble such as blocking pedestrian/vehicular traffic. This is done in an effort
to let the individuals protest and express their opinions without running afoul of the law.
Researching for “indicators of potential violence” and informing groups of “potential activities
that could get protesters into trouble” may reduce actual violence during a protest; however,
social control is not reduced. Efforts by municipalities and law enforcement to exercise control
merely occur proactively (prior to the event) as opposed to reactively (during the event).
Reports of arrests resulting from protest
According to questionnaire responses, those municipalities that approached political protest
from a negotiated management model – or diplomatically – reportedly had no arrests. Aligning
with a negotiated management approach does not mean that community leaders were more
tolerant of political protest. Instead, administrations chose to support informal social control,
relying on protest groups to control their participants. In addition, where no arrests had
occurred indicates that representatives of grassroots organizations submitted to the authority
of the municipal leaders to ensure that participants adhered to all regulations and expectations
set forth through negotiations. As long as members of each organization were willing to follow
those “rules of conduct” then arrests – or increased levels of formal social control – did not
result.
Changes for managing future protest
The final question yielding further analysis addressed whether municipalities made any
changes in responding to future demonstrations. Quantitative results changed from 8 yes and
21 no to 11 and 18, respectively, when analyzing content. Several municipalities did not
identify specific changes but noted openness to improving policies while protecting the right to
protest. For instance, “the city is committed to providing a safe, visible and open forum for
political demonstration. It tries to learn from each event and reaches out to organizers to better
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and safely accommodate proposed public demonstrations.” Similarly, “we are always looking
to improve our process on how we respond to demonstrations. We do not look to reduce the
right to peacefully assemble.” One respondent did not identify specific changes in managing
protest but provided a copy of the city ordinance that guides “organized events.” The specific
ordinance was unanimously adopted by the city council just months before information was
requested, indicating recent policy changes. However, without additional explanation, there is
no way of knowing whether these changes resulted directly from interactions with the Tea
Party and OWS, or due to other factors.
One respondent identified changes in “managing political demonstrations” due to factors that
were “not a direct result” of any specific protest group. Prior to 2009, due to increasing financial
costs incurred during the Presidential caucuses, a policy was adopted providing for recovery of
“all costs of the event (such as electricity, parking revenue, water) from political candidates.”
The policy applies to campaign events as well as other forms of demonstrations, as indicated
by this quote:
We have a risk-based assessment tool to measure all types of events (political or not) and
determine if special conditions might need to be met before they can be held. These include
whether it is hosted by an organization based in the community or out of town, the size of the
group expected, whether it has been successfully held in the community before, and other
factors. The intent of this policy is not to reduce the number of activities occurring, but make
sure that those that are planned include necessary precautions to assure they are safe and
respect the neighborhoods in which they occur.
The “risk-based assessment” demonstrates formal, objective efforts by the municipality to
demonstrate how, or whether, control is achieved. If a demonstrating group is from the
community, it is likely that participants will be more likely to police themselves, limiting a need
for more formal dimensions of control. In contrast, groups that are not from the community
may pose a greater risk, resulting in an escalated response from law enforcement.
While some policy changes were not the direct result of grassroots political organizations, other
municipalities did adjust procedures or enact ordinances in response to recent forms of protest.
For instance, some responses indicated that negative media coverage of OWS activities in other
cities led to changes in how they managed political protest. Specifically, the following quote
demonstrates how negotiated management was an attempt to avoid issues similar to those in
other cities, as reported by media.
The city was very pro-active in responding to members . . . in response to much of the negative
publicity that arose from other cities. The city protects groups 1st Amendment rights to protest
and we’re very responsive in ‘front end’ measures that included requesting invitation to
protesters to educate members . . . as to what actions are tolerated and what lines cannot be
crossed. Protestors were notified what types of actions would result in arrests or trouble for
the groups.
This statement indicates that as long as protesters were compliant with the municipality’s
“’front end’ measures,” then law enforcement had no reason to escalate their response, or resort
to strategic incapacitation or escalated-force policing. Again, quotes such as these demonstrate
the reciprocal influence between protestors and police that della Porta (1996) argues in her
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URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.99.13091
research, in addition to reinforcing the continuum of minimal to increased levels of social
control.
Thirteen of the respondents indicated that changes were made to municipal ordinances
specifically due to OWS. Two municipalities enacted ordinances in 2012 that prohibit camping
in response to the group’s “method of protest.” Another respondent stated:
‘Occupy’ protests have assisted us in developing an effective template [that] comes down to
establishing effective lines of communication . . . it is important for protesters to understand
that we respect their right to protest, but we ask that they respect the law and ordinances.
Comments from most respondents consistently demonstrate that municipalities are likely to
respect one’s Constitutional right to public assembly and protest, as long as participants
“respect the law.” These statements reaffirm efforts to achieve social control, whether through
a community policing approach described by Kienscherf (2016) or a negotiated management
model, described by Johnston (2011). Regardless of the approach, the potential for
communities to advance to para-militarized (Lynn, 2014) or escalated-force policing (Johnston,
2011), or strategic incapacitation (Gillham et al., 2013) is predicated on the interdependence
or reciprocal influence (della Porta, 1996) between protesters and law enforcement.
Limitations and Implications for Future Research
The response rate of 31% by municipalities receiving the information request means that
responses from the remaining 69% may have produced significantly different results. While
those municipalities that did respond provided rural, suburban, and metropolitan
representation, most arrests, as reported by the media, occurred in those locales that did not
respond to the questionnaire. A greater response rate would strengthen the findings of the
study; however, as previously noted, those municipalities that did respond provided unique
anecdotal evidence that demonstrates efforts to engage in negotiated management.
Negotiated Management Fosters a Culture of Control
This study evaluated community responses to protest movements to uncover efforts by
municipalities to achieve social control. These efforts were noted at varying levels with
communities allowing political protest along a continuum from minimal to increasing levels of
control. Social control increased as communities reported allowing political protest “as long as
protesters act within the law.” The greatest level of social control was noted by communities
that did not tolerate any disruption.
Communities described a negotiated management model for managing public protest, where
groups that acted within the law followed procedures for acquiring permits. In addition, group
leaders agreed to specific conditions such as where protest would or would not occur, and that
participants would refrain from disruptive or violent behavior. As long as groups engaged in
negotiated management, as described by Johnston (2011), then law enforcement ensured
protections for protesters. If groups did not engage in negotiations, and/or did not secure the
proper permit, protesters likely would not receive police protection. These claims support
King’s (2013) findings that negotiated management of Occupy Oakland actually resulted in
strategic incapacitation (Gillham et al., 2013) or escalated-force policing (Johnston, 2011) of
the group. This reciprocal influence (della Porta, 1996) has the potential to lead to – or result
from – violence by both the NGO or SMO and the state, represented by law enforcement.
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Correspondence with municipalities where OWS and Tea Party Express bus tours occurred
from 2009 to 2012 paint a picture of what political protest movements can expect. Police are
likely to take a hands-off approach with groups that engage in informal social control. Groups
that intentionally incite violence are likely to be met by strategic incapacitation or escalated- force policing. Recently, individuals and groups referred to as third-party agitators are not
likely vested in the ideology behind a protest but rather intend to illicit violence by police
(Myers-Montgomery, 2016), which is often a consequence of strategic incapacitation.
This returns to the question in the opening paragraph: how does government (local, state, and
federal) balance one’s right to engage in political protest with the rights of the community?
Garland (2001) argues that the battle for control is shaped by structural elements that are not
easily changed. The state, most visibly represented by law enforcement, will not simply
relinquish its’ power, as evidenced by results of the discourse analysis. Negotiated
management provides an avenue for communities to portray a willingness to give protest
groups what they want: a Constitutional right to engage in public assembly; however, control
is not relinquished to these groups. Instead, communities are exercising control before groups
engage in protest. This seems to be the implicit balance: groups are entitled to peaceably
assemble, as long as they are not disrupting the community where protest occurs. OWS
inconvenienced communities with sit-ins, camping, blocking entrances, and other nuisance
behaviors. Current protest groups reportedly create fewer inconveniences than OWS; however,
those resorting to violence, including attacks on law enforcement and citizens and/or
destruction of property are not only a disruption but create danger for communities. One can
argue this approach to protest oversteps the implicit balance.
Laws and ordinances, which are intended to prevent or limit disruptive behavior, guide law
enforcement officials in managing group activities. Essentially, police agencies exercise more
control in representing the state through negotiated management. If protesters do not comply
with negotiations, then police – and some citizens – believe they are “justified” to resort to force.
Refusal to engage in negotiation, as described by King (2013), or failure to maintain informal
social control of protestors, provides additional justification to strategically incapacitate a
group. Responses to the questionnaire, sent to communities for this study, portray consistent
efforts to exercise social control in the management of – negotiated or not – political protest.
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i The larger research project for which data was collected provided a comprehensive analysis related to the Tea
Party and Occupy Wall Street; however, the responses to the information request used in this study referenced all
forms of public assembly, whether by non-governmental organizations, social movement organizations, or other
groups.