

The Dilemma On Reconceptualising Natural Resources In Campfire Areas In Zimbabwe

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ABSTRACT

Zimbabwe is indisputably one of the foremost, volatile and vulnerable nations tainted with adverse impacts of the land degradation, poor governance of natural resources, unnecessary burning of the veld and poaching. Hence, there is the need to revisit sustainable environmental management policies and conservation initiatives starting from grassroots level. The CAMPFIRE program in Zimbabwe is one of the strategies designed to tackle environmental management. The conceptual connection of people and conservation of natural resources in Zimbabwe seemed to have evolved towards local ownership and local management. Thus limits of community ownership over natural resources have been reached. According to dominant actors on the conservation scene, the indigenous people in Zimbabwe have not been able to effectively conserve their wildlife and biodiversity and thus in their view a more enforcing style of conservation, separated from local people, is needed again. This study explores and analyses the benefits of conservation and sustainable management of natural resources including wildlife on rural livelihoods with particular focus on rural development. The methods used in this study included focus group discussions, key informant interviews and field observations.

Keywords: Development, Community Ownership, Conservation, Environment, Management

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The dilemma of conservation and development is how to achieve one without sacrificing the other and the need to effectively embrace sustainability. Initial attempts have revolved around spatial separation of conservation areas (national parks, wilderness areas), where people other than tourists were largely excluded, from those areas occupied by local people, in which the widespread alteration of land cover in quest of development could occur (Mutandwa and Gadzirayi, 2009; Taylor, 2009). Hence, this solid approach to conservation in Zimbabwe has been extensively condemned as being unsustainable and reckless, because of the gravities on the reserves from people living along the boundaries, demands for the restitution of land from people who were evacuated when the reserves were introduced, and the expenses of managing these pressures (Murphree, 2009; Gandiwa, 2011). On the contrary, progress is slowed down by isolation of local people from vital and critical resource areas in the reserves, which could be used to guarantee economic and social change, and their marginalisation from political decision-making processes about how the conservation areas should be used (Wolmer,

Chaumba and Scoones, 2004; Mashinya, 2007). As an alternative, integrated conservation and development projects (ICDP) or, more broadly, community conservation initiatives have been proposed for consideration. These involve local people participating both physically and politically in the process of conservation while pursuing a development agenda, principally through some form of sustained use of natural resources. The underlying assumption is that the initiative will provide the necessary incentives to conserve the resources and their environment. The corresponding hypothesis is that there are circumstances where conservation concerns and community interests in development join and it becomes possible to achieve both. The track record of such presumed “win-win” situations has been patchy at best. Some believe that these initiatives have provided neither sustained development nor lasting conservation benefits (Logan and Moseley, 2002; Mapedza, 2009; Gandiwa, 2012).

In recent years, the reality of a trade-off between conservation goals and development imperatives has become more widely recognized and reachable. This has given rise to a concept that, to maintain the supply of environmental goods and services for society more generally, incentives are needed to induce local people to forego more disruptive land- and resource-use practices (Mapedza et al., 2003 ; Dickman; 2010). Environmental services commonly exist as positive externalities or uncompensated benefits to users because conventional markets generally fail to value them in ways that recompense land managers for providing them. As a result, the production of these services over time has become progressively degraded (Andrade and Rhodes, 2009; Gandiwa, 2012). More so, attempts have been made to establish values for these services and reward. Henceforth, the underlying assumption here is that the conversion of land from its natural state is largely a function of the net economic benefits that accrue to the land user by so doing. To the individual land user, maintaining the land in its natural state is seldom a more attractive option than its conversion for agricultural, forestry or industrial purposes.

One thinkable initiative is the Communal Areas Management Programme or Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) which started in the late 1980s in Zimbabwe and widely emulated elsewhere in Sub Saharan Africa in the following decade. (Fischer, 2011) point out that the underlying idea of these initiatives places them firmly within the ‘community conservation’ paradigm, but in their functioning they share many features with PES.

The Research Problem

The government of Zimbabwe had been trying to be relevant by adhering to all international bodies and statutes hence attempting to implement the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol's Agenda 21. All government and responsible institutions had established structures for community based natural resource management in respective areas in Zimbabwe. This was in-line with bringing resource governance as close to the people as possible. What remain conspicuously missing are their functional processes. This had led to continued resource deprivation. The structures are there but there is no community based natural resource management. This paper attempts to analyse the institutional dearth that is hampering effective community based natural resource management.

Aim of the Study

The major aim of the study is to find out where organisations involved in community based forest resources are lacking.

Specific Objectives

- To find out organisations involved in natural resources management in Sanyati resettlement scheme

- To explore community based forest resource management initiatives
- To examine where these organisations are lacking for effective community based resource management.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Evolution of Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM)

It is important to note that there has been increased obligation of the significance of local institutions in the management of resources. Local people are thought to possess vital knowledge on local environments, which can be very useful in resource management. CBNRM has been popular and gained support worldwide of late with most countries of the Global South (GS), multi-lateral development agencies, donors and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) supporting this resource management system (Chigwenya and Chifamba, 2010). Natural Resource Management (NRM) through local communities has been widely advocated for as a solution to the perennial problem of environmental degradation, a problem bedeviling a number of rural areas worldwide. The conception is based on international debates on the role the indigenous institutions can play in natural resource management. The issue of CBNRM was a result of the Kyoto Protocol's Agenda 21 where there was unanimous agreement on the vital role local communities and civic society can play in the management of natural resources (Brown-Nunez and Jonker, 2008; Fischer, 2011). The conference adopted the establishment of local agenda 21 plan at local level. This was thought to enhance sustainable environmental management. CBNRM can be lightly described as a creative process that relies on adoptive learning and action involving people and groups that share and use a natural resource. It differs from traditional policies in that it works with local men and women mainly because of its 'naturalness', it is therefore appropriate in any part of the world, both in countries of the Global South (GS) and Global North (GN) (Mapedza and Bond, 2006; Balint and Mashinya, 2006). Success stories of CBNRM have been told in various countries throughout the world.

In light of the above, there is intensified indebtedness of the weight of CBNRM in creating livelihoods to millions of people particularly in rural communities. More than 90% of World's 1.2 billion poor (bottom billion) depend on natural resources specifically forests for their livelihoods. One third of the world's population still depends on wood for fuel, which calls for concerted effort to conserve forest resources for future generations (Gandiwa, 2011; Andrade and Rhodes, 2012). People derive a lot of benefits from forest resources, which form a very import part of their livelihoods. These benefits can be in the form of building poles, timber and charcoal. They can also venture into environmentally friendly income-generating projects; bee keeping, for example. They can also derive some non-monetary benefits such as ropes, fruits and medicine (Wolmer et.al, 2004). CBNRM, while enhancing rural and urban livelihoods behoves a great interest to environmental planners and policy-makers.

Understanding CAMPFIRE Programme in Zimbabwe

The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) is an initiative which evolved largely around the concept of managing wildlife in the communal areas of Zimbabwe for the benefit of the people living in these areas (Mutandwa and Gadzirayi, 2007; Murphree, 2009).

Its details were first expounded and emerged in 1986 (Dunham et al., 2003; Corrales, 2004) though its base and foundations were recognized about 25 years earlier when the commercial possibilities of wildlife production in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) were being explored (Child et al., 2003; Brown-Nunez and Jonker, 2008). Years back, wildlife was considered to be state property, managed by the State and able to be used commercially only under licence (rarely given). The resultant alienation of wildlife from both commercial and communal land

farmers led both groups to consider wildlife as a pest. Overt actions were hurriedly pursued to get rid of animals that were considered a threat to crops or direct competitors for grazing with domestic livestock. More broadly, wildlife was threatened by the widespread transformation of natural habitats to agricultural land, even in agriculturally marginal areas. The government itself undertook massive wildlife obliteration programmes in corridors on the borders of the country in an attempt to halt the spread of tsetse fly (Mapedza et al., 2003; Murphree, 2009), the vector for the livestock and occasionally human disease trypanosomiasis. In short, the future of substantial numbers of wildlife outside demarcated conservation areas was bleak.

Initial efforts to utilize wildlife in Zimbabwe, commercially focused on meat production, on the supposition that wildlife would be better adapted and therefore more productive than domestic livestock, at least in semi-arid environments. As the wildlife industry developed and advanced, however, it became apparent that the economic advantages of wildlife lay less in the biological productivity of the species than in the many different ways that value could be added to the basic product in the form of services offered to the end user. More so, these services can be added at little environmental cost and because consumers are generally willing to pay well for them, wildlife utilization has become an industry with the potential to be both ecologically sustainable and economically viable (Logan and Moseley, 2002; Mashinya, 2007).

The preceding diversification and spreading out of the industry was helped greatly by the introduction of the 1975 Parks and Wild Life Act (Wolmer et al., 2004). Hence, this permitted private landholders the right to use the wildlife on their land for their own benefit, including through safari hunting and the capture and sale of animals. Contrary to many anticipations at the time, the wildlife industry flourished and in 1960s and 1970s there were only five game ranches, totalling 750 km, all producing venison. By the early 1990s and mid-1990s, this had risen to over 216 ranches extending over 57,000 km and were more involved in sport hunting, trophy hunting, photographic safaris, game-viewing tourism, game cropping for venison, and selling live animals (Fischer, 2011; Gandiwa, 2011). Many farmers shifted partly or completely to game farming when, after independence in 1980, the Government of Zimbabwe reduced the levels of subsidies to commercial farmers in favour of greater support to the hitherto largely neglected communal farming sector. As a result of the removal of over taxed services and hiccups wildlife production, which was not controlled by the State, became financially more attractive. By 1990, wildlife production had become a major land use in commercial farming areas in the arid and semi-arid zones, where it was proving to be generally a more financially and economically viable form of land use when compared with single species livestock production (Mapedza and Bond, 2006; Taylor, 2009). This process reached its climax with the development of the Save Valley Conservancy (SVC) in south-eastern Zimbabwe in the mid-1990s, where the owners of 20 ranches, totalling over 3,500 km² agreed on a common approach to wildlife management and the complete removal of livestock and much of the livestock-associated infrastructure, primarily fences.

POLICY FRAMEWORK IN ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe's Wildlife Policy of January 1992 states that while the executive responsibility for all wildlife rests with the Parks and Wildlife Management Authority, the Minister responsible for the Environment will allow for the management and use of wildlife as a privilege to Appropriate Authorities (AA) for various categories of land outside the Parks and Wildlife Estate, that is Forest Land (Forestry Commission), Communal Land (Rural District Councils), and freehold land (owner/occupier) (Mutandwa and Gadzirayi, 2007). Furthermore, the policy also recognizes that the conservation of wildlife and habitats outside the Parks and Wildlife estate requires the cooperation of rural communities in communal and resettlement areas, and that these must be the primary beneficiaries. The policy was informed by the success and

demonstrated benefits of wildlife proprietorship conferred on private land owners in the commercial farming sector from before independence in 1975.

According to the country's statutes, wildlife belongs to the state, and wildlife is *res nullius*. This means that a wild animal is entitled to natural freedom of movement from one place to another and does not belong to an individual (Dickman, 2011). Therefore, government support through grants, landholders custodianship and privileges regarding use of wildlife that is on one's land and such rights are automatically lost when the wildlife moves to another area. Rural people under CAMPFIRE occupy Communal land that has wildlife on it, but there has been no clearly defined framework in these communities into legal sub-district institutions at village or ward level that meet the conditions for the granting of AA status, as is the case for individuals on freehold land (game farms, private conservancies) (Mapedza, 2009; Gandiwa, 2012). Communities are represented in RDCs through Councillors whom they elect as prescribed in statutes. AA for the management of wildlife on communal land is therefore granted to RDCs as the lowest accountable level of government, on behalf of communities. There is provision that AA status will be reviewed and or revoked if producer communities do not benefit directly.

Community-Based Natural Resource Management in Zimbabwe

This research exploited two well-known and well-established community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) approaches in Zimbabwe: state-forest co-management and CAMPFIRE initiatives. The viewpoint of both initiatives is that local communities need to realise commercial benefits in order for them to sustainably manage local natural resources such as forestry and wildlife (Balint and Mashinya, 2006). This philosophy tries to link costs of managing the resource with benefits from the natural resource.

Stakeholder Involvement and Co-management

Co-management, in theory, seeks to devolve forest management powers to local communities living next to state protected (gazetted) forests in order to prevent resource use conflicts. It involves the creation of environmental or resource regimes featuring partnerships between local communities or resource users and agencies of (sub) national governments (Fischer, 2011; Gandiwa, 2012). These state agencies, the Environmental Management Authority (EMA) and Forestry Commission for example, normally possess the legal mandate for environmental protection.

In Zimbabwe, co-management began in 1993 in villages surrounding the Mafungautsi Forest Reserve. These villages formed 15 Resource Management Committees (RMCs) which were institutions through which benefits such as harvesting broom grass, thatching grass, reeds and firewood permit systems were to be administered. Previously this role was performed by the Forestry Commission's district office (Wolmer et al., 2003; Mashinya, 2007). The proceeds from these minor forest products were then supposed to be used for community development projects such as schools, or to form a revolving fund to be lent to projects such as beekeeping. In the Mafungautsi area co-management received funding from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Initially, it performed well as CIDA and other stakeholders such as the Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) and the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) played a mediating role between the community and the Forestry Commission. The Resource Management Committees (RMCs) were formed as sub-committees of the village. Their main role is to issue non-timber resource exploitation permits and help enforce the forest protection rules (Dunham et al., 2003; Brown-Nunez and Jonkers, 2008).

The Impacts of Political Uncertainty on Community Based Natural Resource Management

Conflicts

Wildlife damage and predation on crops affect harvest and endangers villagers and ultimately the wildlife as shown in the field shown in figure 1 below. As human populations grow and expand beyond into wildlife habitat, there have been the predictable conflicts between local human encroachment and wildlife.

Figure 1: The state of maize crop that was ravaged by wild animals



Source: (Fieldwork, 2018)

These conflicts were brought into the international media spotlight by the recent killing of a collared lion near Hwange Park. However, there was no sympathy from the people of Hwange and surrounding areas who have lost relatives and domestic animals to lions. Villagers in areas such as Tsholotsho, Hwange, Dete, Victoria Falls, Zambezi, Bikita and Kariba, among others close to national parks, regularly encounter dangerous animals and it is difficult to balance the benefits they receive from these animals. Andrade and Rhodes (2012) affirm that in many cases, they also risk their lives by guarding their crops day and night, occasionally resulting in fatal encounters. According to the Zimbabwe National Parks and Wildlife Authority, 25 people were killed by wild animals across Zimbabwe during the first quarter of 2011, while 13 sustained injuries. In revenge attacks, villagers killed 10 elephants, five lions and 11 crocodiles, during the same period.

Figure 2: Huts damaged by elephants which had invaded the village



Source: (Fieldwork, 2018)

Damage to crops and property are a daily concern for rural African villages. In one communal area, the local chief states that people in his area had lost 640 cattle, 420 goats, as well as pigs and chickens to lions, hyenas and baboons (Gandiwa, 2012). Crop damage from elephants has


been particularly severe since elephants started moving from the park to the villages, destroying people's crops. The resulting poverty and hunger drove people to start poisoning animals with the indiscriminate toxin, cyanide. Besides elephants, cyanide also claimed the lives of several animal species, among them, lions and scavengers that included hyenas and vultures, as well as other animals such as kudu and buffalo that shared the same waterholes. The killing of the elephants attracted the attention of world media.

METHODOLOGY

This report is a result of follow up longitudinal research studies which were largely conducted by the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) in areas like Mafungautsi and in Nenyunga and Community Capacity Building Initiative in Africa (CCBICA) from 2012 to 2017 in Mola. The research period stretched from the early 1990s to 2004 and from 2012 to 2017. Field interviews were carried out with members of local communities, current and former committee members of Resource Management Committees and Ward Wildlife Management Committees (WWMC) (CAMPFIRE case study). Key informant interviews were identified within the Forestry Commission of Zimbabwe (FCZ), the Gokwe Rural District Councils (RDCs), Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) and Zimbabwe Trust (ZimTrust). Some former CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group employees and researchers also carried out key informant discussions. Literature review was another important tool for data collection. Furthermore, focus group discussions were carried out with representatives from the Forestry Commission and Environment Management of Zimbabwe. The idea was to obtain all the necessary information and statistics required. Field observation was also carried


Case study sites

CAMPFIRE research was carried out in Nenyunga ward of Gokwe North District as shown in Figure 3 below. The Ward Wildlife Management Committee (WWMC) in the research area included of three villages. Thus, the co-management case study specifically looked at Mafungautsi Forest Reserve and on two RMCs, Batanai and Chemwiro- Maswi, as shown in Figure 4 below.



(Source: Fischer et al, 2011)


Figure 4: Location of the Co-management and Campfire case study sites in Zimbabwe



(Source: Gandiwa, 2012)

Both the study areas are in the same agro-ecological region, which means that their bio-physical environments are fairly similar. Both areas are largely communal areas with no large-scale commercial farming. In addition, Nenyunga being one of the CAMPFIRE wards, its environment can support a resident wildlife population rather than being an area through which wildlife passes en route to more suitable territories. Both areas also have a similar social political and economic history. This is a frontier region with a number of residents having migrated from other parts of Zimbabwe in search of land. The Gokwe area was seriously affected by political turmoil in the post-2000 era.

Figure 5: General Structure of CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe



(Source: Murphree, 2009)

Governance and Management of CAMPFIRE Programmes

CBNRM has already yielded positive results in Zimbabwe’s communal lands with nearly all rural district councils having established structures for this programme (Fischer, 2011). Suffice to say that, Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) has established to be the flagship CBNRM in Zimbabwe and it is spreading its wings throughout the country. In addition, its major aim is to strengthen the participation of local communities in management of natural resources (Mashinya, 2007; Taylor, 2009). This has been done through various training programmes for the local people. From a government perspective, one could

say that despite the tremendous turmoil and negative publicity the country is receiving internationally this programme continues to yield tangible results.

CAMPFIRE membership has now expanded to 49 (of the 55) rural districts, representing almost the entirety of the country. This programme had earned a cumulative total of more than US\$20.1million. However while the figures gave an impressive impression at the national level, the situation at household level is very pathetic. The cut-above hunk of the revenue was chewed at national and sub-national level. About 60% of the revenue is absorbed and only 15% reach the communities involved (Mapedza and Bond, 2006; Chigwenya and Chifamba, 2011). This is the major backer to the failure of CBNRM programmes in Zimbabwe and other countries of the GS.

RESULTS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Living in close proximity to protected areas imposes costs such as damage to or loss of crops and livestock, and occasionally injury or death of local people (Wolmer et al., 2004; Mutandwa and Gadzirayi, 2007). These costs and expenses escalate as conservation initiatives lead to the recovery of animal populations, and as human population growth surge to an increase in the proportion of land outside the parks that is used for agriculture (Dickman, 2010). The outcomes reveal that human-wildlife conflicts were perceived to be prevalent in the study area between 2002 and 2012. Misunderstandings and conflicts with wildlife over crops, livestock, and human safety issues are known in all four local communities, irrespective of the perceived level of CAMPFIRE effectiveness. In tandem with scientific studies conducted in the GNP (Dunham, 2003; Gandiwa 2011; Gandiwa, 2012), local inhabitants asserted that some populations of large herbivores and carnivores, particularly elephants, spotted hyena, and lions, had increased. These assertions were based largely on recorded increases in crop damage and livestock destruction by large carnivores between 2000 and 2010. However, we recorded a non-significant increase in the number of human-wildlife conflict incidences in the study communities. This non-significant trend could be a result of some local people not reporting incidences of conflict with wildlife. Our results show that most indicators of CAMPFIRE effectiveness were not associated with a decline in experienced human-wildlife conflicts. However, involvement of local people in decision-making was indeed positively correlated with a lower perceived increase in human-wildlife conflict, even though a higher proportion of residents had experienced problems with animals. Elsewhere, in Musamba, northern Zimbabwe (Brown-Nunez and Jonker, 2008) and Tsholotsho District near Hwange National Park, western Zimbabwe (Logan and Moseley, 2002), fences had to be erected between wildlife areas and villages as a way of minimizing human wildlife conflicts. Human-wildlife constraints have been said to be widespread in several community-based natural resources management programs, for example, in Botswana (Murphree, 2009) and Zambia (Andrade and Rhodes, 2012).

Our study findings show that there are differences and similarities in effectiveness of CAMPFIRE programs across the four study communities. Contextual factors across the four communities seem to influence the perceived effectiveness of CAMPFIRE programs. Further investigation revealed that Mahenye, which had the highest ratings for indicators of CAMPFIRE effectiveness despite the decline in Zimbabwe's economy since 2000, was among the first communities in Zimbabwe to implement community-based natural resources management projects before the official launch of the CAMPFIRE program in 1989. Conservation projects in Mahenye started in 1982, and this resulted in the community developing several income-generating projects, including a high-end tourism lodge, which created more employment opportunities, a well-structured anti-poaching team, and awareness and education programs (Chigwenya and Chifamba 2010).

More so, the success of the Mahenye community in CAMPFIRE has been attributed to the commitment of socially dedicated individuals in positions of influence or leadership, the balancing of sources of traditional and popular legitimacy, the presence of an enlightened private sector, the existence of a rich natural resource base, the capacity for flexibility and acceptance of innovation and risk, the existence of intra communal cohesiveness, and the presence of economic incentives in the form of the regular annual distribution of household dividends in an equitable and transparent manner (Murphree, 2009; Mapedza, 2009). However, it has been reported that since 2000, the Mahenye community has experienced challenges with CAMPFIRE because local people have been receiving few benefits and there has been less involvement of local people in decision-making processes related to CAMPFIRE. Despite these challenges, the people of Mahenye have reportedly continued to demonstrate a remarkable level of intra-communal cohesiveness (Murphree 2001). Only Mahenye, Chibwedziva, and to some extent Mola recorded an increase in natural resources monitoring and law enforcement due to the availability of financial resources from the accrued CAMPFIRE benefits. In contrast, monitoring and law enforcement of natural resources was no existent in Chizvirizvi. In addition, the involvement of local people in decision-making in the CAMPFIRE program was very low in Chizvirizvi.

The failure of the CAMPFIRE program in Chizvirizvi has been attributed to the coercive and often violent activities of war veterans within the community, which have eroded the power and influence of both the developmental resettlement committee and traditional leadership; the lack of democratic elections for CAMPFIRE committee; the lack of involvement of local people in management activities or decisions regarding wildlife management; and the lack of benefits to local households from wildlife management (Mashinya, 2007). For instance, Chizvirizvi had the shortest length of community-based wildlife management because appropriate authority was granted only in 2003, whereas in the other three communities, CAMPFIRE has been running since the early 1990s. In addition, of the four communities, only Mahenye had tourism infrastructure (lodges); hence, the community had diversified forms of revenue generation, which increased the community benefits, even during the period of economic decline in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2008 (Dunham et al., 2003; Corrales, 2004). Chibwedziva is adjacent to an area of the GNP that has a slightly higher density of wild animals, for instance, elephants, compared to the other three communities, which corresponds to the perceived high conflicts. Moreover, differences in human population densities across the four communities could also have influenced variations in benefits accrued by local people, as shown by perceptions of effectiveness of CAMPFIRE indicators recorded in this study.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The period since the turn of the new millennium has brought uncertainty politically, economically and socially, all of which has affected the running and supervision of natural resources in Mola and Gokwe areas. High inflation has seriously eroded the benefits that most resource managers derive from the communal areas (the annual inflation rate recently reached 1,900%) (Child et al, 2003). Within the forestry sector, proceeds from NTFPs, which have always been low, have been further eroded, making them even less significant for community development projects. One of the main weaknesses of co-management as practised in Mafungautsi is the exclusion of proceeds from timber, leaving the RMCs access only to low value forestry resources.

In Nenyunga, revenue has also been eroded by inflation and the withdrawal of support in the form of transport, Problem Animal Reporters and bullets, all of which now have to be paid for from the diminishing CAMPFIRE dividends. Financial difficulties have also led the RDC to reduce the proportion of revenue it can plough back into the wards. The weakened WWMC has

become subject to the whims of a councillor who was more interested in advancing his interests in the name of the ruling party, at the expense of the initial intended beneficiaries of CAMPFIRE. The previously growing local resource management capacity and knowledge are now being eroded. The withdrawal of external support to both initiatives by CIDA and USAID, largely viewed by the Zimbabwean government as punishment for its controversial land reform programme, has also had a detrimental effect. There is an increasing reversal of most of the pre-2000 achievements, despite their shortcomings. However, the fact that the institutions for resource management in both co-management and

CAMPFIRE still exist is some cause for hope. But these have to be viewed in the context of the increasingly dictatorial policies in Zimbabwe. These local level institutions need to be accompanied by a more democratic dispensation and long-term solutions are needed which can be resilient in the face of continued and significant political uncertainty. The following policy recommendations have two goals: 1) to promote more sustainable livelihoods for people who rely on the two resource regimes; and 2) to sustainably manage the resource base (forests, wildlife) in order to keep on providing a livelihood for the resource dependent communities.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The successful stories and experiences from Dande Communal Land and others indicate that the cost of resource management is embryonic as a foremost determinant of the size of wildlife benefits. This means that the bulk of the benefits from wildlife utilization are being captured by a very small proportion of the total population, that is, those directly involved in managing the resource. Moreover, wildlife consumption has emerged as a major revenue-generating activity within the respective districts, a notable realization which has led to averseness to renounce control over this revenue. However, this is not facilitating the devolution of the benefits from wildlife to the household level.

The major aim and objective is to enhance sustainability by conserving fragile ecosystem and sustain economic viability of the area through wildlife utilisation. The results to date indicate that the interaction between the size of the resource and the size of the human population and its three-dimensional will affect the accomplishment of this objective. The obliteration of the tsetse fly is subsequent in the intra-movement of both humans and wildlife. The sustainability of wildlife consumption programmes is reliant on on low human population densities. The large inflow of incomers is resulting in the key resource areas being used for settlement, which is likely to reduce the productivity of wildlife populations.

A major factor in wildlife management is the understanding and perception that the costs and benefits are achieved when proper decision has been made. Under this project, legal authority over wildlife resources was intended to be passed from the central government to the wards (Gandiwa, 2012). However, at present, the areas and district council holds the legal custodianship on behalf of the wards. Therefore, decisions and authority regarding concrete rights for individual households are the entitlement of the district rather than the individual households and stakeholders who are the de-facto producers of wildlife. It is against this background that it remains to be seen how households will observe and understand wildlife management as an alternative land use when the legal mandate rests outside of their control.

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