

Peace By Pieces: The Politics Of Herdsmen's Attacks, Grazing Policy And The Ekiti State Grazing Regulation Law, 2016

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the politics of the 'Prohibition of Cattle and other Ruminants Grazing in Ekiti State Law, No. 4 of 2016' against the background of incessant attacks by itinerant pastoralists (or herdsmen) on farmers and host communities in different parts of Nigeria. Such attacks have claimed many lives, destroyed farm crops, other properties and sacked entire communities in the country. The author notes that such attacks/conflicts are dangerous to peaceful cohabitation among the numerous ethnic groups in Nigeria and can threaten national peace, unity and progress. Relying on the organized anarchy model of policy analysis, the author relies mainly on the strength of secondary (including historical) and to a lesser extent, primary sources of data to situate such conflicts at the intersection of economic, climate change, ethnic and historical/political factors in a multi-ethnic, federal Nigerian state. The author posits that many leaders of the Nigerian political class have been playing politics in their responses to the attacks and that, in a manner descriptive of seeking peace by pieces, only a few who are genuinely concerned about lasting peace, security and national unity have been pushing for legitimate means of bringing the attacks under control. The author argues that Nigeria will have to seek solutions to the problem within its specific circumstances and historical experiences. It therefore makes recommendations on ways to bring the attacks under control with a view to building a stronger, more united Nigeria.

Keywords: Pastoralists; Farmer/Herdsmen's Conflicts; National Unity; Public Policy; Grazing Regulation Law.

INTRODUCTION

Federations often consist of diverse peoples, cultures and values whose mutual existence, propagation and growth are protected by means of constitutions. Also, many federating societies adopt administrative systems that allow for the co-existence of several tiers or levels of government, where each tier or level of government derives power from the constitution to legislate on specific items. In many young and developing federations such as are common in Africa, striking a mutually acceptable balance between the need to maintain unity in diversity, and between the powers of the central or federal government and those of other levels of government can be temptingly difficult. This can be particularly so where there appears to be a seeming coincidence between administrative/political divisions and ethnic or cultural values and interests, especially where there is competition or rivalry among the ethnic nationalities.

This is the situation in Nigeria with many ethnic groups, a thirty-six state structure and a Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Although inter-ethnic cohabitation occurs in many places in Nigeria, each of the Eastern, Western and Northern Nigeria is dominated by the Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups, respectively. While the average Igbo is known for business, the Yoruba are mainly arable and cash crop farmers but also engage in serious academic pursuits. Conversely, the average Hausa-Fulani is a herdsman who is easily identified with

cattle and general livestock tending, an endeavour that takes him to different parts of the country in search of lush vegetation for animal pasture, particularly southern Nigeria which receives more rainfall than the north. Thus, many Hausa/Fulani are pastoralists who herd cattle and other livestock, often on an itinerant basis.

The above has provided a historically chequered relationship between herdsmen and their host communities. From warm acceptance, mutual tolerance, co-habitation and cooperation many decades ago, the relationship of herdsmen with their host communities has gradually degenerated over the years to one of mutual suspicion, conflict over resources, destruction of properties, orgies of violence and killing (Seddon and Sumberg, 1997; Blench, 2003; Gbaka, 2014). There are various reasons for such conflicts. For example, there is struggle for land as a major resource: it is arable farmland for native farmers while it is grazing land for cattle and their herders. In the process, conflicts erupt between the two groups when cattle destroy farmlands and eat up crops. But in recent years beginning from the 1980s, the conflicts have escalated both in number and scope for various reasons including the possession of arms and ammunition by herdsmen, including unlicensed guns and automatic rifles. With such ammunition, they have a sense of power over the native farmers and their host communities whose members are often killed in ensuing scuffles.

Somehow, government has not done enough to end such conflicts. As Blench (2003: 11) argues, government is either unable or unwilling to act decisively to end the crisis because of “self-absorption in local matters and self-interest”. He argues further that where government has sponsored dispute resolution mechanisms until the 1970s, such were weighted towards herders’ interests. Yet, the role of government remains pertinent in resolving the problem. The development has thrown up pertinent questions about citizenship, ethnicity, identity, nativity and governance in Nigeria that are begging for answers.

The Regulatory role of Government

As the sovereign power within a state, government has the primary duty of maintaining order within its territory. It must promote citizens’ welfare in ways that will preserve their freedoms and justice. In its preamble, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides:

...for a constitution for the purpose of promoting the good government and welfare of all persons in our country on the principles of freedom and justice, and for the purpose of consolidating the unity of our people. (FRN, 1999).

To achieve the above, government must regulate the activities of its citizens and other residents within its territory. However, regulation is often political, involving as it does values, interests, conflicts and choices. Regulatory policies almost always invariably involve a political rationality that must take cognizance of historical, organizational, contextual and economic circumstances (Reagan, 1987: v). Due to the above, a grazing regulatory policy in a multi ethnic state like Nigeria must also take into consideration the geo-ethnic factor. This is because although pastoralists are prominent among ethnic groups from Northern Nigeria, for reasons of geographical (i.e rainfall and considerations of vegetation) and economic considerations (i.e. market availability), cattle grazing takes place for longer periods annually in the southern parts of the country. This implies that many pastoralists of northern extraction such as the Fulani and Hausa have to spend more time in the south grazing their cattle in the south where the geographical conditions are more favourable for their cattle.

As an aspect of agriculture, law-making on pastoralism or animal herding is provided for by item 18 on the concurrent list of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria which provides:

Subject of the provisions of this constitution, a House of Assembly may make laws for that state with respect to industrial commercial or agricultural development of the State (FRN, 1999).

Thus, both the federal and state governments have jurisdictional powers to make laws towards regulating cattle grazing in the country. Therefore, the feeble efforts of both the federal and majority of state governments at regulating cattle grazing calls to question the motives, body language, attitudes and interests of the operators of the reins of government at both levels.

For instance, a National Grazing Bill that the federal government forwarded to the National Assembly failed to scale through because "its provisions were declared unacceptable by people (lawmakers) from parts of the country" (*Newsherald*, Wednesday, Nov. 16, 2016). Also, the Ekiti State Ministry of Agriculture wrote "several letters to the Sultan (of Sokoto) (the) Inspector General of Police and other instrumentalities of the federal government (on cattle Grazing) with no positive result" (Ekiti State Bureau of ICT, accessed Wed. Nov. 16, 2016; Government of Ekiti State, 2016). It is therefore significant that due to incessant attacks and the killing of Ekiti people by herdsmen, coupled with the failure of the federal government to act decisively to stem such attacks, the Ekiti State Government decided to control the menace through policy.

The Organized Anarchy Model of Public Policy

Different scholars have analyzed the question of farmer-herder or farmer-pastoralist conflict using different analytical frameworks. These include climate change, relative deprivation theory and processual theories of conflict (Olaniyan, Francis and Okeke-Uzodike, 2015); eco-politics (Blench, 2003), eco-violence (Okoli and Atelhe, 2014), and global climate change (Okoli, Enyinnia, Elijah and Okoli, 2014; Odoh and Chigozie, 2012 and Abbass, 2012), among others. The present study differs from most of the aforementioned that sought to describe farmer-pastoralist clashes because it aims at understanding and explaining a contentious public policy and recommending the way forward. Therefore, a policy framework will be most suited for explaining it.

Efforts to control indiscriminate grazing of cattle and its attendant negative outcomes in Nigeria through policy can be understood within the purview of John Kingdon's (1984) organized anarchy model, otherwise called the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA) of public policy making and implementation. Drawing on the garbage-can model of decision making, Kingdon's organized anarchy conceives of public policy as emanating from a combination of *problems*, *politics* and *policy* streams of events which flow quite independently of one another but must meet to produce outcomes. As has been argued, organized anarchy model:

contrasts with 'comprehensively rational' policymaking in which...policymakers identify problems (or their aims), bureaucracies perform a comprehensive analysis to produce various solutions (or ways to meet those aims), and policymakers select the best solution. Instead, policymaker aims and policy problems are ambiguous and bureaucrats struggle to research issues and produce viable solutions quickly (Cairney and Jones, 2016).

As explained by Henry (2007:288-290), the problems stream concentrates public and policymakers' attention on a particular problem of national importance and its consequences (such as the incessant farmer-herder clashes in Nigeria and the hostilities, loss of lives, destruction of property and the negative attention these have given the country. See, for example, table 1 above). It is also in this stream that problems are defined and new policies targeted at resolving them emanate. In the alternative, the problem may be left to fade out with

time. Problems are typically categorized in terms of what values (socio-economic, class, ideological or ethnic, for example) they project and seek to protect, the comparisons they present or the social categories they report. Quite often, resolving the problem will depend to a large extent on its proper categorization.

The political stream is the second and this is where agenda setting takes place. Here, the governmental agenda consisting of those issues that are considered worth dealing with or resolving is negotiated among the visible cluster of policy gladiators or entrepreneurs. These often include high-level political office holders, top bureaucrats, the media, interest group and political party chieftains, non-governmental organizations and members of the legislature, etc. Since groups often do not want to be excluded from the decisions, compromise positions often result about the issue in question.

If the issue is of great national importance such as farmer-pastoralist clashes in Nigeria, then the maneuvers become more tense and sensitive. If the polity is a highly socially disaggregated federal structure where lower levels of government have jurisdictions to legislate on the issues in contention, then the probability of extreme politicization and disaggregated treatment of issues is high, especially if the federal or central government foot-draws in its response to them. Thus, the political stream determines to a large extent, whether or not a policy will be made and the extent to which it can be 'successfully' implemented.

Organized anarchy recognizes the policy stream as the third constitutive aspect of public policy. The policy stream contains the "decision agenda or alternative specification" that includes a list of alternative actions "from which a public policy may be selected by policymakers to resolve a problem". With the superiority of intellectual arguments and personal commitments of policy gladiators rather than political maneuvers as the main decision criteria in policy choice, the "hidden cluster" of academics, researchers, consultants and legislative administrative staff form the main pillars of the policy stream (Henry, 2007: 288-290).

Therefore, the policy stream judges ideas on the basis of technical feasibility, public acceptability by a broad spectrum of values, and expected constraints to policy implementation. In comparison with the political stream where agreement on policy alternatives come through bargaining, rational reasoning and persuasion constitutes the major means of reaching agreements in the policy stream. In an actual policy cycle, this would translate to information dissemination and persuasion of those to be affected by policy in order to reign-in, rather than to exclude them. This may take the form of public hearings, calls for memoranda and informed representation of stakeholders in policy. Eventually, various solutions are suggested and the policy adopted may be incremental rather than cataclysmic in nature; an attribute that may promote or hinder policy acceptance by various groups.

However, the model has been criticized for its imprecision on what should happen in some policy making situations that could arise in certain political systems. For instance, it has been observed that with the model, many ideas are likely to end up in the garbage can of ideas because; the likelihood of significant policy change is difficult to predict since it requires sustained and high attention, an acceptable solution and some spirit of compromise in the political system. (*since*)... when new, major legislation looks likely to be adopted, there is a deluge of interest and a range of participants keen to jump on an idea's bandwagon – adding further to the metaphor of the garbage can of ideas and the messy nature of politics.

(Cairney & Michael, 2016).

Also, public policy results only when windows of opportunity open for a convergence of the three streams of problems, politics and policy. This may not happen in every case where policy has potentials of solving problems; in many cases, such a convergence of the three streams may not occur for policy to result. Fortunately, the three streams are present in the case of the grazing regulation law in Ekiti State, where the problem is the killing and destruction of law abiding citizens by a rampaging army of occupation of cattle herders in different parts of Nigeria; the politics being government silence and inaction as its citizens are mercilessly hacked down in cold blood. In addition, however, there must be persistent and fearless agitation by committed policy entrepreneurs who must possess both legitimacy and connection to pull policy through. This is also present nationwide even though they are few, including the Ekiti State Governor and members of the State House of Assembly.

Due mainly to the silence and inaction of the federal government on the menace of armed itinerant cattle rearers, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) has accused government of complicity in the incessant killing of Christians in Southern Kaduna by Fulani herdsmen and Islamic fundamentalists with impunity because "the perpetrators have been given immunity and they feel they are untouchable". It noted further that "over 1,000 Christians in Southern Kaduna had been killed, 53 communities with their churches destroyed and 17 villages conquered and occupied by the Fulani herdsmen between May 2016 and January, 2017" (Olokor, 2017:14).

Because of violent clashes between farmers and cattle rearers in the northern part of Ekiti State and the silence of the federal government on the problem, the state government decided to confront the problem by pushing for a public policy to regulate cattle grazing in the state. Since the passing of the Ekiti State Grazing Regulation Law, 2016 by the Ekiti State House of Assembly, other states of the federation whose citizens are victims of the activities of Fulani pastoralists have started to take action towards making policies aimed at stemming the tide of attacks by Fulani pastoralists.

Background to the Ekiti State Grazing Regulation Law, 2016

In order to control indiscriminate cattle grazing so that farms could be safe from destruction by cattle, the government established grazing reserves in Northern Nigeria and the Obudu Cattle Ranch in Eastern Nigeria in the 1960s. However, the projects did not continue and free animal grazing continued with incidences of farm destruction, violent clashes and deaths in the trail. The clashes became more violent and bloody when, in recent times, pastoralists who normally went about only with staffs began to carry deadly weapons like locally-made and automatic guns such as AK 47 (Oyeyipo and James, 2016), with which they freely attack their host communities, killing many people in the process. In many of such cases, the government has done little or nothing both to prevent attacks and to bring perpetrators of such acts to book. This has been the case in many states in Nigeria. As has been argued elsewhere:

There is ample documentation that all over the country the two (pastoralists and agriculturalists) are regularly in conflict. Bukar Usman has documented that over 69 deaths and 99 injuries were recorded in Jigawa between 1993 and 1995 and that this pattern of conflicts runs through the entire country from the Sahel to the forest belt of Imo State (Usman, 1999:93). A more recent publication has shown that there is a keen contest over access to and control of the wetlands, the *fadamas* between farmers, fishing people, herders and hunters. This contest has resulted in several violent explosions of conflict in Nigeria's North Central region (Blench, 2004). (Alubo, 2006: 110-111).

In recent times, there has been a steady rise of violent activities by pastoralists (otherwise known as herdsmen) across the country. Table 1 in the appendix documents some of such incidents:

Cattle Rearing and Terrorism

In 2015 the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), which is published by Sidney, Australia-based Institute for Economics and Peace labeled Fulani herdsmen as the fourth deadliest global terror organization after Boko Haram, the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq and al-Shabab (in Somalia) (*Punch* Editorial, May 6, 2016). Also, while the Global Peace Index (GPI) for 2016 indicated that terrorism has almost tripled globally since 2011 and has been responsible for over 30,000 deaths, Nigeria ranks second on the list of five countries with the highest concentration of terrorist activities. While it is preceded by Iraq, it leads Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria. Between them, the five countries accounted for 78 percent of terrorism- induced deaths in 2014 (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016).

Nigeria's ranking has deteriorated on the global peace index since 2008. Out of 163 countries surveyed, Nigeria has fallen from a rank of 118th most peaceful country in 2008 to 146th and 149th in 2012 and 2016, respectively. With a record of close to 20,000, Nigeria also ranks among the nine countries (excluding Syria) with the most internal conflict deaths in 2016. It ranks fourth after Mexico, Iraq and Afghanistan while it precedes Yemen, South Sudan, Ukraine, Central African Republic and Pakistan (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016). Corroborating the above, available records show that:

The destruction of farm crops in the last five years has occurred in almost all Southern states of Nigeria and would probably be estimated to cost hundreds of millions of Naira. It has occurred also in some parts of the North including Kogi, Taraba, Plateau, Kaduna, Benue and Zamfara states. *The herdsmen have also killed hundreds of farmers in the country* (Italics mine for emphasis). The number of those displaced [is] numerous. Indeed in the World's Index of Terrorism, the Fulani herdsmen rank 4th on the list of (the) world's most violent organizations (*The Sun* Editorial, November 16, 2016).

Most attacks by herdsmen occur in non Hausa dominated states (Fulani herdsmen are itinerant, migrant people who move about in search of pasture and water for their flocks), particularly in the middle belt and southern states. Most of the dead are from other ethnic groups and the material loses are colossal, which aptly justifies the description of Fulani herdsmen as terrorists.

Policy and Politics of Cattle Grazing in Nigeria

Historically, the Federal Government of Nigeria has made about five laws, acts or regulations to control land use, including cattle grazing in the country. These have included efforts to establish and regulate the use of grazing routes in the country. First was the Land Tenure Act of 1962 which Rasak (2011) opined, did not specify the right of Nigerians to live or work in any part of the country but only referred to natives. The Nigerian Grazing Reserve Act of 1964 was aimed at granting grazing lands to pastoralists so as to address farmer-pastoralist clashes, improve productivity by encouraging sedentarization and to improve social amenities in such settlements. However, as Ibrahim, Ismaila and Umar (2015: 25) argued, the policy was poorly implemented and achieved little.

In order to support the Green Revolution agricultural programme of the then Federal Military Government, the popular Land Use Act of 1978 addressed the shortcomings of former policies including the Land Tenure Act of 1962 by granting undeterred access to all Nigerians to work

and use land anywhere in the country. The fourth, the National Agricultural Policy of 1988 sought to allocate 10% of Nigeria's landmass to grazing reserves. However, the Nigerian Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL 2006, cited in Ibrahim, Ismaila and Umar, 2015: 25) observed that only 2.82% of the country's landmass was actually acquired for grazing purposes under the policy. Another effort to address the problem by legislating the National Grazing Route and Reserve Commission into law in order to establish grazing routes and grazing reserves in year 2011 was botched.

Recent legislative efforts to control cattle grazing in Nigeria

Going by the increased tempo of attacks by Fulani herdsmen in recent times, the need for a law to control the situation became apparently urgent. Listed below are some bills recently presented to the National Assembly by lawmakers to that effect:

- a. A senator in the Seventh Senate proposed a bill for the enactment of an act to provide for the establishment of national grazing routes and reserves with a commission to manage them (Kumolu, 2014). The commission was to earmark animal grazing routes and to prevent herdsmen-farmer clashes as well as cattle rustling in Nigeria. However, the bill was rejected by Senate (Oyeyipo and James, 2016).
- b. A bill titled 'National Grazing Reserve (Establishment) Bill 2016' seeking to establish a National Grazing Reserve Commission for the establishment of at least one cattle reserve in each state of the federation was proposed but did not scale through (Oyeyipo and James, 2016).
- c. A bill entitled 'The National Grazing Routes and Reserve (Establishment) Bill' (*Daily Trust*, 2012) was proposed to establish grazing reserves, routes and a commission to manage them and were to crystallize into ranches later. The bill made provisions for representatives from the thirty-six states of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) (Oyeyipo and James, 2016). It also failed.

Many of the bills did not succeed primarily due to suspicions of a desire to further Fulani expansionist motives by requiring the establishment of grazing reserves in each state of the federation. This was because states would be obliged to cede part of their lands for the purpose of establishing grazing reserves. Expectedly, opposition to the bill arose mostly from representatives of southern and middle belt states that had been at the receiving end of herdsmen's violence and attacks. The bill's proposal to compensate land ceded for the grazing reserves and ranches was not enough to see the bill through, being considered to have political motives or undertones. As has been argued:

The bill failed...as the senators were divided over whether the Federal Government was constitutionally empowered to create grazing reserves and stock routes in any state of the Federation. The inability of the... house ... and the government to promulgate a law establishing grazing reserves raises doubt on the government's commitment to finding a lasting solution to the conflict.

(Muhammed, Ismaila and Bibi, 2015: 26).

The Politics of Cattle Grazing

Agriculture is an item on the concurrent list of subjects in the Nigerian constitution and to that extent; both the federal and state governments are empowered to make laws on it. Till date, however, the Federal Government has not taken any decisive action nor made any concrete move to curtail the menace of violence by herdsmen nationwide. Instead, the federal government has only made a feeble call on security agencies to apprehend the rampaging herdsmen and "half-hearted approach" to tackling the menace of attacks by herdsmen (*The*

Sun, 16th November, 2016). Although some state governments have made statements on the attacks by herdsmen, many of such have proven to be not only weak, but also largely ineffective because they were belated rather than preventive in nature. Unsurprisingly, the herdsmen have overpowered the police with their weapons and killed several officers in the recent past (see items 22 and 35 on table 1), thereby making security operatives to be afraid of the herdsmen, the main reason the police failed to intervene in the herdsmen's attack on Oke-Ako in Ekiti State on May 20, 2016.

The reasons for the federal government's failure and inability to control indiscriminate cattle grazing and its attendant negative consequences in Nigeria can be largely traced to the political economy of cattle rearing in the country. First, President Muhammadu Buhari is a Fulani and the Grand Patron of the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders' Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), the umbrella body for cattle rearers in the country. By virtue of the fact that the president himself is a Fulani, a cattle owner and a major cattle dealer, it is plausible that his seeming inability to separate the responsibilities of his office as president from his interests as Fulani, cattle dealer and grand patron of MACBAN has made it difficult for him to call the rampaging Fulani cattle rearers to order.

In the same way many monarchs, senior civil servants, political office-holders and opinion leaders in Nigeria are owners of cattle businesses that are entrusted into the care of Fulani and 'Bororo' cattle tenders. These cattle rearers are 'equipped' with AK 47 guns with which they kill farmers, terrorize innocent citizens and forcefully take over farms, sack and take over whole communities. The question is "who buys guns for these cattle rearers?" Yet, these senior citizens are opinion leaders who should be instrumental to making laws to control the activities of the rampaging herdsmen in Nigeria. They cannot instigate government to control indiscriminate grazing due to a clash of their personal economic interests with national interests.

The failure of government to address the situation decisively has several implications for Nigeria's unity and security. First, the fact that herdsmen now carry sophisticated ammunition with which they kill and maim perceived opponents at will constitutes grave danger to national security. This is because security personnel including the police have not been able to withstand weapon-wielding herdsmen's boldness and firepower in past clashes. That was the main reason for the police's excuse of 'lack of fuel for patrol vehicles' to bring the mayhem in Oke-Ako under control. In fact, the police post in Irele-Ekiti which is closer to Oke-Ako had been deserted after herdsmen killed a police officer for intervening in herdsmen-farmers' clash some years earlier (Olakiitan, 2016).

In other states in Nigeria, rampaging herdsmen have also killed a Divisional Police Officer, other police officers, monarchs, government officials and lawmakers with impunity while the government did nothing to bring the offenders to book (see items 3, 4, 22, 28, 31 and 36 on table 1). The conclusion is that Fulani herdsmen are now above the law in Nigeria, a status that is condoned by the federal government due to its policy of inaction (indicating acquiescence) over the group's actions.

A second and perhaps graver implication of the federal government's failure to address the issue of herdsmen's attacks is the accusation that it could be a ploy to advance Fulani ethnic expansion. This is because President Muhammadu Buhari is a Fulani and the national patron of the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), the umbrella body for cattle breeders in Nigeria. The thinking is that as President of Nigeria and national patron of

MACBAN, Buhari should ordinarily be able to call the herdsmen to order rather than “paying lip service to the attacks by the Fulani herdsmen” (Olakiitan, 2016).

However, such an expectation may not be realized for two reasons. First is that the Fulani in Nigeria has a history of forceful occupation of other peoples' territories (Isichei, 1983: 206-207; Blench, 2003: 8; Smith, 1988). Second is that President Buhari is a Fulani whose sympathy for his Fulani ethnic group is manifested in his complete silence over Fulani herdsmen's killing and sacking of their host communities. For example in the early 2000s, Fulani herdsmen attacked and killed numerous Yoruba farmers in Oke Ogun area of Oyo North, Oyo State. The Yoruba staged a retaliatory attack and killed Fulani herdsmen. General Buhari (now Nigeria's president) physically led a delegation of the Fulani to the Oyo State Government House and told Lam Adesina, the Governor: “*your people are killing my people*” (italics mine, for emphasis). The meeting ended abruptly as the two leaders could not resolve the matter amicably (Agbaakin, 2012; Personal interview with Olaoye Bamidele, November 29th, 2016).

The Fulani, a primarily nomadic people, migrated from Fouta Djallon area in present-day Guinea to settle around Gombe in the 19th century. Through the Sokoto Jihad of 1804, Fulani leaders, including Othman Dan Fodio spread the Islamic religion, overthrew and brutally murdered the Hausa Habe rulers of the area and established the Sokoto Caliphate, imposing their culture including the Fulani language on the territory (Isichei, 1983: 206-214; Abubakar, 1980: 303-326). Fulani Jihadists ended their campaign in Hausaland in 1809 but continued seeking to extend their influence to other places including Nupeland and Ilorin (Abubakar, 1980: 303), a Yoruba kingdom. After Aare Ona Kakanfo Afonja, they established a Fulani Caliphate with Abdulsalami who obtained a flag from Sokoto as Ilorin's first Fulani Emir at about 1823/24 (Isichei, 1983: 215). From then, the Fulani sought to extend their power and influence to other parts of Yorubaland by waging wars against other Yoruba towns around Oyo. However, they could not take the capital, Oyo-Ile. In 1838, Yoruba soldiers repelled Fulani invaders from Ilorin, stopping them at the Battle of Oshogbo, from where they retreated (Isichei, 1983: 216; Personal interview with Olaoye Bamidele, November 29th, 2016).

Since the Buhari-led Federal Government has failed to take concrete actions to checkmate the degenerating scenario of herdsmen's attacks on their host communities, many see it as a ploy to actualize Fulani conquest of, and expansion into other parts of Nigeria under the supervision of a Fulani as president. Thus, in response to federal government's silence on the attacks and killings, the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeder's Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) threatened the Ekiti Grazing Enforcement Marshals (EGEM) which legislation instituted to control cattle grazing in Ekiti. Also, MACBAN demanded an apology from the governor for signing the bill into law (Nwaoko, October 22, 2016). Consequently, the Ekiti state governor accused the federal government of “backing *Miyetti Allah* to attack Ekiti” (Nwaoko, October 25, 2016). He also opined that “the Fulani herdsmen that attacked Oke-Ako and other communities in the country... (may be) Boko Haram members making tactical intrusion into the South West” (Olakiitan, 2016).

Background to the Ekiti State Grazing Regulation Law, 2016

The Ekiti State Grazing Regulation Law 2016 was a direct outcome of and response to the challenges of violence and attacks by itinerant Fulani herdsmen and the failure of the federal government to initiate or support any measure aimed at addressing the menace in a sustainable manner.

The major trigger of the public outcry that heralded the calls for affirmative government action to stem the rising tide of herdsmen's attacks on the people of Ekiti state was the attack on Oke-Ako community in Ikole Local Government Area of Ekiti in which two indigenes died and several people were wounded. However, there have been several Fulani herdsmen's attacks on Ekiti communities in the past with only a few recorded. While some of these attacks were directed against humans in the form of kidnapping, robbery, rape and killing, others were on property in the form of theft, unlawful entry, destruction and arson.

One of such incidents occurred between 10th August, 1998 and 29th May, 1999, at the Orin Farm Settlement in Ido/Osi Local Government Council when Captain Atanda Yussuf was the Military Administrator of Ekiti State just before the dawn of the Fourth Republic. Despite several warnings, Fulani herdsmen had regularly made cattle to graze on and trample the remaining crops in the farm settlement that was established by the old Western Regional Government. The Local Government Supervisory Councillor for Agriculture, Mr. Adelodun Aina, went to the State Ministry of Agriculture in company of the Sole Administrator for the Local Government, Mr. Oladoro Sanni to lodge a complaint. However, the military administration did nothing about the complaint (Personal interview with the former Supervisory Councillor for Agriculture, Ido/Osi Local Government Council, Mr. Adelodun Aina on Tuesday, 29th November, 2016).

Another of such attacks by Fulani herdsmen on Ekiti communities occurred in 2011 in Irele-Ekiti, a few kilometers to Oke-Ako (see item 36 on table 1). Following police intervention to restore order during a clash between herdsmen and natives in the town, Fulani herdsmen ganged up and attacked the police post in the area, and killed a police officer. Police presence had been withdrawn and the police post in the area vacated since the incident (Adegbuyi, 2016).

The attack of May 20, 2016 on Oke Ako in which two people died and others sustained various degrees of injury, was yet another incident of Fulani herdsmen's brigandage, destruction of property and murder in Ekiti State. In several other incidents in Ido/Osi, Ise-Emure and Irepodun/Ifelodun local government councils, Fulani herdsmen had emerged from the bush, blocked roads, robbed, raped, abducted helpless passengers and retreated into the bush before the arrival of security personnel (Olugbenga, 2013). It is noteworthy that like other incidents around the country before it, the federal government remained quiet over the development. But the Nigeria Police arrested two suspects who were kept in custody pending their arraignment in a court of law (Ojomoyela, 2016). Also, the Ekiti State Government made a law to provide for the control of animal grazing in the state.

The 'Prohibition of Cattle and other Ruminants Grazing in Ekiti State Law, No. 4 of 2016'

The 'Prohibition of Cattle and other Ruminants Grazing in Ekiti State Law, No. 4 of 2016' was passed by the Ekiti State House of Assembly and signed into law by the State Governor, Ayo Fayose on 30th October, 2016. It was the product of an executive bill that was sponsored by the Ekiti State Government "to regulate and control cattle grazing and other matters connected therewith" (Ekiti State of Nigeria, 2016: 2).

Public Hearing and inputs by Policy Gladiators

Since the primary target of the proposed law were pastoralists (a.k.a. herdsmen) who have been killing, maiming people and destroying farm crops in Ekiti State (and other parts of the Nigeria) with impunity, government deemed it necessary to encourage inputs by affected groups as a mark of openness and to garner support for the proposed law. For that reason, there was a public hearing jointly organized by the House of Assembly Committees on

Agriculture and Environment. It held at the Ekiti State House of Assembly complex where all stakeholders and policy entrepreneurs were represented and encouraged to make presentations and inputs into the making of the proposed law.

Groups represented at the public hearing included representatives of pastoralists (represented by pastoralists, Secretary and Legal Adviser to MACBAN in Ekiti State, Zaiyanu Muhammed and Barrister Umar Imam, respectively), security agencies, vigilante groups, the ministries of agriculture, environment and justice, traditional rulers and other members of the public. While the Legal Adviser did not support the carrying of AK-47 by pastoralists, he attempted to justify the possession of cutlasses, knives, catapults and movement of cattle at night by herdsmen. Also, MACBAN Secretary submitted that the culprits are not indigenous pastoralists but those from Sokoto, Chad and Niger Republics, etc en-route to southern Nigeria (Government of Ekiti State, 2016).

In the making and implementation of public policies, consensus building is an important requirement for securing popular acceptance of policy. This is more so for regulatory policies that are aimed at securing control as well as allocation of benefits and sanctions. As has been argued elsewhere, even though 'successful' public policies are rare in the strict sense of the word, policies often stand better chances of attaining specified ends if they appreciate the "values of consultation, the bottom-up process and the need for social diffusion and aggregation, rather than social differentiation and segregation. Above all ... (they) must encourage gravitation towards ideas of the public interest, which... (includes) consensus, effectiveness, efficiency and service delivery" (Olugbenga, 2013:152). The public hearing on the bill was aimed at attaining the above-stated objectives.

Major Provisions of the 'Prohibition of Cattle and other Ruminants Grazing in Ekiti State Law No. 4 of 2016'

The law was necessitated by the killing of two people and injuring of several others during a suspected herdsmen's attack on Oke-Ako community in Ikole Local Council area of the state on May 20, 2016. It contains eight major sections but the most popular include Section 2 which prohibits uncontrolled grazing; Section 4 that provides for impounding of cattle or other ruminants that engage in indiscriminate grazing; and Section 7 that specifies offences and penalty (Ekiti State of Nigeria, 2016: 3-4). Section 2 (1) provides that:

no person shall cause or permit any cattle or other ruminants belonging to him or under his control to graze on any land which the Governor has not designated as ranches.

Section 2 (2) provides that: "the Governor shall by an order designate land in each Local Government in respect of which cattle or other ruminants may be permitted to graze". Section 2 (3) provides that "no cattle or other ruminants shall by any means move or graze at night" while Section 2 (4) provides that "cattle movement and grazing are restricted to the hours between 7:00am and 6:00pm" (Ekiti State of Nigeria, 2016: 3-4).

Section 4(1) forbids herdsmen to carry firearms and other offensive weapons while grazing animals, making offenders liable for the charge of terrorism. This was directly aimed at criminalizing the carrying of all categories of weapons (including AK 47) with which pastoralists (a.k.a. 'herdsmen') have hacked down their numerous victims with impunity. Subsection (2) provides for the confiscation by government of cattle or other ruminants found to be grazing freely while Subsection (3) makes provision for the valuing and payment of compensation by herdsmen for property or farm products destroyed by herdsmen and, or

their cattle. Section 6 empowers the Commissioner (of Agriculture or his representative) to make rules for the enforcement of the provisions of the Law.

Section 7 provides for penalty in case of breach of any of the provisions of the Law. It states:

Any person who contravenes any Order made under Section 2 or any rule made under Section 6 commits an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a period not less than six months without any option of fine.

Policymaking may ordinarily be acrimonious, but implementation is often more complex irrespective of the environment. Indeed, as Olugbenga (2012) has argued elsewhere, implementation is the graveyard of policy. This is where policy resources, the determination of policy entrepreneurs, gladiators and ideologues to implement policy with results get tested. It is the phase where policy opponents, interests whose voices might not have been heard at earlier stages of policy, or who chose to remain silent for various reasons often rear their heads. Such groups are 'the dogs that do not bark' but can bite. Therefore, in order to promote implementation of the law, the Ekiti State Government inaugurated the Ekiti State Grazing Enforcement Marshals (EGEM), a public security outfit dedicated to the implementation of the Cattle Grazing Regulation Law in the state.

Reactions to the Law

Since its signing into law on 30th October 2016, the grazing regulation law has received varying reactions from different groups, ranging from full acceptance to calculated rejection (depending on what is at stake and how individuals and groups will be affected). These include adulations by communities and states at the receiving end of herdsmen's attacks as well as media houses, some of which ran editorials to commend Ekiti State Government for the initiative (*Nigerian Tribune*, September 8, 2016; *The Sun*, September 13, 2016). It is therefore not surprising that several state houses of assembly have commenced processes aimed at making similar laws in their states while residents of other states have urged their legislatures to emulate the Ekiti example.

Other reactions have included threats of reprisals, indicating attitudes of calculated ethnic chauvinism with divisive potentials and continued violence rather than of unity and peace in Nigeria. Notable among such was MACBAN's immediate rejection of the law and its call for the withdrawal of EGEM Marshalls. Also, herdsmen from Kwara State under the auspices of *Jamu Nate Fulbe* Association of Nigeria contested the possession of powers by the Ekiti State House of Assembly to charge erring herdsmen for carrying light weapons while grazing cattle. The two associations also demanded an apology from the governor (Nwaoko, 2016a, 2016c). MACBAN's legal adviser also contended that the grazing law was not in consonance with Nigeria's anti-terrorism law.

However, in spite of his occupation of the office of President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, his identity as a Fulani and his closeness to MACBAN as its grand patron which gives him ample opportunities to call the Fulani herdsmen to order, President Muhammadu Buhari did not intervene in the crises of herdsmen's attacks on human beings, farmlands and properties in Ekiti State and other parts of the country, either to identify or bring the culprits to book. This comes into bolder relief in the case of 2016 Christmas day massacre of Christians in southern Kaduna by assailants who were later identified by Governor el-Rufai of Kaduna State to be Fulani cattle rearers both from Nigeria and other West African countries. He owned up to identifying them and paying them to stop further killings of Christians and other people in southern Kaduna (PM News, 2016).

Effects of the Law

The immediate effect of the Cattle Grazing Control Law was the restriction of cattle movement and grazing in daytime. In the few cases of breach, erring cattle were confiscated on the order of the state government while their herders ran into the bush to avoid arrest. However, some cattle herders were arrested and prosecuted for violating the law and for destroying farm produce. They were sentenced to jail without an option of fine according to the law. However, this has resulted in an unanticipated outcome: Fulani cattle herders growing more violent with farmers and residents while grazing cattle in daytime even on the outskirts of Ado-Ekiti, the state capital (Interview with residents and farmers off Afao Road, Ado-Ekiti, January 3, 2017).

Another effect of the law has been night grazing of cattle by herders who steal farm produce, feed their cattle on the remaining and set the farm and the left-over ablaze to make room for grass to grow quickly to feed their cattle in the nearest future! This has been the experience of Igbira farmers in Erinfun and environs near the Federal Polytechnic, Ado-Ekiti, a situation that has led to threats and counter-threats with Fulani cattle herders in the area (Interview with an anonymous informant on Tuesday, January 24, 2017).

The making, reactions to and implementation of the 'Prohibition of Cattle and other Ruminants Grazing in Ekiti State Law No. 4 of 2016' brings to the fore, the conflicts between citizenship, religion and ethnicity in Nigeria. This is significant considering the fact that there are many ethnic nationalities with constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion and worship in Nigeria. Since all are equal before the law, government is not expected to promote any ethnic group or religion above others or at the expense of others. Also, no lawful economic activity or engagement (such as cattle herding or farming) is to be promoted or allowed by government to override others by force. Thus, the silence of the Federal Government at the wanton killings, destruction of farmlands and forceful take-over of entire communities from their traditional owners by Fulani herdsmen in Nigeria are evidences of complicity and an open invitation to anarchy in the country.

The way Forward

Given the trajectory of farmer/pastoralist conflict, its many negative consequences in Nigeria, the results of many earlier researches on the problem and the findings of the present study that has examined an old problem from new perspectives, the following recommendations are made towards resolving the problem conclusively:

First, self-interest (in economic, religious or ethnic ties) has caused many government functionaries to get emotionally involved to the extent of at least acquiescing to the attacks and conflicts if only by doing nothing where they should act or by secretly supplying groups with ammunition. Blench (2003:11), for instance, asserts that alternative dispute resolution mechanisms sponsored by government until the 1970s worked in favour of herders' interests. The powerful group of government functionaries, politicians and the nobility (who actually own many of the cattle herded by pastoralists) must divest themselves from the crises for peace to prevail. To this extent, laws should be made to criminalize support for parties in conflict without an option of fine if found guilty. Also, as part of the resolution, there should be commissions of inquiry into recent farmer/pastoralist clashes in Benue, Kaduna and other states in the country.

Second, the resort to violence by farmers and herders suggest that existing policies are not working equitably in favour of all groups. History shows that former land use acts and other instruments for the control of animal grazing were faulted by different groups, and that the

federal government has either been unwilling or out-rightly incapable of providing workable solutions. Thus, the various state legislatures should learn from history, take a cue from the Ekiti State House of Assembly and make appropriate laws and design policies to counter the problem within the contexts of the constitution and knowledge of local conditions before disagreements escalate into conflicts. In the meanwhile, affected communities and pastoralist groups should be encouraged to deepen consultation by working out mutually beneficial arrangements for multiple use of land and other resources in a peaceful manner. Since all parties do not have absolute trust in government based on antecedents, reputable local and international agencies should be encouraged to act as observers and trainers of the various groups in conflict management and resolution mechanisms. Such agencies can also act as safety nets when resource management fails.

Third, since resource scarcity is a major cause of the conflicts, efforts should be made to ensure that future development has no effect on such resources, especially arable and grazing land. Thus, government should amend and fine-tune the Land Use Act, other existing land use instruments and gazette existing resources to redirect land use practices in line with international best practices and Nigeria's need for stability and peaceful ethnic/occupational coexistence of her diverse peoples. For example, statistics from the National Livestock Project Division (2008, cited in Gbaka, 2014) identified un-gazetted ten (10) grazing reserves in Benue State which has one of the highest figures of encroachment-related farmer/pastoralist conflicts in Nigeria's recent history. There is, therefore, a need to gazette existing grazing reserves, create new ones where necessary, designate and monitor livestock routes (as the Ekiti State Grazing Policy has done) and separate these from farmlands with the consent of pastoralist and farmer groups in order to reduce tension and conflict.

Fourth, it has been difficult to apprehend and identify perpetrators of attacks because of weak security and national identity systems. Border security is insufficient and the national identification system does not capture many citizens and foreigners living in, entering or doing business in Nigeria. It is therefore important to strengthen both Nigeria's border security as well as citizens' and foreigners' identification systems as a matter of policy. Due to the itinerant nature of the pastoral job and the fact that pastoralists carry unlicensed weapons illegally, they should be made to register and obtain identification cards and grazing permits from government. Farmers should also obtain annual identification cards and land use permits from government. Revenue from these sources will help offset the cost of land cultivation and grazing management services, protect genuine pastoralists and farmers from false accusations and help check the activities of 'unknown foreign pastoralists' who are actually a security threat to Nigeria.

Finally, the Federal Government must be fair to all citizens (no matter their ethnic identity or religious inclinations) in addressing farmer/pastoralist clashes in order to prove that the country remains secular and to preserve Nigeria's unity in spite of the diversity of her peoples. Failure by the Federal Government to do so will cause state governments to seek to protect their citizens and their occupations independently by various means. This will amount to the pursuit of peace by pieces, which can be detrimental to our collective welfare, unity and eventually, survival of the Nigerian state in its present form.

CONCLUSION

Fulani herdsmen/farmers' conflict in Nigeria is a problem that is historically situated at the intersection of agricultural/land use policy and the political economy of ethnic relations. Therefore, it requires careful attention due to the delicate relationships and sensibilities which it engenders, as has already been demonstrated in this paper. Handling such delicate issues in a

consistently predictable manner to achieve peace, unity and progress in multi-ethnic, multi-religious secular federal states like Nigeria requires specific regulatory policies that are not only transparent but also agreeable to a broad spectrum of stakeholders within the policy arena. Although the problem cuts across several countries in Africa, no continent-wide solution has been found for it even when countries have attempted to address the problem using different approaches including pastoralism, sedentarism and expulsion, among others. Experiences demonstrate that no single approach can be easily replicated in other countries due to historical reasons. Invariably, each country will have to seek solutions within the ambit of its specific circumstances and historical experiences. In all, however, there is an expectation that the policy approach is capable of handling most situations to achieve desired ends.

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Appendix

Table 1: Some documented recent incidences of violence, killing and arson involving herdsmen and agriculturists/host communities in Nigeria.

S/N	Date	Location	Incident
1.	June 13, 2001	Benue State	A Fulani herdsman trespassed into the farm of Iortimin Umande, a Tiv farmer. When the farmer challenged him, the herdsman drew his dagger and stabbed the farmer to death. The crisis led to more loss of lives.
2.	September 5, 2001	Ikyiaor, about 25 kilometres from Wukari	Using automatic firearms, Fulani herdsmen attacked the village in an early morning rain. 12 natives and 2 Igbo traders resident in the community were killed.
3.	July 8, 2012	Maseh, Riyom LGA, Plateau State	Senator Gyang Dantong and Mr. Gyang Fulani died during a stampede at the burial of 50 victims of Fulani herdsmen's attacks
4.	September 30, 2012	Isoko North Local Government Council, Delta State.	A Fulani herdsman was accused of murdering the Director of Personnel Management of the Local Government Council
5.	April 23, 2013	Mbasenge, Guma Local Government Council, Benue State	10 farmers were killed in an attack by Fulani herdsmen
6.	May 7, 2013	Agatu Local Government Council, Benue State	47 mourners were gunned while burying two policemen
7.	May 14, 2013	Agatu Local Government Council, Benue State	More than 200 herdsmen surrounded Ekwo-Okpanchenyi community and killed 40 people
8.	July 5, 2013	Nzorov, Guma Local Government Council, Benue State	20 people were killed in a conflict between Tiv farmers and herdsmen
9.	July 28, 2013	Agatu Local Government Council, Benue State	Fulani herdsmen staged a reprisal attack on two villages, killing 8 people in revenge of an alleged killing of 112 cows
10.	November 7, 2013	Ikpele and Okpopolo communities	Herdsmen killed 7 people and displaced about 6000 inhabitants
11.	November 9, 2013	Agatu Local Government Area, Benue State	Herdsmen killed 36 people and overrun seven villages during a fight with the host communities
12.	April 5, 2014	Galadima village, Zamfara State	Herdsmen killed 200 people and wounded many during an attack on a village meeting
13.	2011-2014	Benue State	Herdsmen invaded, attacked and overrun 14 out of the 23 local government councils in Benue State. The death toll from herdsmen's attacks in Benue State for the period amounted to about 1,269.
14.	June, 2015	Motokun village, Patigi Local Government Area, Kwara State	Herdsmen attacked the village with many lives lost, others wounded and property destroyed
15.	June, 2015	Oro-Ago community, Ifelodun Local Government Area, Kwara State	Herdsmen attacked the village
16.	June, 2015	Ninji and Ropp villages, Plateau State	Herdsmen attacked the villages, killing 27 people and specifically, 70 other people believed to be Christians.
17.	September, 2015	Onitsha-Ukwuani, Ndokwa West Local Government Council, Delta State	Attack by herdsmen left 3 people dead
18.	September, 2015	Edo State	3 herdsmen raped and killed a middle-aged woman
19.	October 2, 2015	Ogun State	Herdsmen raped and killed residents. This was quickly followed by several other attacks on several communities by herdsmen
20.	November 1, 2015	Ulaja and Ojeh communities, Dekina Local Government Council, Kogi	Herdsmen attack left 22 people dead
21.	December 1, 2015	Ofagbe community, Isoko North Local Council, Delta State	Herdsmen killed one person
22.	January 24,	Vunokilang, Girei Local	Herdsmen killed Okezie Okoroafor, the Divisional Police Officer in

	2016	Council, Adamawa State	charge of Vunokilang Police Station and 29 others
23.	February, 2016	Tom-Anyiin, Tom-Ataan, Mbaya and Tombu, Buruku Local Council, Benue State	Herdsmen attacked the communities twice between 1 st and 8 th February. Each attack left 10 people dead while the second attack displaced over 300 people
24.	February 11, 2016	Abbi community, Uzo-Uwani Local Council	Herdsmen killed two siblings, burnt houses and motorcycles
25.	February 29, 2016	Agatu Local Council, Benue State	Herdsmen killed 500 local people and displaced about 7000 others
26.	March 9, 2016	Ngorukgan, Tse Chia, Deghkia Nhumbe, Logo Local Council, Benue State	Herdsmen killed 8 residents in an attack
27.	April 5, 2016	Benue State	Herdsmen-farmers' clash led to the death of Mr. Aondohemba Kasa, APC Youth Leader and 3 others.
28.	April, 2016	Ubulu-Uku, Aniocha Local Council, Delta State	Herdsmen destroyed farmlands in 63 communities and killed the monarch of Ubulu-Uku
29.	April 8, 2016	Ondo State	Herdsmen kidnapped and killed Chief Olu Falae's security guard at his farm
30.	April 9, 2016	Edo State	Herdsmen killed Alex, a 64-year old farmer and razed down his camp
31.	April 2016	Apa-Bunu, Kabba-Bunu Local Council, Kwara State	5 herdsmen kidnapped Oba Adebisi Obademi, the traditional ruler of Apa-Bunu on his way to a neighbouring community
32.	April 12, 2016	Dori and Mesuma, Taraba State	Herdsmen attacked the villages, killing at least 15 people
33.	April 19, 2016	Lagun village, Lagelu Local Council, Oyo State	18 herdsmen invaded farms, shooting Mr. Jimmy Adio dead.
34.	April 25, 2016	Uzo-Uwani Local Council, Enugu State	Herdsmen's attack left 40 people dead
35.	April 27, 2016	Obiaruku, Ukwani Local Council, Enugu State	Herdsmen unleashed terror and held 8 farmers hostage for hours
36.	2011	Irele-Ekiti, Ikole Local Council, Ekiti State	Fulani herdsmen ganged up and killed a police officer following intervention of the police in a clash between herdsmen and natives. The police vacated the area since that incident.
37.	May 20, 2016	Oke-Ako Ekiti, Ikole Local Council, Ekiti State	Fulani herdsmen's attacks killed 2 people and injured 11 others over disagreements on cattle grazing on natives' farmlands
38.	November 13, 2016	Villages in Kamaru Ward, Kauru Local Government Area of Kaduna State	Fulani herdsmen's attacks left 31 people dead and 45 houses burnt
39.	December 25, 2016	Four local government councils in the South of Kaduna State	808 Christians killed in Southern Kaduna, farm produce worth millions of Naira destroyed and many towns forcefully taken over by suspected Fulani cattle herdsmen. Earlier, the state Governor (a Fulani Muslim) had identified and paid the Fulani killers (including Fulanis from neighbouring African countries) who took part in a former orgy of killings to 'induce' them to stop killing (The Vanguard, December 3, 2016). The measure achieved the opposite in a massacre of 808 Christians on Christmas day!

Sources: Various sources including Alubo (2006), Oyeyipo and James, 2016, nigeriatoday@<http://www.signalng.com>, other internet sources and many documented eyewitness accounts of incidents of violence.