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Archives of Business Research – Vol. 11, No. 5

Publication Date: May 25, 2023

DOI:10.14738/abr.115.14685.

Hunter, R. J., Shannon, J. H., Amoroso, H. J., & Lozada, H. R. (2023). A Teaching Note on Unconscionable and Adhesive Contracts.

Archives of Business Research, 11(5). 54-71.

Services for Science and Education – United Kingdom

A Teaching Note on Unconscionable and Adhesive Contracts

Richard J. Hunter

Seton Hall University, and Business Law,

Collins College of Business, University of Tulsa

John H. Shannon

Seton Hall University

Henry J. Amoroso

Department of Economics and

Legal Studies, Seton Hall University

Hector R. Lozada

Institute for International Business

Seton Hall University

ABSTRACT

In this article, the authors, professors of legal studies, joined by a colleague from the

discipline of marketing, write about the topic of unconscionability as it relates to

the common law doctrines of “freedom of contract,” caveat emptor, and contracts of

adhesion. Unconscionability can be a “threshold” discussion, or it can be considered

at another point in a business law or legal environment of business course under

the topic of “genuineness of assent.”

Keywords: unconscionability, caveat emptor, adhesion, boiler plate contract, “as is”

clause

INTRODUCTION

Under the early common law, courts would regularly enforce contracts entered into by parties

under a principle known as freedom of contract—even contracts that appeared to be one-sided,

unfair, oppressive, burdensome, or unconscionable. Cserne (2021) writes:

“Freedom of contract is a principle of law, expressing three related ideas: Parties should be free

to choose their contracting partners (“party freedom”), to agree freely on the terms of their

agreement (“term freedom”), and where agreements have been freely made, parties should be

held to their bargains (“sanctity of contract”). A key contribution of economics to contract law

scholarship has been to systematize and rationalize both the principle and its limits in terms of

social welfare.”

Jensen (2020) comments that “As a general principle, parties should have the freedom to

contract. Courts should only intervene when the contract ‘violates some principle which is of

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Hunter, R. J., Shannon, J. H., Amoroso, H. J., & Lozada, H. R. (2023). A Teaching Note on Unconscionable and Adhesive Contracts. Archives of Business

Research, 11(5). 54-71.

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/abr.115.14685.

even greater importance to the general public’” (citing Christensen v. Eggen, 1998, p. 221).

Jensen (2020) continues: “People have a right to make legal contracts and to expect the courts

to honor and give binding effect to their agreements. . .. So important and unfettered is the right

to contract that courts have no authority to invalidate unwise or improvident agreements or to

rewrite them so as to achieve a fairer bargain for one party or another”(citing Pollock-Halvorson

v. McGuire, 1998).

The principle of freedom of contract was embodied in the concept of "caveat emptor," translated

as "let the buyer beware." Caveat emptor has been expressed in the following phrase: “Qui

ignorare non debuit quod jus alienum emit," which means "let a purchaser, who ought not be

ignorant of the amount and nature of the interest, which he is about to buy, exercise proper

caution" (quoted in Ollerman v. O’Rourke, 1980).

The Development of a Doctrine of Unconscionability

Jha (2020) discussed the chronology of the development of unconscionability as a doctrine that

would challenge the principle of absolute freedom of contract. The first indication that a break

from caveat emptor was possible under contract law can be traced to opinion of the United

States Supreme Court in Post v Jones (1857), where the Court noted:

“The contrivance of an auction sale under such circumstances, where the master of the

Richmond was hopeless, helpless, and passive — where there was no market, no money, no

competition — where one party had absolute power and the other no choice but submission —

where the vendor must take what is offered or get nothing — is a transaction which has no

characteristic of a valid contract.”

This concept was further explored in United States v Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1942), where the

court discussed the issues of bargaining power and inequality:

“But is there any principle which is more familiar or more firmly embedded in the history of

Anglo-American law than the basic doctrine that the courts will not permit themselves to be

used as instruments of inequity and injustice? Does any principle in our law have more

universal application than the doctrine that courts will not enforce transactions in which the

relative positions of the parties are such that one has unconscionably taken advantage of the

necessities of the other?”

The development of the concept unconscionability, however, remained with the courts and not

with the legislature (see Diener, 2016). Jha (2020) notes: “The landmark judgment which

brought about this change ... was that of Campbell Soup Co. v Wentz (1948), in which the court

opined ‘We do think, however, that a party who has offered and succeeded in getting an

agreement as tough as this one is, should not come to a chancellor and ask court help in the

enforcement of its terms. That equity does not enforce unconscionable bargains is too well

established to require elaborate citation.’”

Writing for the court in Jones v. Star Credit (1969), Judge Wachtler court noted: “There was a

time when the shield of ‘caveat emptor’ would protect the most unscrupulous in the

marketplace—a time when the law, in granting parties unbridled latitude to make their own

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Archives of Business Research (ABR) Vol. 11, Issue 5, May-2023

Services for Science and Education – United Kingdom

contracts, allowed exploitive and callous practices which shocked the conscience of both

legislative bodies and the courts.”

In Wille v. Southwestern Bell (1976), the court reflected:

“American Courts have traditionally taken the view that competent adults may make contracts

on their own terms, provided they are neither illegal nor contrary to public policy, and that in

the absence of fraud, mistake, or duress, a party who has fairly and voluntarily entered into

such a contract is bound thereby, notwithstanding it was unwise or disadvantageous to him.

Gradually, however, this principle of "freedom of contract" has been qualified by the Courts as

they were confronted by contracts so one-sided that no fair-minded person would view them

as tolerable.”

The Wille court had also provided its own insight into the origins of unconscionability, noting

that “An early definition of unconscionability was provided by Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, in

the case of Chesterfield v. Jensen (1750):

“A contract that such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on one hand,

and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other; which are unequitable and

unconscientious bargains; and of such even the Common Law has taken notice.”

The modern basis for unconscionability appears in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Section

2-302 (Swanson, 2001), which changed the essential relationship between the parties from

"caveat emptor" to "caveat venditor," or let the seller beware (Kagan, 2023). Under the analysis

found in the UCC, the purpose of the doctrine of unconscionability is twofold: “prevention of

oppression (sometimes called substantive unconscionability) and unfair surprise (procedural

unconscionability).”

The court in Davis v. TWC Dealer Group, Inc. (2019) underscored this duality of purpose and

approach:

“The judicially created doctrine of unconscionability has both a procedural and a substantive

element, the former focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the

latter on overly harsh or one-sided results. Both procedural and substantive

unconscionability must both be present in order for a court to refuse to enforce a contract

under the doctrine of unconscionability. But they need not be present in the same degree. In

other words, the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of

procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is

unenforceable, and vice versa.”

In fashioning Section 2-302, the writers of the Uniform Commercial Code intentionally failed to

provide a precise definition of the term "unconscionable" in the belief that to do so might be to

limit and defeat the purposes of the rule. Farnsworth (1999, p. 310) stated: “Nowhere among

the Code's many definitions is there one for unconscionability. That the term is incapable of

precise definition is a source of both strength and weakness." Judge Harmon in Wille v.

Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (1976) added: “This doctrine received its greatest

impetus when it was enacted as a part of the Uniform Commercial Code but the writers did not