

# Evaluating Public Private Partnership (PPP) Contracts For Service Delivery By Kalangala Infrastructure Services Limited In Kalangala District, Uganda

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## ABSTRACT

The paper evaluates performance of an Implementation Agreement of 16<sup>th</sup>, January, 2009 between Kalangala Infrastructure Services Limited (KIS) and government of Uganda, regarding Ferry Operations between Bukakata and Luku Landing Sites across Lake Victoria, for the benefit of people of Kalangala District. The objective of the study was to establish whether key stakeholders who have been left out in the agreement can have their concerns addressed; and, whether KIS which monitors and evaluates itself in the project can provide the right quality of service to intended beneficiaries. Purposive and simple Random methods were applied on a sample of 105 correspondents selected from a population of 125 stakeholders using a case study design. Opinions were built basing on data from interviewing and document review. A Qualitative analysis of findings indicated lack of consultation, participation and feedback to key stakeholders. It was also established that stakeholders were denied a chance to and evaluate the project by KIS appointing & paying its own monitor. Based on the above the project fell short of transparency, accountability and value for money. The study recommended a holistic approach involving community participation across the project cycle to ensure service quality, value for money, ownership and sustainability.

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## INTRODUCTION

According to UN Women, the standards of M&E must value principles of participation and involvement of key stakeholders, including programme implementers, beneficiaries, local officials, and other observers such as related civil society groups (UN Women Annual Report 2017-2018). Since M&E is critical for deducing chances for program success (Gage and Dunn 2010).

The people of Kalangala District have for a long time had a problem of crossing from the islands across L. Victoria to the main land linking to the rest of Uganda. In response to this problem, the government of the Republic of Uganda decided to enter a PPP to provide ferry services. The implementation agreement of this arrangement provides for an oversight committee that handles coordination, policy guidance, dispute resolution, discussion of KIS status reports and determining terms and conditions of the implementation agreement. This committee includes government Ministries and Agencies, a district engineer representing Kalangala District and the company (KIS) itself, but excludes key stakeholders that include

local leaders, institutions, business operators and the community members who are meant to be the key beneficiaries to this project (Implementation Agreement, Clause 4.1). In addition, Clause 1.3(b) of the implementation agreement authorizes KIS to appoint an expert to monitor its operations and activities and verify information from KIS regarding claims for payment; an indication that KIS monitors itself. This further alienates the above mentioned key stakeholders who are supposed to participate in monitoring and evaluating the performance of the project. This research therefore seeks to bridge the gaps by raising questions on how stakeholders who have been left out of the implementation process can have their concerns addressed and how a service provider (KIS) who monitors himself can provide the right quality of service to intended beneficiaries. Monitoring and evaluation principles will be exploited for purposes of bridging identified gaps in the implementation of the ferry service project.

### **JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY**

The rationale of the study was a result of the realization that there was limited information concerning interventions in delivering water transport services through PPP in Uganda. The research done on KIS ferry operations in Kalangala district will therefore be used to fill this knowledge gap.

### **AUTHORS' CONTRIBUTION**

The study provides information on operation of ferry services by Kalangala Infrastructure Services (KIS). The information will be a basis for assessing the quality of service provided by public private partnerships in Uganda. The research findings will be used as a reference material for future scholars interested in public private partnerships.

### **RELATED LITERATURE AND THEORY**

#### **The Agency Theory**

The study was guided by the Agency Theory that has been widely used across a variety of disciplines since its inception four decades ago (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hirsch and Friedman, 1986). The agency theory applies to most relationship situations (Majone, 2001) in which one party, the principal, delegates authority for control and decision making about certain tasks to another party, the agent (David W Parker et al., 2018). The essential assumption underlying the agency theory is that agents are essentially selfish opportunists who, unless monitored effectively, will exploit their principals (Miller and Whitford, 2007). The information asymmetry that exists between agents and their more distant principals provide the basis for opportunism.

The agency theory has been used to explain relationships in the field of economics and finance (Sappington, 1991), political science (Moe, 1984), social sciences (Shapiro, 2005), information systems (Mahaney and Lederer, 2011) and management (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). More recently, it has been applied to supply chain management (Zu, X et al., 2012) and project management (Forsythe et al., 2015; Ceric, 2012). The theory was first formulated in the economics literature (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973) as a quantitative and conceptual approach to investigate the nature of resulting costs. Subsequently, an empirical focus has emerged to explore organizational behaviour and corporate governance (Cuevas-Rodríguez et al., 2012). In a more adjunct capacity, is the research in trust and relationships (Brewer and Strahorn, 2012; Zwikael and Smyrk, 2015; Aubert and Kelsey, 2000), asymmetric information (Ceric, 2012; Xiang et al., 2012), communication (Turner and Müller, 2004; Diallo and Thuillier, 2005), and the extensive

literature on project risks and their management (Maqsood, 2011), and risks in construction contracts through the lens of a principal-agent model (Chang 2014).

Because the project owner has limited resources, such as time or specialist knowledge, a person or entity is contracted to perform specific activities required to complete the project. Subsequently, Mitnick (2013) asserted that all contractual arrangements contain important elements of agency. The more the interests between the agent and the principal align, the higher the probability that the agent will work in the principal's interest (Cuevas-Rodríguez et al., 2012). The agency theory proffers that the principal will need to use control mechanisms such as monitoring referred to as "agency costs" (Xiang et al., 2012). However, Forsythe et al. (2015) researched information asymmetry within a building information modeling system to find that such a system can provide identical information impartially. While asymmetric information may lead to mistrust and opportunistic behaviour, it also leads to potential risks (Ceric, 2012). While parties in an agency relationship may have conflicting attitudes towards risk and sharing risk, these parties may prefer different actions or make different decisions because of their risk perspective (Ceric, 2012). Risks associated with information asymmetry (Jäger, 2008) are that characteristics, information and intentions are all hidden (Winch, 2010). But can be resolved through incentivizing (Hockenbury and Hockenbury, 2003). Projects provide the environment in which agency problems are likely to occur (Bredin and Söderlund, 2011). Projects define necessary skill requirements, one of which involves close collaboration between experts of various disciplinary fields and areas of expertise. However, most project risks are not technical but managerial (Shenhar and Dvir, 2007). Managers therefore have generally four options for responding to risk: avoid; transfer; mitigate; or accept (Chang, 2014). Responses to agency problems would be avoidance, although it is difficult to achieve as it would result in the principal acting as the project manager which is often not feasible. The principal could simply not continue with the project because a project manager would not be able to be appointed. This theory was used to explain the relationships between PPPs and service delivery at KIS ferry services limited.

### **Need for Service delivery for Kalangala water transport**

Service delivery refers to how best the service provider meets or exceeds specifications of customer requirements or preferences and it can be measured in terms of Responsiveness, reliability, convenience and empathy (Rauch, D.A et al., 2015). Nowadays, people not only want a quality service but the service which is convenient for them too. They are seeking for a convenience which saves their non-monetary costs that are time and effort and the service convenience provided by the companies is largely acknowledged by the customers (Kaura 2013). Service refers to a product or activity that meets the needs of a user or can be applied by a user while Service convenience refers to the degree of ease or strength a service user labours to use the service (Dai & Salam, 2014). Customer purchasing behavior is largely influenced by the convenience offered by the companies (Roy et al., 2016). Service convenience is basically aiming at reducing customer time and effort in obtaining the service. Accessibility of service providers through various ways and availability of service provider at convenient hours powerfully influence customer satisfaction. In a convenient location, they receive good care, there are good operating hours, and employees have an understanding of their needs (Kaura et al., 2015). So it makes sense to have an effective water transport in Kalangala since other systems like road and foot transport are rudimentary and take a lot of time, leave alone not supportive to vulnerable people in trading and sick one that want to access services like markets and hospitals in nearby areas of Masaka and Kampala that are not available in Kalangala district.

Service reliability that refers to the realization of assured service. It is the delivering of the appropriate service from the first visit on wards dependably and accurately. The accuracy and timeliness in the service provided (Britton and Rose, 2010). Service responsiveness refers to a situation where a company or service provider effectively and efficiently responds or reacts to customers' plea, complaints, advice or suggestions in order to close a gap or improve something in the service provided and willingness to help clients and give quick service. It is communicated to customers by the length of time they have to wait for assistance and attention to problems (Muhammad Awan et al., 2011). For example using a canoe or Motor boat from Kalangala to Masaka takes few people, it is risky and can not take cargo, so a Ferry system that is effective supports public water transport system more and more over, it is free of charge.

Service empathy that refers to giving individual attention to customers, was another issue to address, Empathy relates to customer satisfaction. With good communication and an understanding of customer needs and friendly behavior, empathy will be achieved (Ennew, C et al., 2013). In addition, the above authors assert that understanding customer expectations will influence better service quality. According to Niveen Saghier (2015) service quality can only be attained if companies give paramount attention to the tangibles (equipment, physical facilities, and appearance of personnel); reliability (ability to perform the promised service accurately and dependably); responsiveness (willingness to assist customers and offer prompt service); assurance (knowledge and courtesy of employees and their capability to communicate trust and confidence); and empathy (individualized attention and caring, provided to customers). These are things that an effective Water Transport System in the area was to address hence a PPP arrangement was thought needed at most, and so the study feels such thought deliverables were meant or what gaps that still exist and may need fixing for the betterment of good service delivery. The PPP was thought to be better than government itself delivering the service but after that what current performance indicators actually show, should tell whether Kalangala Infrastructure Services Limited is on the right track as per the agreed engagement over this water transport services in Kalangala District.

### **Public private partnerships (PPPs) and Service delivery**

In their Investigations on the relationship between PPP and service delivery, Andres et al. (2013) revealed a positive and significant affiliation between private sector participation and the coverage, quality of service and labor productivity of the analyzed utilities that reduces technical losses in a controlled institutional and regulatory environment. Furthermore, Estache and Saussier (2014) argue that PPIs can lead to improvements in efficiency, but do not necessarily do so. However, a justification was that PPPs can lead to efficiency gains in service delivery. There are many drivers of those efficiency gains in PPPs (World Bank 2014). Despite this, what one asks is that would the role of government in Support for better performance of this water transport, that is implemented by the private players. The world support for efficiency gains in service delivery should equally bound government to do an excellent job on Monitoring and evaluation of such projects and accordingly, the Kalangala Infrastructure Services Limited is hardly overseen from the study conducted, as it is left to implement the project with limited involvement of government and other stakeholders.

Regarding Public Private Partnerships of Design, Build, Finance, Maintain, and Operate (DBFMO) under which KIS ferry services lie, Willems (2014) argues that, in DBFMO Public Private Partnerships, the process of building and running a PPP does not allow for much involvement of other stakeholders. The stakeholders, citizens and societal groups, have limited opportunity for involvement because of the wide variety of rules that restrict the tendering

process. The emphasis in this tendering and negotiating process is very much on the interaction between the public and the private actors, and as a great deal of the information is valuable and not publicly available because it contains information on prices and tendering offers of private consortia. Willems is supported by [Verweij \(2015\)](#) who argues that after the tendering process is over, the content of the PPP projects has been at least partly determined, and often strongly determined, and involvement of stakeholders can only result in minor changes. In his in-depth analysis of two PPP projects one with a strong contractual character, and one with a mixed contractual and organizational character, concludes that internal managerial orientation and non-cooperation and low involvement of stakeholders are strongly related to the nature of the contract which favours achieving deadlines and agreed performance targets over any other aspect of the project. [Jeffares, Sullivan, & Bovaird \(2013\)](#), argue that partnership performance can be conceptualized in roughly two ways. One, performance can be narrowly conceived as the achievement of particular targets as set out in the contract and the efficiency of achieving those targets and two is when focusing on the wider support and interconnections beyond the contract. Monitoring and evaluation is also critical for developing objective conclusions regarding the extent to which programmes can be judged a “success” (Gage and Dunn 2009).And this is very relevant in a case at hand above. Government of Uganda can only monitor and evaluate Kalangala Infrastructure Services Limited based on set targets of delivering an effective water transport system for its people in Kalangala District.

### **Key Stakeholders involvement and service delivery**

Stakeholders refer to actors who are either affected or may affect or influence the execution of a given project directly or indirectly (Mainardes, et al., 2011). A stakeholder is anyone who may be affected by, or may affect a project (Olusegun 2014). In the case of infrastructural planning, stakeholders may include project donors, partner NGOs, government agencies, community participants and others. Stakeholder engagement refers to substantive, two-way dialogue between a company and its direct and indirect interested parties. These can help to Identify and prioritize infrastructural needs and opportunities, justify potential positive or negative impacts from extractives operations for risk mitigation, gather innovative ideas, identify community resources, encourage community member involvement in project design, implementation, and monitoring, identify and evaluate potential partners and monitor project impacts and ensure that development projects are meeting community expectations through negotiation processes (Ahadzi and Bowles, 2004). Macro-economic indicators affect the financial projections of PPP projects Chan et al., (2010). Stable macro-economic indicators allow investors to make realistic financial assessments of projects, Osei-Kyei and Chan, (2015). Yet stakeholder participation refers to measure of the degree at which stakeholders directly or indirectly engages in the producing and delivering the ferry services (Reed &Stringer 2016).And in the case above it is very limited as illusted above.

Feedback relates to the means by which management monitor progress as well as identifying project failures that are through organized communication mechanisms shared to inform learning and improvements (Freeman et al., 2010). Stakeholder consultations refer to the formal tapping of stakeholder inputs, expectations and knowledge to inform proper project planning and ownership (De Schepper, S. et al., 2014). Further, stakeholder engagement refers to gathering innovative ideas, identifying community resources, and encouraging community member involvement in project design, implementation, monitoring, identifying and evaluating potential partners, and monitoring project impacts to ensure that development projects are meeting community expectations (Olusegun Bamidele 2014).

The idea of a stakeholder/ beneficiary in a Public Private Partnership is however explained by various scholars in different perspectives; De Bettignies & Ross (2009) argue that there is little evidence that democratic considerations have made a significant impact on the governance arrangements for Public Private Partnerships. D'Alessandro, Bailey, & Giorgino, (2014) argue that usually the presence of a tight contract is because of a narrow technocratic treatment of risk, seen as one of the main reasons for the limited involvement of stakeholders. To Hodge & Greve, 2005; Weihe, (2008), Public Private Partnership projects are technical in their nature and, furthermore, that the negotiations are about sensitive financial deals which preclude the involvement of other stakeholders. According to local leaders interviewed there are no periodical reports that the district council receives about the success stories or challenges that Kalangala Infrastructure Services limited faces and in that way the ppp arranged is bound to either be exploitative to the beneficiary, like the people who use its services and the local staff that work for it. In a normal functioning PPP arrangements, government agency involvement should be timely in controlling transport charges and wages for the local plus proper critical management innovations like periodical mechanical repairs so as to assure an effective service.

Lori Schoenhard (2014), states that Public Private Partnership stakeholders provide expertise due to wealth of knowledge they have about current processes, historical information and insight that aids in risk prevention because they know project needs and constraints. Companies might also face regulatory risks that often come with high implementation costs. The above views had been compounded by Mette Morsing and Majken Schultzn (2006) who argued that companies should not only influence but also seek to be influenced by stakeholders, and therefore change when necessary.

### **Monitoring, Evaluation System and service delivery**

Effective and planned monitoring and evaluation is vital for mainstreaming citizen and managerial accountability and boosts service quality (Matsiliza, 2012). An M&E system when well designed, informs consistency in data collection, analysis and organizational learning as diverse departments can develop independent needs (Pasanen & Shaxson, 2016). Results oriented M&E training help to boost internal sustainability of M&E systems through on the job and off the job programs (Acevedo et al., 2010). Diverse projects across sectors are reported to offer an efficient means for mobilizing talented people to complete particular tasks (Project Management Institute, 2013). However, project work leads to frequent moves between temporary teams, which significantly influence personal relationships (Bredin and Söderlund, 2011). In this study, M&E systems were operationalized as the measures of value for money, transparency and accountability, and efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery.

Transparency explains the all-time constant dissemination or sharing of information about the services. Accountability refers to the responsibility by the heads as managers or staff of local units and governments to be answerable for their actions and inactions (Tisne 2010). Value for money refers to the worth of the project in terms of present costs and future benefits (World Bank 2013). The researcher's understanding of value for money is where benefits are either bigger or equal to costs. And according to Fisher (2011), effectiveness refers to the upgrading in managing projects with the aspiration to improve delivery on time and budget. Efficiency refers to the degree at which the project meets the operational requirements for cost, margins and asset utilization. It relates to doing things right. This refers to how productively inputs are translated into outputs. It further means that there should be maximum output with little cost. In other words efficiency measures the extent to which resources are maximally to accomplish

its goals and objectives, (Mario Arturo Ruiz Estrads et al., 2017). This in this study did not come out well as a practiced norm and it leaves gaps for an effective water transport system of the area.

Performance measurement is essential to business success, whether it is at the organization or project level. Due to complexities and limitations in public funding, the practice of partnerships has been preferred in procuring economic and social infrastructure projects. PPPs have been changed from ideological arguments about their advantages and disadvantages to focusing on how they can be structured to achieve public policy goals (Yong, 2010). To realize the predetermined outcomes and benefits of PPPs, it is necessary for key stakeholders to concentrate on performance improvements during the early development processes of the projects (Yong, 2010). However, they are at times. Moreover, an absence of effective performance measurement in PPPs can act as a trigger for producing below optimum service quality of infrastructure (Liu et al., 2013), as evidenced in this study

### **MATERIALS AND METHODS USED IN THE STUDY**

The study was carried out in Kalangala and Masaka districts. Focus was at Kalangala district headquarters, KIS main offices on Plot 5-6 Mwena Road, in Kalangala Town Council, communities using Luku landing site on Bugala Island and Bukakata landing site in Masaka district. A case study research design was preferred using qualitative approaches, methods (interviewing) and tools (Interview guides) to collect in depth information directly from key informants (Pasian, 2015). Documentary reviews guided in tapping secondary data that allowed the study to include contextual conditions that were pertinent to the analysis (Harris and Brown 2010). This allowed the researcher to make a deeper inquiry into the phenomenon under study. This study concentrated the *evaluation of Public private partnerships (PPP) contracts for service delivery* on ferry operations by Kalangala Infrastructure Services in Kalangala district that incorporated a total of 125 respondents and sample size 105 a sample size of 105 respondents drawn from a population of 125 determined using Krejcie & Morgan, 1970 table, purposively (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011). and simple randomly (Ritchie et al., 2013b: 60) selected from Kalangala district local government, civil society, and community leaders, Ministry of works officials, UNRA officials, KIS management and ferry users/beneficiaries since a sample is a part of the population which is studied in order to get inferences about the whole population as affirmed by Mligo, (2013:115). To ensure that the research results can be accurately interpreted and generalized to other populations, content validity index (Lichtman, 2010:151) and a test retest techniques (Saldana, 2012) were borrowed to enhance data quality control. The data was first sorted out around key central questions and used in pattern matching and explanation building. This was done to establish whether it would fit or fail the research questions, thereafter the researcher embarked on comparing responses (content analysis) under each theme while establishing similarities and differences with other responses, other literature and the researcher's opinions (Feig & Stokes, 2011:6). Finally the researcher drafted a report that details the findings while adhering to ethical standards of confidentiality, compliance, integrity, honesty and objectivity.

### **DISCUSSION OF RESULTS**

#### **Service delivery of KIS ferry operation**

According to the findings majority respondents agreed that KIS ferry services are timely and reliable. This can be justified by Niveen Saghier (2015) that service quality is featured by perceived quality, ability to perform the promised service accurately and dependably; the willingness to assist customers and offer prompt service; assurance, effective communication, trust and satisfaction. In agreement with the above, there is a strong affiliation between private

sector participation and perceived quality provided there is a supporting legal framework and reduction in technical losses (Andres et al., 2013). However, the same people still contended that there is a problem regarding responsiveness, convenience, and empathy.

For example majority comprehend this service as a road, but the service does not operate at night and if there are emergencies like sickness and women in labour they cannot access the service. Alternative means have to be sought. In terms of convenience, there are no sanitary facilities and material causing discomfort and a risk of spreading diseases in case of epidemics. In addition, there is no provision for shelter for passengers in transit for both sunny and rainy days making voyages uncomfortable. For example a single trip is meant to take 30 minutes but due to marine dynamics, including wind direction and turbulence and obstacles like fish nets which engulf the ferry propellers a single trip might end up taking over one hour making especially the sick, elderly and children physically, biologically and psychologically suffer. Equally in terms of empathy and care, the ferry has no ambulance support services.

There are very limited safety provisions, for example the floaters can only accommodate very few people in case of an accident. Life jackets are available but passengers are not trained on how to use them and the right size to guarantee individual passenger safety. There are also no swimming sessions for regular passengers and other safety skills pioneered by KIS. There is also no evidence of certification and insurance to guarantee standards and safety of both the ferry and passengers respectively. A minority group of elites among the leadership of the civil society and the community responded with an extremist view that KIS operations are suspicious since the entire implementation is held in secrecy. This implies that quality of service is still largely wanting until the above issues are addressed.

### **Stakeholder involvement and service delivery**

The first objective of this study was to establish whether key stakeholders who have been left out in the ferry service project implementation can have their concerns addressed. The findings showed that majority of respondents concurred with the documentary evidenced that key stakeholders were left out in the implementation of the KIS ferries agreement. Nevertheless a few technocrats from government departments indicated that they were consulted got engaged at one time or the other. However, the same people expressed discomfort on subsequent inconsistencies like the shift of the contract from 8 to 13 years, authority of KIS to own and mortgage landing sites legally owned by UNRA and where the latter was blocked from carrying out any activity on the landing sites without authorization from the former; and failure to show evidence of payment of share capital and claims of total ownership of the ferries by KIS at the end of the project. This explains the conflicts and challenges highlighted in the previous sub-headings. In practice, for PPP agreements to be efficiently and effectively implemented, the strategic plan has to be communicated to the stakeholders clearly, their input tapped, their power, influence and impact on the project rated before implementation.

The above contentions are in agreement with Lori Schoenhard, (2014), who stated that it is paramount for stakeholders and beneficiaries to be involved in PPP projects because they have the magic that provides expertise, intuition and valuable experience about issues that concerns them, on project constraints and risks and help in reducing and uncovering risk on public private partnerships by raising initial requirements, project needs, and constraints and propose alternative mitigation plans that increases chances for project sustainability.



As indicated above, there was no key stakeholder involvement, yet the agreement suited meeting the needs of people that are supposed to be engaged, consulted, and involved at agenda and problem analysis. A few participants would engage in planning, prioritizing, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, review and assessment of project impact. All these were sidelined by KIS. Involving knowledgeable stakeholders during this process would increase project success. By gathering and reviewing project requirements with stakeholders, KIS would get their buy-in, and increase chances of project success. By failing to meet stakeholders' needs and expectations and managing relationships through the project cycle KIS fell short of fulfilling a key requirement in delivering quality services to would be beneficiaries.

By marginalizing public institutions like UNRA, MoWT, MoFPED and their roles and responsibilities, the implementation agreement put KIS at a disadvantage whereby it would operate in a vague or un clear legal framework without checks and balances. As a result, the implementation of the ferry operation project was bound to be in perpetual conflict that would lead to failure on both sides. In this case, KIS is perceived as neither a partner nor agent, neither a monopoly nor a joint venture. It remains a suspicious entity that will neither deliver to stakeholder expectations nor gain from an acceptable, successful and sustainable business.

There is marginal transparency and accountability, conflict and conflicting interests by KIS, contrary to democratic scrutiny by the key institutions and representatives of the masses right from inception of the project. Hence KIS continues to operate in a vacuum with no clear sharing and feedback mechanisms. Outside the contract, there is no clear corporate social responsibility project that endears KIS to government, communities and the people of Kalangala. There is also no evidence of risk sharing and risk mitigation in the implementation of the project as activities of KIS continue to be questioned by both the government of Uganda and the people of Kalangala. There is also evidence of holding government and the people of Kalangala at ransom by stopping operations and cutting off the route whenever there is a slight delay in payment. This is coupled with government complaints on continuous increments on transport charges by KIS without basing on the Treasury bills. KIS is therefore perceived as an exploitative business operator who takes advantage of situations and institutional weaknesses to want it all and take it all irrespective of others' interests.

### **M & E System and service delivery**

The second objective of the study was to establish whether KIS which monitors and evaluates itself in ferry operations project can provide the right quality of service to intended beneficiaries. The M&E system according to this study is meant to ensure efficiency and effectiveness, transparency and accountability and value for money in KIS ferry operations. Ideally, an M&E system refers to institutional safeguards to ensure satisfactory performance measured basing on the results chain and theory of change. The result chain briefly reflects inputs, processes, out puts, outcomes and the impact in a given intervention while theory of change is an assumption that the planned interventions will deliver the desired results.

Majority of the respondents indicated that they do not know of any monitoring system by KIS in ferry operations and they have never participated in any way of monitoring KIS ferry operations. However, KIS has an internal auditor who only helps to check internal efficiency, effectiveness, and internal financial controls. The organization also employs Mott McDonald for monitoring and inspection to ensure among other things KIS does not lose money in the ferry project.

From document review, an oversight committee is supposed to guide, control and monitors the execution of the contract. This is in agreement with scholarly review that clear contractual

relations like terms of reference, institutional interrelations, trust of watchdogs, and supervision supplemented with independent audits are vital in sustaining PPPs (Zwikael and Smyrk 2015). Others explain that PPPs contain government or public departments headed by trustees and agents who risk public funds, information asymmetry suggest having control, monitoring events and demanding for accountability in public interest to mitigate issues of incremental agency costs (Cuevas-Rodríguez et al., 2012). Competitive bidding in PPP engagements attracts innovation, diversity and quality of services offered compared to the conventional procurement method (Chou and Pramudawardhani, 2015). And this relieves governments of financial burden to commit more resources to only capitalistic projects and registering “value for money” in public infrastructure (Chou and Pramudawardhani, 2015).

The claim that KIS monitors and evaluates itself is true since the terms of reference are not clear on the responsibility of other parties to the contract. The memorandum of understanding seems to be patronizing KIS alone as the untouchable. Many specifications in the contract are said to be violated and conflicting with the physical implementation. The contract is not fair to the government. There is no equity, no economy, no efficiency, no effectiveness and no value for money. It looks like there was no base line study, no proper planning, and no stakeholder representation, no legal, technical and financial audit by the independent arms of government. The MoU seems to have no ongoing supervision, M&E system and technical benchmarks on financial, operational and environmental risks. The short term and long-term cost implications on government and social-cultural impact are not put into considerations. The results chain is less factored in this KIS implementation agreement.

Secondly, since government is complaining, on the cost overruns, value for money, limited participation, lack of transparency and accountability, technocrats and politicians are complaining regarding access to the implementation agreement, and amendments to the same, it means they were deliberately denied the opportunity to participate in monitoring the project. This means there is no assurance of quality services.

Since long-term outcomes and effects, risk mitigation plan, feedback mechanisms, and shares of either party in relation to gains and losses are not clear, there is no way to ascertain the expected and desired benefits from the project. Since documents are handled in secrecy and KIS activities are not easily controlled, empirical evidence cannot be adduced to prove the quality of services provided. Such practices contradict the principles and standards of M&E. Such a limitation on participation conflicts with the principal of sustainable procurement that emphasize nondiscriminatory, democratic participation, economy, value for money, transparency, and accountability that results into better value and priced goods and services (Uganda Financial Management Act 2015). These services seem to be profit oriented rather than customer driven. The findings of this study show challenges encountered in implementing the ferry operations project are an impediment to the successful realization of quality services. For example, the introduction of passenger cards to assist in ascertaining the number of passengers per trip would be a good M&E measure but is not consistent hence exposing the ferry to overloading risks and inconsistencies in expected M&E results.

### **LESSONS LEARNT, CHALLENGES, AND LIMITATIONS**

Borrowing from the key tenets of Agency theory which hold that the agency theory applies to most relationship situations in which one party, the principal, delegates authority for control

and decision making about certain tasks to another party, the agent (David W Parker et al., 2018). Agents are essentially selfish opportunists who, unless monitored effectively, will exploit their principals by hiding performance information so they either have to be incentivized or audited to match agreed standards (Miller and Whitford, 2007). Findings of the study indicate that KIS engagements closed out key stakeholders that include key public institutions and the community itself as a result project sustainability was put at stake as complaints and conflicts arose resulting from failure to consult, involve and communicate. The major conflict related to sidelining the legal framework and increasing financial claims from time to time without basing on Treasury Bills.

Secondly is holding government and the community at ransom by cutting off the route and halting operations whenever there are slight delays in payment. In addition, ferry project beneficiaries have no opportunity to monitor the project hence value for money cannot be ascertained and despite the ferry users appreciating the efficiency of this service, convenience, responsiveness, reliability and empathy that would qualify service quality remain wanting.

The study was limited by resource constraints. It necessitated varied financial and non-monetary inputs that could enable the researcher to generate the findings within the allocated time frame. However, alternative cash streams were deployed to attract funds and support in kind parents, friends and family members who contributed and enabled me to handle the escalating costs. On the other hand, some respondents could get biased on the study phenomenon, dodging questions and some reluctant to give core information due to personal interests and uncertainty; others gave wrong information due to bias. The researcher however delimited possible fear and bias by assuring respondents of utmost confidentiality and cooperation and asserted the purpose of information as being purely for academic reasons while showing them the introductory letter. However, there is need to involve the local community in the planning, initiation, formulation and execution of PPP projects to ensure ownership and sustainability. Even where there is need for expertise and consultancy in baseline and feasibility studies, the local communities and intended beneficiaries must be represented. Planning for PPP projects should take a bottom-up approach to bring the people directly into the process of implementing projects that will improve their quality of life. PPP plans should be clearly communicated to those involved in the process including the private partner. Inclusive development and cross-cutting issues need to be factored in whenever PPP engagements are being planned and executed to cater for minority interests.

On the M&E side, there is urgent need for a government policy to provide for a professional M&E officer to be incorporated at every level of the procurement process to ensure key tenets of results chain, value for money and theory of change take precedent in PPP procurements. Participatory M&E should be institutionalized, empowered or facilitated as a holistic umbrella in form of monitoring and evaluation committees, from local administrative units, local governments up to the center to protect government and community interests and needs to prevent opportunism and exploitations by unscrupulous business people. An all round review of KIS ferry service agreement should be carried out urgently to establish what went wrong and subsequently a Value for money audits be executed to prevent further losses by government. In this case the contract should either be re-negotiated or terminated as soon as possible.

The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority, of Uganda, should be advised to revoke the article that provides for restricted bidding or contracting in public private partnerships. This will prevent monopoly by unscrupulous companies and exploitation of citizens and government.

Further this will guarantee quality services. There is urgent need for a government policy concerning marine safety.

Funding should be sought to train all ferry workers and users in marine safety. KIS ferry management should be compelled to provide sanitary facilities and shelter to cater for passengers' convenience, and put measures in place to cater for inclusive and sustainable development.

A feasibility study should be carried out for a purpose of constructing a 5 nautical miles bridge to replace ferries and provide sustainable crossings.

The researcher recommends that another study be done on the antecedents of sustaining PPP agreements in water transport in Uganda and on the implementation of PPP by local financiers other than government. Another study should be carried out on the effect of M&E information management systems on the sustainability of Public private partnerships in road transport sector in Kalangala.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX (4) KREJCIE AND MORGAN TABLE (1970)

N	S	N	S	N	S	N	S	N	S
10	10	100	80	280	162	800	260	2800	338
15	14	110	86	290	165	850	265	3000	341
20	19	120	92	300	169	900	269	3500	246
25	24	130	97	320	175	950	274	4000	351
30	28	140	103	340	181	1000	278	4500	351
35	32	150	108	360	186	1100	285	5000	357
40	36	160	113	380	181	1200	291	6000	361
45	40	180	118	400	196	1300	297	7000	364
50	44	190	123	420	201	1400	302	8000	367
55	48	200	127	440	205	1500	306	9000	368
60	52	210	132	460	210	1600	310	10000	373
65	56	220	136	480	214	1700	313	15000	375
70	59	230	140	500	217	1800	317	20000	377
75	63	240	144	550	225	1900	320	30000	379
80	66	250	148	600	234	2000	322	40000	380
85	70	260	152	650	242	2200	327	50000	381
90	73	270	155	700	248	2400	331	75000	382
95	76	270	159	750	256	2600	335	100000	384

**N=Population**

**S=Sample size**