The Intercultural Relations as A Main Factor of Intercultural Social Capital for Socio-Economic Development in Multicultural Societies. The Research Example of Trieste, Italy.

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ABSTRACT

The present paper is based on extensive research, titled "Administration of social services in multicultural societies, contemporary approaches of the intercultural relations and intercultural communication: The case of Trieste in Italy". The present study, by exploring the intercultural social capital and intercultural relations within the city, aims to highlight the qualitative characteristics of this social capital and these relations, by assessing and interpreting them. The magnanimous financial crisis, the political parties, the perceptions concerning self-management and the increasing process of globalization have ‘wiped out’ the welfare state and have undermined the entire social welfare system on an international scale, a fact which appoints the social capital and the networks as countervailing entities of major importance, entities that actually support the socio-economic development and social cohesion, as well. Migration, which leads to the formation of cultural minorities, is defined as one of the main culprits of social exclusion at an individual and group level. At a social level, national and cultural differences, which are constantly spiraling, owing to international migration, are recognized as one of the main structural changes taking place not only in the modern societies. The research results showed that the cultural diverse groups get close to each other and form networks based upon their cultural characteristics. Also, it was shown that the intercultural relationships development and encouragement by the local authorities lead to the construction of a strong social capital, which is necessary for the socio-economic development and social cohesion.

Keywords: Intercultural relations, economic crisis, social economy, social enterprises, intercultural social networks, local development.

SOCIAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL, IN THE HORIZON OF GLOBALIZATION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS: THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH

Today's problematic political-economic scene is basically the result of globalization. The perpetual transnational flow of information and commodities is inevitably accompanied by movements of populations, cultural traits and economic exchanges. The tendency to have central control and to eradicate traits and characteristics that populations have is called globalization and while it is seen as positive by some it is considered negative by others, depending on their political convictions or their social level. (Bitsani and Kiriakidis, 2010).

According to Habermas, (2003) globalization is not a final stage but a process. (Habermas, 2003). A process that facilitates, the extent and intensity, of any type of movement, communication or exchange beyond the geographical boundaries of a country.
The most important parameter is unquestionably the fact that economic globalization which is ungovernable, since there seems to be a lack of actual inter-state regulations, since it is argued that any kind of regulations would supposedly undermine balance around the globe. (Kiss and Danis, 2010). Thus, we inevitably come across it in three basic fields of social life (Petrella, 1996).

- In economy and in the rules which regulate production, exchange, the distribution and the consumption of consumer goods and services.
- Politics and terms of centralization and exertion of power and jurisdiction, diplomacy and the use of means of coercion and supervision
- Culture, the diffusion of meanings, convictions, preferences and values, also the production and use of symbols.

However, the coercive dissemination of unequal economies undermines the very existence of sovereign states. On this horizon it is to be expected that the welfare state has come to its end. Large networks of financial markets don’t have the ability to print money indiscriminately. Markets impose a maximum limit regarding the accumulation of national debts. It is now not possible to increase taxes indefinitely. It is no surprise, especially for those who have heard of Milton Friedman, and are familiar with how fit he is that "there is no such thing as a free lunch." (Friedman, 2007).

In the area of development of the society of information, of globalization of the economy and intense competition, depreciation and questioning of traditional structures of social organization and emergence of new subjects of representation of social forces, local societies are developing and becoming important economic entities, places which are characterized by collectivistic identities and political participation, places with intense expression of the problems and challenges that humanity faces. It is a fact that the new 'social' environment is expressed with new concepts, such as social capital, social cohesion, local contracts of employment, that have become part of the new vocabulary of social development.

The rising of unemployment and poverty in Europe resulted, among other things, in the development of new forms of social entrepreneurship and innovation agencies for dealing with social marginalization, as a way of fulfilling new needs, especially in the face of the inability of the states to design effective policies. The prolonged crisis of the Welfare State allowed the rise of a new form of social economy named 'economy of solidarity'. We are talking of a form of social economy which is oriented to these initiations that concern local development, the reintegration of long-term unemployed and dealing with marginalization (Bitsani, 2013; Appiah, 2010).

The social economy or solidarity entrepreneurship, characterized by innovation, expanded to new fields as neighboring services, restructuring of problematic communities, helping the elderly and people with special needs, vocational integration of people with low educational level, and in merchandise, the moral and solidary financing, the environmental management of waste (Kiss and Danis, 2010). Social economy mainly focused in the implementation of the targets of social policy or policy of employment. In most European countries, the distinctiveness in their management, leaded in the creation of an expectation of a higher ability than the state, regarding the provision of services of public benefit in a more effective way (Cominu 2006, 21; D’Acunto 2004: 117).

In this framework it is attempted the interconnection of new measures of social protection with the reintegration in the marketplace, which emphasises the development of human
capital and equal opportunities, and not the safeguarding of passive rights in income reinforcements (Bagnasco et al., 2001).

Also modern society is characterized by a complexity of relationships and a diffusion of power in many centers. For this reason, its function should be based on principles and rules of fairness, which protect on the one hand the respects of the rights and the role of institutions and on the other hand the effectiveness of the actions of the agencies. Nowadays, the co-existence of the state, the private sector and the society of the citizens, creates a new, multilevel and dynamic picture which includes and imposes clear interdependencies (Todorovic and Ma 2008, 21-25). Thus dynamic poles of action are created with complimentary and not necessarily competitive roles which cover the ideological, political, financial and social structure (Moulaert and Ailenei 2005; Sakellaropoulos, et al.,2005). The society of citizens and the non-governmental organizations in general, obviously will not substitute the legitimacy or the dynamics of the market, their actions enrich the social model, reinforce participation in the democracy and create more mechanisms of control of all powers (state, economy, mass media, parties, local authorities etc.).

Such a perspective in effect could mean the development of different structures/services for dealing with several faces of social marginalization or several vulnerable groups and their integration in the level of local communities, in combination with the provision of individualized approach, examination of needs at the local level and the implementation of programs of prevention (Schiuma and Lerro 2008: 130-133).

In the meantime, the high percentages of unemployment, explain the interest of the political and academic community for the social economy, which does not come as an alternative way of production of resources and services but satisfies those needs which are neglected from the central state within the framework of the fiscal crises and restrictions. Fiscal restrictions are very intense in Member–States of the European Union towards their way for their entrance to the Economic and Monetary Union.

It is obvious that the term of social economy as an alternative sector of the economy in periods of socio-economic crises, adopts different practices according to the needs of the specific social reality historically, locally and institutionally. The dynamics of the developmental process depends on other important local factors (local social capital, favorable conditions in peripheral level).

**The Dynamics Of Social Capital For Socio-Economic Development**

The term social capital is commonly used as a meaning interrelated to the community, but it is not just limited there, since it includes as much formal as informal networks and shared values. Woolcock's definition (Woolcock, 1998) maintains that social capital includes all the values and networks that facilitate collective action, pointing out that social capital is an integral part of civil society.

Social capital, according to Bourdieu, is “as the aggregate of actual or potential resources that are connected through the possession of a network of permanent relations of mutual acquaintance and recognition which are more or less institutionalized” (Bourdieu 1985: 248). In other words, the social capital represents the total sum of advantages which are obtained by those belonging to collective networks or groups.(Bitsani,2008;Sakellaropoulos et al., 2005). The total volume of the vehicles linked to the social capital is intrinsic to the extent of network of connections, which is successfully likely to mobilize, the volume of the capital (economic,
political or symbolic) owned by those connected. (Adkins, 2008). According to Bourdieu, the results of the capital are corollary of its unequal distribution. Coleman (1988) thought the social capital to be a definition inherent to social structure, facilitating individual activity and serving a purpose in the social framework.

According to the scholar, the social capital is comprised of overlapping social networks which poses shared values, trust and common decision making criteria. The principle of mutuality is dominant in networks where a high level of social capital is prevalent, which contributes to individual prosperity, given that the participants have easier access to information or other resources, which increase the opportunities for personal fulfillment. Coleman distinguished three parameters of social capital: the trust which is built within the social networks, which ensures that one’s duties and obligations are smoothly fulfilled, the information which is channeled by the social networks and regulatory measures and sanctions which are imposed by the members of the networks, thus dictating specific behaviors. (Adkins, 2008 ; Bitsani, 2013).

Furthermore, he distinguished between the social capital that is formed within the family and that which is formed at a communal level. Participation in the latter has its roots in certain skills which induce collective action and the development of social networks, linking the individual to the group and thus playing a role in his forming of self-perception. According to Coleman’s definition of social capital, these skills constitute a type of capital, a resource that has its own intrinsic worth.

Conventional methods which analyze the reasons of participating or not in matters of public interest, usually focus on members’ demographic features (gender, education, etc.), sometimes overlooking the link which unites those social-economic factors (Pattie et al.,2002). The social capital in Coleman’s view (1988) describes all those mechanisms and procedures intrinsic to cooperation amongst citizens, who mitigate the dilemma of collective action.

According to Putnam (2001), the social capital is the same as social entities and it refers to regulatory measures, social networks, norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise, while they also facilitate action and cooperation in services of public interest ( Putnam, 2001). Putnam also addresses the way in which the particular regulatory measures and social networks evolve, pointing out that the positive influences of social capital increase when in use, and respectively decrease when inert. Social connections weaken, if not nurtured. In addition, regulatory measures depend on frequent qualitative communication amongst members of a group.

According Bitsani (2008; 2013), the power and the dynamic of the social capital is inherently linked to participation in services of public interests. The more heterogeneous the groups in which one belongs to, the more likely it is to result in integrated point of views, attitudes and behaviors, hence development of flexibility.

By comparing Bourdieu's theory to those of Coleman and Putnam, it is evident that Bourdieu's theory is more precise in its description of the dimension of social capital, while the other definitions are over-generalized, involving all kinds of interaction.

Moreover, Bourdieu places emphasis on social stratification, the caste, hierarchy and inequality. As opposed to Putnam who perceives the definition of social capital through horizontal networks. Emphasis is put on access of social networks while the exclusion from them constitutes the downside of the social capital. It should be noted that social capital has a
specific symbolic quality; it constitutes potential benefit, not just an actual benefit. Bourdieu considers long-term investment in resilient networks beneficial, in comparison to those connections which are weak and flexible.

His approach is closer connected to macro sociology rather than micro-sociology. There is common ground that in most definitions of the social capital (Loury, 1992; Bourdieu 2008) it is presented as a structural characteristic of society which is not dependent on individual activity, contrary to the meanings of social networks and social support, that refer to individual activities. Its results strengthen social coherence (and control), the conveyance of value systems and social interaction beyond a family framework. Woodlock (2011) maintains that social capital is a common feature in social structures and institutions; also that it includes meanings such as mutuality, participation and trust. Its purpose is the promotion of society and general well-being.

The power of the social capital, according to Sammut (2011) is associated to the number of benefits that will ensue from it and the degree of risk that an individual or group is willing to take. An important factor in social conciliation is trust, given that its nature is sometimes informal, there is a possibility that the members of a group might not fulfill their obligations (Makrydemetris; 2002).

The dynamic and the power of social networks ensures members’ compliance by making them feel fear for sanctions and marginalization. (Makrydemetris, 2002). However, Sakellaropoulos (2003) believe that fear of rejection is not adequate enough to support the agreements made by the members of a group. It is the internalization of the values that exist within a group that will ensure its coherence.

Common denominators in all definitions, which have been expressed from time to time, are: “connectivity”, which refers to the bonds of the local social capital that has a widespread governmental, agricultural financial and political structure (vertical connectivity) plus, the integrated regional resources and subsystems (horizontal connectivity) which ensure unhindered management of these resources (Granovetter, 2005; Warner, 1999, 2001). On an individual level, the expansion of personal networks is reinforced by interaction through work and school of labor, while on a community level it is consolidated through political and cultural activities.

it also is a byproduct of religion, tradition, shared historical experience and other types of cultural norms. Thus, while awareness of social capital is often critical for understanding development, it is difficult to generate through public policy. (Muller, and Ellison, 2001) and Three key factors: autonomy, linkage and returns on investment for both intermediaries and participating residents, are shown to affect social capital construction. (Warner, 1999).

THE INTERCULTURAL CONDITION OF MODERN SOCIETIES THE PROFILE OF THE MULTICULTURAL MINORITIES AT TRIESTE-DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH FIELD.

This place is subjective, mysterious and elusive; it always gives one a sense of something that’s lost. Trieste… its name reveals its magnetism, the blurred melancholy that it hides. Trieste as a dream city, as a mythic harbor in the Mediterranean, is a place that inspired writers like James Joyce, Italo Svevo, the poet Saba Umberto, the English novelist Robert Hichens, Paul Theroux, and so many others (Bitsani, 2008).
“There are people all around the world who constitute the Fourth World, their own diasporas. If you end up meeting them, these people will not end up tricking you or embittering you, because they are not interested either in your race or your religion. They are neither interested in your gender or your nationality. The obtuse they tolerate, though not whole-heartedly, but with compassion. They laugh easily. They don't find it hard to feel grateful. They are never small-minded and pusillanimous.

They are not inhibited by fashion, public opinion or what is considered politically correct. They are banished in their own community; they always belong to a minority, but it is a powerful nation, and it is a shame that they don’t know it. It is the nation of no-where and I have ended up believing that it is natural that Trieste is its capital,” cites Jan Morris the English novelist in her work titled ‘Eternal city, Trieste and the Meaning of Nowhere.’(Morris, 2009 ; Horgan, 2012, Bitsani 2013).

Trieste lies between Eastern Italy, Austria and Slovenia and Croatia (Northern ex- Yugoslavia), in the heart of Venezia Golia, region of Noerd-East Italy. Trieste is the city where multilingualism and multiculturalism is the rule, the mixed marriages the common solution and quite obvious the tolerance (with some exceptions in regard to the Slovenian issue) towards the different culture. Trieste was and is rich in contrasts which could not be dissolved. It does not have a central base neither a unitary system of values. Since it has become a free port, Trieste owes an important part of its affluence to the interest shown by the state to the development of the city and the boost which was given to it from the affluence of Trieste. (Bitsani,2008; Bitsani and Kavoura,2011).

The migration phenomenon and the formation of intercultural social and economic relations emerged in Italy in the 19th century and its practical and social implications can be seen in the 21st century (Bitsani, 2008 ; Bitsani and Kavoura, 2011). Nowadays, to these different culturally groups in regard to their ancestry, Muslims have also been added based on the contemporary migration phenomena that Europe is facing. The distinction between Muslim and Christian minorities in their sociological features as two different status groups implies different communal identities. It is natural that members of each community harbor a feeling of solidarity that generates certain commitments towards their community (Bitsani, 2008;2013).

This triggers cultural consciousness or identity that becomes an orientation or a frame of reference through which each community interacts and perceives others. Consequently, the social distance from other multicultural groups will be determined by the nature of the relationships they build and particular attitudes they display towards others. Trieste, Italy is a typical recourse for other areas of the Mediterranean where cultures and identities intermingle nowadays and migration and policy directions need to be implemented (Bitsani,2002 ; Bitsani, 2008).

**RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

**The Intercultural Approach :Research within the minority groups (focus group)**

Cultures and the intercultural in this sense need to have reference to a historical process. It is necessary to emphasise the necessity of the historical investigation, which will lead us to the understanding of the procedures of the creation of cultural characteristics, the understanding of geohistoric and geopolitical creation, through the interactions which come from big historic cultural tides (Abdallah-Pretceille, 1986 ; Azzi, Chryssoschoou, Klandermans, and Simon, 2011 ; Bitsani, 2013 :19). Although the countries’ cultures nowadays, are unique due to the multiple
unique historic developments, it is necessary to refer to the historic framework of every social organisation.

Intercultural approach is in contrast to the objectivistic and structuralistic approach since it puts emphasis on the production of culture through the same subject, for the strategies which are developed without the subject always to have awareness for that.

According to the phenomenological approach, on which intercultural depends, culture is not a social reality per se which we may understand in an objective way, it is a way of life which we aim to rebuild its concept. We do not refer to the subject as a unit; on the contrary we refer to the interrelational which is associated with the dialectic identity / otherness (D'Angelo, 2002). We do not ignore the influences of the environment and the forms, but cultures exist only when they are treated from the active people who provide them with life and they may also transform them (Bitsani 2013). By focusing on the subject we do not aim to put emphasis on the individualistic theories but to consider the network of the subjectivities within which it is included. The concept of interaction is considered to be important for the specification of culture and cultural identity (Bitsani 2013 ; 19-20).

It is a technique that seeks information from some people related to the study under social space, and they know this area very well. This technique is particularly useful in the context of this research, firstly, we seek evidence about events that happened in the past on the other hand, it highlights the experiential dimension of intercultural approach. Interviews took place with informants (group study), who have direct involvement with the Greek community of Trieste and the Muslim community as well as with representatives of parties related to the research topics and the Slavic communities (Serb community and Istria) (Bitsani 2013 :20).

Four major steps were followed in this empirical study: (1) preparing the questionnaire (2) sampling technique (3) administering the questionnaire by field workers (4) analyzing data on the computer. The questionnaire included questions about Muslims’ and Christians' intercultural relationships with the adjacent cultural majority. A survey type questionnaire covered half of both groups' families -the total number of Christian and Muslim families reached 560 families and the sample consisted of 150 Christian Orthodox families and 130 Muslim families-. The number of Christian Orthodox families is nearly 300 and Muslim families in Trieste around 260. The survey covered half of both families as the total number of Christian and Muslim families reached 560 families.

It should be noted that in both groups the identitarian dimension of religion is closely linked with that of the national origin. In regard to the Orthodox Christians this is almost identical, particularly in the Serb Orthodox Christians which is about the same level, to the Greek Orthodox Christians these two identitarian dimensions are identical. At other times, a predominant ethnicity appears in modern States, other times this is strictly identical. With regard to Muslims, the dimension of their identity that predominates and unites them eliminating their constituent ethnic peculiarities is that of religion.

To make this sample adequately representative we followed two steps. First, we asked the officials in charge at the mayor’s house to provide us with unofficial lists of residents. This measure was central because the official lists included only those whose origin is in these areas, while the unofficial ones included those who are residents of these areas. Therefore, the sample consisted of the residents of the Christian orth. in Trieste and Muslim residents in Trieste. The second step was selecting the respondents from the available lists. A total of 150
Christian Orthodox families and 130 Muslim families in Trieste were selected after examining these lists with the headmen of the social service. The respondents of the whole sample were selected from different geographical locations, different occupations, different levels of income, and different educational levels. So the criteria were:

- The geographical location
- The occupation
- The level of income
- The educational level

To be able to find respondents at home and not at work, Sunday was the day chosen for fieldwork. Every Sunday was a day of fieldwork for each social group. We have visited the already selected families and interviewed the head of the family or any other available adult in the house. Questions were addressed to Muslims and Christians orthodox as two different cultural minority social groups irrespective of sectarian subdivisions within each group. The data obtained from the field work concern two different cultural communities, namely, the Muslims of Trieste and the Christian Orthodox of Trieste. The overall percentage of Muslims was 54.76 per cent and Christians orthodox 45.24 per cent of the sample. For the convenience of the research, Orthodox Christians will be called simply Christians. (Bitsani, 2013 : 21-22).

**RESULTS**

Mapping And Analysing The Intercultural Relations, As The Main Factor Of The Trieste’ Intercultural Social Capital

Since inter-cultural relationships reveal major aspects of the social life of Muslims and Christians, it is pertinent to assess the nature of these relationships. This part studies the inter-cultural relationships of each minority vis-a-vis the cultural majority of the adjacent social milieu. (Bitsani, 2008). The empirical data collected in this study probe seven features of these inter-cultural relationships, and they are:

- The nature of inter-cultural relationships with the adjacent social milieu;
- The impediments to excellent inter-cultural relationships;
- Reasons for settlement in the quarter;
- Relocation to the adjacent quarters;
- Inter-cultural family education;
- Choice of the school;
- Economic life.

**Nature of Inter-Cultural Relationships**

The respondents in each minority described the relationships with the adjacent social milieu as good, formal, reserved or no relationship. Table (3) shows that Muslims and Christians have different perceptions of the nature of these relationships. Christians seem to hold a more positive perception of their relations with the adjacent social milieu than Muslims.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of relationship</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslims N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Christians N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>63 57.27</td>
<td>110 83.97</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>71.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>17 15.45</td>
<td>3 2.29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td>28 25.45</td>
<td>16 12.21</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No relationship</td>
<td>2 1.82</td>
<td>2 1.53</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>140 100.00</td>
<td>131 100.00</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A percentage of 83.96 per cent of Christians considered it good compared to 57.27 per cent of Muslims. Conversely, while 40.90 per cent of Muslims considered the relationship formal and reserved, only 14.50 per cent of Christians considered it as such. Thus, the description reported by Muslims signal an implicit inclination of culturalism compared to Christians who are more satisfied with these relations.

**Impediments to Excellent Relationships with the adjacent social milieu**

As to the impediments to have excellent relationships with the adjacent social milieu, respondents were asked to specify the factors that might obstruct these excellent relationships. More Muslims related these impediments to differences in traditions and confessions than Christians.

It is worth noting that the distinction between «traditions» and «confessions» was not clearly denoted to the respondents. As a matter of fact, the term «tradition» implied, as we shall see in part three, religious traditions rather than cultural traditions in the broad sense of the term. This entails that confessions coincides with traditions to the respondents. Accordingly, if we combine the percentages of impediments related to confessions and traditions, the overall percentage becomes 60.91 per cent for Muslims and 38.93 per cent for Christians.

By contrast, Christians were more likely to relate these impediments to social, political and economic factors. Standards of living was an impediment to 15.27 per cent for Christians compared to 6.36 per cent for Muslims. Political factors were an impediment for 2.29 per cent of Christians versus none of Muslims. Therefore, Muslims who tend to have more formal and reserved attitudes and more cultural interpretations for the impediments are more predisposed to have a cultural inclination than Christians.

**Reasons for settlement in the quarter**

Settlement in the quarter took place for different reasons specified by the respondents. Most reported reasons stated in were not related to cultural factors. The only reason directly related to culture was the «feeling of security among co-religionists». Table (2) shows that this reason was more compelling to Muslims than it was to Christians. A percentage of 10 per cent of Muslims specified this reason compared to only 4.58 per cent of Christians.

On the other hand reasons that are not directly related to culture were more important to Christians. We find that financial reasons were compelling to 6.87 per cent of Christians versus 2.73 per cent of Muslims. Other non-cultural reasons like availability of the house and convenience of the social environment were not a reason for settlement to Muslims but were necessary to 4.58 per cent and 3.82 per cent of Christians respectively.

Accordingly, given the cultural and non-cultural reasons for settlement specified by Muslims and Christians, it is noticed that Muslims were more motivated by cultural reasons to settle in the quarter than Christians who settled for non-cultural reasons. Thus, the tendency to settle for confession-related factors is stronger with Muslims compared to Christians.

**Relocation to the adjacent quarter**

Another feature of inter-cultural relationships of both minorities revealed the attitudes of Muslims and Christians towards the adjacent social milieu. Respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree to relocate or live in the quarters of the adjacent social milieu. Those who agree were, then, asked to specify their incentives for relocation, and those who have
conditional agreement stated their conditions, and finally, those who disagree gave their reasons for that.

The total of 123 respondents who agree to relocate specified their incentives for relocation. Table (4) shows that the only incentive that is confession-related was «willingness to co-exist with other confessions». Christians are more willing to co-exist with other cultural groups than Muslims. A portion of 18.06 per cent of Christians are ready to co-exist compared to 13.73 per cent of Muslims. Thus, among the different incentives specified by those who agree to relocate, Muslims were less willing to co-exist with other cultural groups than Christians. Muslims, therefore, are more culturally oriented in their willingness to relocate to the adjacent quarter of the social milieu compared to Christians.

Table 2: Incentives for Accepting to Relocate to the Adjacent Quarter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incentives to relocate</th>
<th>Community</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to coexist with other confessions</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13.73</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better social conditions</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31.37</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in life style</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfaction with current social relationships</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>47.06</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>56.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
<td>52.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another total of 21 respondents in both communities formed those who conditionally agree to relocate to the adjacent quarters in the social milieu. Table (3) shows that one of the conditions reported by the respondents was overtly related to cultural attitude and it is the «residence of co-religionists». None of the Christians considered this a necessary condition for relocation while 22.22 per cent of the Muslims believed it was necessary. Thus, Muslims express a preference to live in a locality that has a majority of people from their own cultural group, while Muslim do not seem to have the same concern.

Table 3: Specifications of Conditions for Accepting to Relocate to the Adjacent Quarter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions to relocate</th>
<th>Community</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23.81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslims</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Christians</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14.29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslims</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14.29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslims</td>
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<td>22.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Christians</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100.00</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

A final total of 97 respondents in both communities who decline or disagree to relocate to the adjacent quarter of the social milieu reported their reasons for that. Table (4) shows that the confession-related reasons are more important to Muslims than to Christians. A percentage of 22 per cent of Muslims believe that feeling secure among coreligionists is a reason compared to 14.89 per cent of Christians. Interestingly, 10 per cent of Muslims prefer to live with co-religionists compared to 2.13 per cent of Christians. Feeling unable to coexist with different confessions was an important reason to 14 per cent of Muslims compared to 6.38 per cent of Christians.
It is, in a way, revealing that concerning attitudes that reflect a cultural inclination, Muslims seem to be less willing to coexist and associate with other cultural groups than Christians who revealed different inclination. Muslims, more than Christians, harbour a feeling of security among their co-religionists and express a preference for living amongst them (Bitsani, 2008).

### Table 4: Reasons for Declining to Relocate to the Adjacent Quarter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslims in Jbail-Amchit</td>
<td>Christians in Tyre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with current social relationships</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with the house</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness to work</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling of security among coreligionists</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference to live with co-religionists</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inability to coexist with different confessions</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Family Education

Starting from the assumption that cultural attitudes are primarily influenced by family education, respondents were asked to which extent they encourage inter-cultural interaction in raising their children. Muslims hold a more persistent reserved attitude in this respect than Christians. A significant percentage of 83.21 per cent of Christians encourage inter-cultural interaction, while only 45.45 per cent of Muslims do. Conversely, Muslims who do not encourage this kind of interaction in raising their children ranked higher (47.27%) than Christians (10.69%). Therefore, Muslims are more culturally oriented in their family education outlooks, while Christians welcome more inter-cultural interaction in the socialization of their children.

### Choice of the School

The types of school are private (belong to the minorites and public. Some private schools are affiliated to certain confessions. In most cases the cultural dimension is a vital determinant of choosing a school for families. Accordingly, the choice of school has become a key indicator of cultural attitudes. It is relevant to investigate the percentages of Muslims and Christians in terms of type of school they choose for their children.

If we compare the percentages of Christians and Muslims who send their children to public schools, we notice a substantial difference between both. Only 6.14 per cent of the Muslims prefer public schools while 44.91 per cent of the Christians do. Private schools, whether profitable or non-profitable, are more favoured by Muslims than Christians. These two types of private schools constitute one category of schools because both are owned and managed by cultural groups. Hence, their mission is to transmit the religious and socio-cultural heritage of particular cultural groupings. The overall percentages of these private schools comprises a much wider population of Muslims than Christians. Nearly, an overall percentage of 93.86 per cent of Muslims send their children to these private schools compared to 55.09 per cent of Christians. It should, also, be noted that the private school in the Christian community belong to the church.

Therefore, schooling in both communities has demonstrated that factors related to confession, kinship and communal solidarity play a vital role in the choices of Muslims more than Christians, who tend to take into consideration other factors. This clearly shows that Muslims
display a deeper sense of cultural cohesiveness compared to a looser sense of cultural communality of Christians. (Bitsani, 2008).

**Economic life**

Two variables in the economic life of both communities were selected to examine inter-cultural relationships. These two variables were the location of the workplace of the father and the cultural affiliation of both business partners and employees. Respondents were asked whether they work inside or outside the quarter of their community. More Muslims work inside their quarters compared to Christians. Conversely, more Christians work outside their quarters. A portion of 37.27 per cent of Christian fathers work inside the quarter versus only 8.40 per cent of Christians. A higher percentage of Muslim fathers (66.41%) work outside their quarters compared to Muslims (36.36%).

The cultural affiliation of business partners indicates the kind of inter-cultural interaction and attitudes. As we have seen, business partnership was very low in both communities. More Muslims (4.55 %) than Christians (1.53 %) deal with business partners who belong to the same confession. While very few Christians (0.76%) have business partners affiliated to different confession, none of the Muslims do. Thus, Muslims tend more to accentuate the cultural element in their business partnership than Christians.

Also the multi-cultural affiliation of wage labour differs in both communities. Christians bypass Muslims in hiring wage labour from different confessions. The percentage of multi-cultural affiliation of Muslim wage labour is 45.04 per cent compared to only 17.2 per cent among Muslims. Likewise, a higher percentage of wage labour affiliated to the same confession (4.55%) is hired by Muslims compared to a lower percentage of 2.29 per cent among Christians. Hence, Muslim's display more cultural attitudes in hiring wage labour compared to Christians.

Therefore, following both variables in the economic life of both communities, it is demonstrated that Muslims whose workplace is centred inside the quarters are more prone to have business partnership and hire wage labour from the same confession compared to Christians who are more inclined to work outside their quarters and have business partnership and wage labour from different confessions. This difference in economic life in both communities reveals that Muslims display a stronger sense of communality compared to the more tenuous sense of communality of Christians. (Woodlock, 2011; Bitsani 2008; Bitsani, 2013).

**The necessity of cooperation and social entrepreneurship for social cohesion and local development**

Respondents were asked whether or not they cooperate with other confessions in local development policies. Table (5) shows that Christians more than Muslims cooperate with other confessions. The percentage of Christians who cooperate is 48.85 per cent compared to 38.18 per cent of Muslims. Conversely, Christians who do not cooperate make up a percentage of 51.14 per cent compared to a higher percentage of 61.81 per cent of Muslims. These percentages signify that Muslims are more reserved concerning inter-cultural relationships compared to Christians who are more open to inter-cultural relations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5: Inter-cultural Cooperation in Local Development Policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inter-cultural Cooperation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not cooperate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is important to note that despite the differences between both, yet more than half of the respondents in both communities reported that cooperation does not exist. The percentage of Christians who reported that there is no cooperation is 51.14 percent and Muslims 61.81 percent. What does this signify? It shows that both communities are interested in their immediate and narrow cultural concerns rather than in the local community as supra-cultural community. They focus on their own cultural groupings more than on permanent supra-cultural structures that carry out development policies. This, also, indicates a sense of alienation from the larger social entities that transcend restricted cultural affairs. (Bitsani, 2013).

Evidently, this lack of cooperation does not strengthen national integration. Building a nation requires integrating people into a hierarchy of structures that carry out policies ensuring the welfare of the local non-cultural community as a whole. People should integrate into these hierarchical structures starting from the local community as a regional entity reaching up the state. Only by the active participation of people across all levels of these hierarchical structures can integration take place. Such integration creates a feeling of integration into development policies at the local, regional and national level. It, also, inculcates a sense of national identity by linking the local with the national. This can be realized through genuine and smooth cooperation of people from different cultural backgrounds.

Cooperation within the framework of a network has proven to be more expeditious and effective, since the achievement of aims and goals is materialized easier, in comparison to what each member of a group would be able to achieve if they were to act independently (Woodlock, 2011).

**CONCLUSIONS**

The crisis and the subsequent social and economic implications gradually promote new forms of co-existence, participation and cooperation, standardizing meanings such as solidarity and self-organization as informal mechanisms that shall ensure immediate needs. The necessity to construct relations and structures based on social solidarity, in times of prolonged economic recession and declining welfare systems, is evinced in the significant widespread initiatives that have been taken, and the broad network of social services provided (Sakellaropoulos, 2012; Bitsani, 2013).

In conclusion, inter-cultural relationships have shown two different cultural orientations of Muslims and Christians. This divergence expressed itself in the way both communities perceive the nature of inter-cultural relationships, in the impediments to excellent relations, the reasons for settlement in the quarter, the willingness to relocate to the adjacent social milieu, family education, schooling and economic life. These indicators of inter-cultural relationships show that Muslims tend to have more cultural attitudes and communal solidarity than Christians who have a milder cultural attitude and a more tenuous sense of communal solidarity. Christians and the basic elements (religion, origin) of their identity are much more closer in the majority, are more secure in their social milieu and, hence, exhibit an attenuated sense of cultural solidarity and identity. Moreover, much of the literature about Muslims in Europe and all over the world, and their economic, political and cultural endeavour and urge to achieve reflect their sense of cultural insecurity and anxiety in a milieu of Muslim majority (Woodlock, 2011; Bitsani, 2008; 2013).

Regarding Bitsani’s research (2008), historic tradition that interculturalism characterizes Trieste enabling the dynamic coexistence and the interaction with parity between different communities not only created the particular identity of the city but built and a strong
intercultural social capital. This intercultural social capital is created by developing and encouraging the intercultural relationship of its residents. This allows the identification of "foreign" to finally gain a sense of "belonging" and tolerance and acceptance by the indigenous people, creating dynamic synergies with multiplying results for the benefit of all. (Woolcock, 1998; Woodlock, 2011; Gubbins, and Garavan, 2009).

In this framework, it is obvious the need of development of intercultural policies and social economy strategies in the local level. This need is based on a) the lack of trust and cooperation between the examined cultural diverse groups and the public sector and b) the gap of a spirit of cooperation that exists among the multicultural groups and between them and the public authorities, as it was verified by the data of the research.

According Woolcock and Narayan (2000:18), it is critical to invest in the organizational capacity of the poor, and support the building of “bridges” across communities and social groups. The latter is particularly important, since many decisions affecting the poor are not made at the local level. To this end, the use of participatory processes can facilitate consensus-building and social interaction among stakeholders with diverse interests and resources. Finding ways and means by which to transcend social divides so as to build social cohesion and trust is crucial for economic development. Also the flexibility of social networks that ensures greater access to the labour market.

Overall, it is within this framework of today’s economic crisis in our informational society, our world of economic globalization with its intense competition, its depreciation and disputation of traditional social structures and organization, in which the modern societies are developing and becoming important economic entities. They are places which are characterized by strong social networks and social capital, by collectivist identities and political participation, places, which intensely express the problems and challenges that humanity faces.

In addition, all the above factors increase the possibilities of social inclusion of the cultural diverse groups and minorities, directly affect the competition levels of a region and mainly support the society’s cohesion, especially in the framework of crisis and local development dynamics. Social entrepreneurship, however, can become the onset of the developmental process (Ferri et al., 2009, 147-151; Dempsey et al., 2009).

References


Bitsani, E. (2013). Intercultural city identity” and “human intercultural cities” (h.i.c) a dynamic ontological model for the social co-existence and social cohesion of modern and post-modern cities. N.Y,USA. Nova (in press).


